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Three independent studies drawing on the cases from different spaces and times 
comprise this research project, but they share a common theme: how do expansive reforms that 
open up paths to political participation take place?  
The first paper takes up the case of the motor voter reform, which allows people to 
register to vote at driver’s license offices. The reform was widely legislated by U.S. states before 
the passage of the National Voter Registration Act in 1993. The paper investigates the factors that 
helped promote the reform at the state level by breaking down the reforms along two 
dimensions: the voter registration location and the implementation method. Motor voter 
legislation could either stand alone or be accompanied by agency-based registration (ABR), 
which includes registration at social service public agencies that primarily serve the poor. A 
reform could be implemented in an active or passive way. While ABR and active implementation 
had the potential to mobilize previously alienated socioeconomic groups, motor voter reform 
itself and passive implementation were expected to have a partisan-neutral and limited impact, 
respectively. Using data collected from the archived materials of the leading advocacy 
organization of the reform, Human SERVE, I test the following three general hypotheses 
statistically: 1) the Democratic Party is interested in mobilizing the poor, 2) electoral competition 
enhances mobilization efforts by parties, and 3) liberal political culture promotes inclusive 
electoral institutions. All three hypotheses find some support in the empirical analysis.  
 The second paper focuses on a candidate selection method reform in contemporary 
Japan. Throughout the first decade of the twenty first century, the (then) opposition Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) used kōbo, an open-recruitment candidate selection method, which was 
purported to open up the party nomination to non-traditional outsider aspirants. The DPJ's action 
presented a puzzle: searching for low-electability amateur candidates instead of traditional 
quality candidates seemed paradoxical for a party preparing to take over power. The paper 
reveals that using kōbo was a transitional strategy for a young party building itself under the 
mixed-member majoritarian system. I argue that recruiting “fresh faces” was not what really 
motivated the use of kōbo, by showing how kōbo increasingly produced insider candidates over 
time. 
The third paper investigates the development of direct primary in nineteenth century 
Pennsylvania. The historical origins of the U.S. primaries have mostly been discussed in terms of 
statewide legislations around the Progressive Era, which made the primaries mandatory for the 
two major parties. This paper focuses instead on the voluntary adoption phase that took place 
under the party by-laws, paying special attention to the case of Pennsylvania after 1842. I argue 
that the party elites of county organizations initiated the introduction of the primaries in order to 
prevent defection and to preserve party unity. As the vote share of a party increased, the party 
nomination became more valuable, and more people competed for nomination. More disgruntled 
nomination losers would run as independents, hurting the electoral prospects of a given party in 
the general election. For party leaders, whose overwhelming concern was the maintenance of 
party unity, the direct primary system offered a solution by presenting the primary winner as a 
focal candidate to the party voters. The primaries made it harder for losers to defect later, with 
the transparent features of their procedures. Thus, the stronger the party, the more likely it was to 
adopt the direct primary. The paper tests this hypothesis empirically with an original data set 
built from hundreds of archived local newspapers. To my knowledge, this is the first study on 
nineteenth century county-level party activities to use comprehensive data covering most 
counties from a single state. The findings have broader implications as to how party competition 
affects the choice of candidate selection methods, and the role which competition among elites 
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Three independent studies drawing on the cases from different spaces and times 
comprise this research project, but they share a common theme: how do expansive reforms that 
open up paths to political participation take place? In order to address this question, the papers 
look at two types of political institutions: voter registration and candidate selection methods used 
by political parties. The first paper focuses on the former, while the second and the third papers 
focus on the latter. 
Studying voter registration reforms in the expansive direction among the U.S. states 
helps us investigate when and under what conditions a de facto expansion of franchise was more 
likely to materialize under formal universal suffrage. The paper in this research project draws on 
the case of motor voter registration reforms that took place among U.S. states between 1975 and 
1992.  
Studying expansive reforms of the candidate selection method used by political parties 
allows us to investigate when and under what conditions party elites give up their control over 
candidate nomination. Political parties are essential vehicles of political representation in a 
liberal democracy, and the nature and the degree of intra-party democracy define the quality of 




understand the factors that affect and change the internal management of political parties. 
The two papers in this research project pick up two cases at the opposite ends of the 
intra-party democracy scale with respect to candidate selection: Japan and the United States. 
Most of the contemporary Japanese political parties have used and still use very closed, 
underinstitutionalized candidate selection rules. The paper focuses on the new selection method, 
kōbo, which was adopted by the then-opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan, during the 
first decade of the twenty first century and investigates the motivation behind the reform and 
how the system worked. The other paper on candidate selection reform attempts to shed new 
light on the understanding of the historical origins of the U.S. primaries, which is widely 
considered to be the most democratic form of candidate selection. Following are the focuses and 
findings of the three papers. 
The first paper focuses on the motor voter registration reform in U.S. states between 
1975 and 1992, and tests three hypotheses: (a) the Democratic Party is interested in mobilizing 
the poor; (b) electoral competition enhances mobilization efforts by political parties through 
expansive electoral reforms; and (c) liberal political culture promotes inclusive electoral 
institutions. The statistical analysis uses a data set that was newly built by the author for this 
study from the archived records of a prominent advocacy organization. The results provide some 




The second paper investigates the motivation behind the candidate selection reform 
experimented by the Democratic Party of Japan between 2000 and 2009. By using the original 
data set constructed for this study and drawing on the extensive interviews with the party 
officials and elected politicians, the paper reveals that the supposedly innovative kōbo, an open 
recruitment system, produced increasingly more traditional insider candidates over time, and the 
reform was never meant to be a step toward intra-party democratization. The paper concludes 
that the DPJ kōbo should be interpreted as a strategy adopted by a young party during the time of 
party-building. 
The third paper investigates the historical origins of the U.S. primaries by going back to 
the nineteenth-century practices by county party organizations in Pennsylvania. Based on the 
original data set and case studies gathered through extensive archival work on local newspapers, 
the paper illuminates how activities by county parties in the nineteenth century were managed 
and how the trials and errors by these county parties led to an invention of different candidate 
selection methods. The case studies and the statistical analysis find that the party elites adopted 
the direct primary in order to maintain party unity. More specifically, the direct primary was 
expected to solve the coordination problem among party voters by finding the focal candidate 
behind whom they should rally, and thus to prevent defection by nomination losers or electoral 








1. Partisan Conflict, Electoral Competition, and Ideology: Motor Voter Reform in the 




The motor voter registration system, which allows people to register to vote at driver’s 
license offices when applying for a license, is one of the major instances of reform that have 
relaxed electoral regulations by simplifying voter registration in the United States. Although it is 
best known by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) of 1993, which imposed mandatory 
implementation in all U.S. states, its gradual and voluntary adoption by many states from 1975 to 
1992 played a crucial role in building momentum for the federal legislation. A significant force 
behind this long-term development was a persistent effort made by the leading advocacy group, 
Human SERVE, to promote the reform at the state, county, and city levels. Because expansive 
reform in voter registration has been, in general, considered to increase registration of the lower 
socioeconomic strata and those more likely to vote Democratic, they were often considered to 
benefit the Democratic Party more than the Republican Party. Motor voter reform was unique in 
this sense, because it was considered partisan-neutral in terms of the composition of the groups 




activists often criticized the Republicans for their blunt resistance, while also blaming the 
reluctant incumbents across the partisan line for their negligence.  
In order to determine what really helped or hindered the prospects of reform, it is 
important to differentiate among the state-level motor voter legislation based on two key 
elements: the new location offered for voter registration, and the way in which it was 
implemented. In regard to the registration location, whether the motor voter was accompanied by 
agency-based registration (ABR) was expected to make a critical difference in who might 
potentially benefit from the change. While the motor voter was considered to have a limited 
effect on changing the composition of the electorate, ABR, which typically included voter 
registration at welfare agencies, was expected to register and mobilize formerly politically 
alienated people from relatively disadvantaged socioeconomic groups. The latter would have 
expanded the constituency by changing its composition qualitatively, which in turn would have 
had some partisan (i.e., pro-Democratic) consequences. Therefore, the addition of ABR turned 
otherwise popular motor voter reform into a controversial bill. The second element was the 
implementation phase, which determined the actual effects of the reform. If the reform had been 
followed by active implementation, it would have had a substantive impact by registering more 
voters. If it had been implemented in a passive way, the reform could have had limited to no real 




followed by active implementation, but the outcome of legislative battles was often 
disappointing for them. Treating all the motor voter legislation as a single type of event masks 
what took place in the real political battlefields.  
Using the two forms of classification of motor voter legislation, instead, allows us to test 
some general hypotheses beyond the realm of voter registration. Drawing on state-level motor 
voter reform examples, I test the following three hypotheses: 1) the Democratic Party is 
interested in mobilizing the poor; 2) competitive elections motivate parties to mobilize new 
constituencies; and 3) liberal political culture promotes institutional designs under which the 
government actively assists political participation. The original data set built from the Human 
SERVE archives enables the statistical testing of these hypotheses. First, I address motor voter 
reform in the context of studies of state policy diffusion and discuss my hypotheses in detail. 
Next, I explain the role Human SERVE played in the reform processes, how I collected the data, 
and why the subcategories of motor voter reform are important. I will then discuss the variables I 
used in the statistical analysis along with the empirical results. A brief conclusion follows. 
 
1.2. Motor Voter and State Policy Reform 
One of the enduring problems of American elections is low voter turnout. Numerous 




before Election Day and inconveniently short operating hours for registration offices, have been 
criticized for the burden they impose on potential voters and blamed for suppressing turnout.1 
Although later studies suggest that voter registration and actual turnout on Election Day may not 
be connected as tightly as previously assumed (Timpone 1998), and expansive and suppressive 
electoral regulations had asymmetrical impacts depending on regional historical contexts 
(Springer 2012), various kinds of institutional reform to lower the hurdle for voter registration 
were proposed by both activists and scholars in the past, especially in the 1980s. The recent 
controversies prior to the 2012 elections over the adoption of increasingly restrictive voter ID 
laws in many states remind us that voter registration is still a hotly contested political issue in the 
United States.  
Among all the proposed electoral reform, the NVRA of 1993 was one of the most 
significant achievements of reform advocates.2 The Act requires states to offer voter registration 
at driver’s license offices; welfare, food stamps, Medicaid, and WIC (Women, Infants, and 
Children) offices; and disability agencies. It requires each state “to establish Federal election 
voter registration procedures by: 1) application made simultaneously with a driver's license 
                                                  
1 Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), Teixeira (1992), Mitchell and Wlezien (1995), and Highton (1997) all 
suggest that a more relaxed registration system would increase registration and turnout rates. 




application; 2) mail; and 3) application in person at a designated Federal, State, or 
nongovernmental office, or at the applicant’s residential registration site in accordance with State 
law.”3 This study attempts to make a unique contribution to the study of state policy innovation, 
specifically in the field of electoral regulations, by focusing not only on the first feature of the 
NVRA, the motor voter program, but also on the third element, agency-based registration 
(ABR).  
The motor voter program was voluntarily adopted in many states long before the passage 
of the NVRA, starting with the earliest case in Michigan in 1975. Allowing voter registration at 
driver’s license offices provided convenience for potential voters by reducing the cost for 
registration. The reform was expected, at least by its advocates, to boost registration and, in turn, 
turnout on Election Day. However, research findings, conducted before and after the NVRA, on 
the effects of motor voter reform on registration and turnout rates have been mixed (e.g., Knack 
1995, 1999; Rhine 1996; Martinez and Hill 1999).  
Notwithstanding the attention paid to their impact, one under-studied aspect of these 
instances of electoral reform is the background to their adoption.4 Although policy diffusion 
                                                  
3 Congressional Research Service summary of PL 103-31 as of 4/28/1993 (Conference report filed in the 
House of Representatives). 





among the U.S. states in terms of substantive policies, such as those pertaining to redistribution 
or morale issues, has been studied increasingly over time (Medoff et al. 2011), the study of the 
introduction of electoral reform, expansive or restrictive, has been relatively scarce. Notable 
exceptions are women’s franchise (Munshi 2010) and ex-felon disenfranchisement (Behrens et al. 
2003). This paper attempts to build on and contribute to the existing study of electoral policy 
diffusion, through the example of motor voter reform. 
The historical expansion of franchise around the world has been explained from diverse 
perspectives, including arguments centering on the threat of revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2000), the necessity to mobilize for wars (Ticchi and Vindigni 2008), and the voluntary choice 
on the side of elites based on cost-benefit analysis (Lizzeri and Persico 2004). In the United 
States, party competition has often been cited as a major driving force behind the rapid 
expansion of franchise in the early nineteenth century, with Munshi (2010) adding the case of 
early twentieth-century women’s franchise. Schattschneider (1960) summarizes the conventional 
wisdom as follows: “[t]he expansion of the electorate was largely a by-product of the system of 
party conflict” (p. 98). However, much voter registration reform, especially that which is 
restrictive, has been discussed in the context of disenfranchisement of African Americans, 
specifically in the South. The spread of the motor voter in the pre-NVRA era provides a unique 




states in a relatively more general and recent context. Looking into this voter registration reform 
is important, because restrictive voter registration regulations in the United States are said to 
have worked as de facto disenfranchisement of members of lower socioeconomic strata. 
Relaxing voter registration regulations can be viewed as a true expansion of franchise under the 
formal universal suffrage system of the contemporary United States. Investigating the factors 
that affected the timing and realization of motor voter reform has important implications for a 
more general question: When does political mobilization via expansion of the electoral universe 
occur?  
The remainder of this section substantiates the four premises on which I base my 
argument and the three hypotheses with testable statements. As I will discuss in detail in the next 
section, the impact of the motor voter (MV-only) on the newly registered electorate was 
expected to be partisan-neutral. Therefore, the reform was popular, and state politicians had an 
incentive to claim credit for introducing it. This was the main drive behind the steady reform 
trend, specifically after Human SERVE was formed and started to engage in advocacy in 1983. 
At the same time, ABR, the reform that Human SERVE wanted to promote most, clearly 
targeted the poor, and the expected impact was disproportionately pro-Democratic. Thus, once 
ABR was attached to the motor voter (MV-ABR), the reform became controversial and 





Premise 1: MV-only was popular because it was considered partisan-neutral, while 
MV-ABR was controversial because it targeted the poor, who were more likely to be 
Democratic. 
 
The second premise pertains to the culture of the two major parties. As clearly observed 
in the recent voter ID reform controversies prior to the 2012 elections, the Republican Party has 
attempted to tighten electoral regulation whenever possible. While Republican politicians have 
attempted to frame their recent claims in anti-fraud terms that appeal to the anti-immigrant 
sentiment among voters, they typically and more fundamentally have argued that the right to 
vote is a privilege that responsible citizens should work hard to actively achieve and exercise, 
and the government does not need to take extra steps to make it easier. This Republican attitude 
is clearly reflected in the motor voter example: there was not a single case of motor voter reform 
under a unified Republican state government (with a Republican governor and both 
Republican-majority houses). By comparison, the Democratic Party has tended to be more 





Premise 2: The Republican Party is basically opposed to any inclusive electoral reform, 
while the Democratic Party tends to be more supportive of it. 
 
The third premise relates to the incumbent attitude. The activists who led Human SERVE 
repeatedly accused the Republicans of resistance to voter registration reform (Piven and Cloward 
1988; 1996; 2000). There has always been a widely held belief that increased turnout (resulting 
from any kind of reform) would lead to an increase in the Democratic vote because 
lower-income populations and minorities, who tend to be more Democratic, are the group most 
likely to benefit from relaxed electoral institutions. This reasoning remains influential to date, 
notwithstanding the conclusions of studies in the 1990s and 2000s that increased turnout would 
have little partisan effect on electoral outcome (Teixeira 1992; Knack and White 1998; Highton 
and Wolfinger 2001; Citrin et al. 2003). I do not deny the potential impact of this partisan 
interpretation, whether it is a truth or just a myth, on the behavior of incumbents. However, this 
paper will focus more on the complaint repeated by reform advocates that incumbents were 
reluctant to embrace motor voter reform. Any change in the electoral system adds uncertainty to 
incumbents’ re-election prospects, and thus, regardless of partisan affiliation, they may be 





Premise 3: Incumbents are reluctant to promote any reform that may change the 
composition of the electorate that voted them into office. 
 
The last premise is very simple. If there is an option when adopting a new policy, state 
governments prefer an implementation method with lower costs. These costs are both financial 
as well as political. The examples for the latter include not only inter-party strife, such as 
bargaining in the legislature, but also aspects such as resistance from public sector unions. In fact, 
in some states, Human SERVE reported that the state employees’ union resisted reform because 
the leaders were opposed to any additional workload. Under such circumstances, politicians may 
not find it worthwhile to promote the reform. This implies that, among the implementation types 
discussed in detail later, the passive type is the default choice for state governments when other 
conditions remain equal. 
  
Premise 4: State governments prefer implementation methods with lower costs.  
 
Next, I turn to the three hypotheses to be tested with the motor voter reform cases. 
Because unified Republican state governments always blocked motor voter reform, it is clear that 




introduce motor voter reform compared to the former. Thus, the following hypotheses and the 
testable statements deducted from them will focus on the impact of having unified Democratic 
state governments in comparison with having divided state governments. The first hypothesis 
pertains directly to the skepticism the reform advocates embraced during the advocacy activities: 
Are Democratic politicians interested in mobilizing the poor at all? The activists of Human 
SERVE believed in the value of the safety net provided to the poor by social policies. Facing the 
threat by the Reagan administration to cut down on social spending, they thought that mobilizing 
the poor—the beneficiaries of the programs—to vote in elections was crucial for defending the 
existent social policy. Because the poor (who were more likely to support the Democratic Party 
than the Republican Party to begin with) would rally around the Democratic Party in order to 
fight against the Republican administration, they assumed, at least at the beginning, that 
Democratic politicians would be supportive of the idea of ABR. However, as it turned out, even 
the Democratic governors, secretaries of state, and legislators were not always enthusiastic about 
expanding motor voter reform to include ABR. Although their reactions were in line with 
Premises 1, 3, and 4, the paper tests the following hypothesis based on Premise 2 and the original 
reasoning by the advocates.  
 





It is possible to test this hypothesis only because of the information collected from the 
Human SERVE archives, which allows for the distinction between MV-only and MV-ABR 
reform, as well as the differentiation between the active and passive implementation types. The 
two implementation types will be discussed in detail later, but in brief, active implementation 
would make it easier for the applicant to find out about the service and use it, whereas the 
passive type would require more prior information and initiatives on the side of the applicant in 
order to use the service. From Hypothesis 1, the following two testable statements are deducted. 
 
Statement 1a: MV-ABR is more likely to be adopted under a unified Democratic state 
government than under a divided state government. 
Statement 1b: A motor voter law (with or without ABR) is more likely to be implemented in 
an active form under a unified Democratic state government than under a divided state 
government. 
 
The second hypothesis pertains to Schattschneider’s (1960) argument with regard to the 
impact of electoral competition on a party’s mobilization efforts. Incumbents typically attempt to 




(Premise 3). However, if they face tight competition in their home districts, they may agree to 
the reform if they can expect a favorable impact, or they may even gamble when the expected 
impact is neutral, hoping that their incumbency advantage allowing them to claim credit for the 
reform would tip the balance toward them.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Electoral competition enhances mobilization efforts by parties through 
expansive electoral reform.  
 
Because of the partisan-neutral image, expected limited impact on the electorate composition, 
and the popularity of motor voter reform (Premises 1 and 3), this hypothesis translates into the 
first of the following falsifiable statements. If Hypothesis 1 is also true and its impact is larger 
than Premise 3, the second statement should hold as well. 
 
Statement 2a: The more state legislators are from competitive districts, the more likely the 
state is to adopt MV-only. 
Statement 2b: The more Democratic state legislators are from competitive districts, the 





The two forms of implementation have different implications in terms of mobilization. 
Passive implementation may have very limited impact on potential voters, as those who would 
find out about the registration service and actually use it are likely to be informed and politically 
aware to start with. Thus, they are more likely to be similar to those who have previously 
registered and voted. Adding them to the voter list is not expected to have a drastic effect on the 
composition of the electorate, and thus politicians can claim credit for the reform without being 
worried that the newly registered voters may not vote for them. Active implementation, by 
contrast, is likely to register those who have been previously politically isolated and less 
informed and are also more likely to belong to the lower socioeconomic strata. Given Premises 1 
and 3, the passive form should be a default choice, as stated in the first of the following 
statements. If Hypothesis 1 is also true, the second of the following statements should hold as 
well. 
 
Statement 2c: The more state legislators are from competitive districts, the more likely the 





Statement 2d: The more Democratic state legislators are from competitive districts, the 
more likely the state is to adopt motor voter reform (with or without ABR) followed by 
active implementation. 
 
The third hypothesis relates to the political culture of each state. Under the two-party 
system in the United States, the Democrats and the Republicans are the major parties in all states. 
However, the liberalism or conservatism of each party differs as a result of the historical 
background and political culture of each state. Thus, the ideology of each state merits an 
independent analysis from a partisan perspective. In American political culture, those who 
believe in active government involvement in various issues are considered liberals, while those 
who believe in a small government are the conservatives. With respect to electoral institutions, 
liberals are more supportive of an active government role in ensuring political participation by 
citizens, while conservatives believe that political participation is a privilege that should be 
exercised actively on the part of the citizens. This translates into the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Liberal political culture promotes inclusive electoral institutions. 
 





Statement 3a: The more liberal the state, the more likely the state is to adopt MV-ABR. 
Statement 3b: The more liberal the state, the more likely the state is to adopt motor voter 
reform (with or without ABR) followed by active implementation. 
 
These statements will be tested in the statistical analysis. It is important, however, to look 
first into the original goals of the key player, Human SERVE, and determine how the 
subcategories of motor voter reform were developed. 
 
1.3. Human SERVE and the Reform Agenda 
The Human Service Employees Registration and Voter Education Fund (Human SERVE) 
was formed as a nonprofit organization in 1983 by two sociologists, Richard A. Cloward at 
Columbia University and Frances Fox Piven at the City University of New York. With the 
mission to open up access to the American voter registration system to people at the bottom of 
the socioeconomic scale, the organization promoted motor voter reform at the state and lower 
levels, and played a catalytic role in the passage of the NVRA of 1993. After the act went into 
effect in January 1995, Human SERVE helped improve implementation by state officials, 




Jo-Anne Chasnow, one of the most important figures in the organization, Human SERVE 
activities were broken down into three tracks of sometimes parallel “experiments” based on their 
targets and goals. 5 The first (1983–1984) focused on voter registration at not-for-profit agencies, 
and the organization returned to this focus during 1995–1996, in the wake of the enactment of 
the NVRA. Human SERVE tried to mobilize national networks of voluntary social service 
agencies, including tens of thousands of agencies with predominantly poorer clientele, to make 
voter registration services available at their application intake desks. The second track (1983–
1990) contained a strategy to involve state and local governments. Human SERVE approached 
statewide officials, state legislators, mayors, and county executives in an attempt to promote 
voter registration in public assistance, unemployment, and welfare offices, through paths of 
legislation and executive orders. According to Chasnow, most legislators were not willing to 
include agencies that served the poor in the voter registration locations. The third “experiment” 
(1987–1993) targeted national legislative reform, which involved persuading others in the 
national voting rights community to focus on the agency-based approach to voter registration 
rather than on Election Day registration, and materialized in the NVRA of 1993. This study 
                                                  
5 Descriptions of Human SERVE are based on the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library 
Finding Aid for “Human SERVE Fund Archives, 1982–2000,” prepared by Jo-Anne Chasnow and published 
in electronic form in April 2003. In addition to the three experiments, Human SERVE used the litigation 




focuses on the second experiment at the state level, which evolved from the first track at the local 
level and led to the third track at the federal level. 
The following section addresses three sets of subcategories that are important for 
understanding the nature of actual motor voter reform. First, I briefly review the historical 
development of the concept of ABR within Human SERVE, and discuss why it is important to 
distinguish motor voter reform with ABR from that without ABR. Second, I summarize the types 
of implementation that formed a major battlefield for those who cared about policy impact. Third, 
I discuss the five different paths of motor voter reform, which reflect the multi-track approach 
pursued by Human SERVE and other advocates, and I explain why this study focuses on state 
legislation.  
1.3.1 Motor Voter with or without Agency-Based Registration 
The “motor voter” was a concept pioneered in 1975 by Michigan Secretary of State 
Richard Austin (Moss 1993), who was the “first statewide elected African American official” 
(Bigelow 2001) in Michigan. Although two other states followed suit and adopted motor voter 
reform in the 1970s, there was a lapse before other states started to revisit the reform option in 
the early 1980s. Voter registration reform advocates such as Human SERVE helped give the 
motor voter idea new momentum. While this reform became the best-known feature of the 




subcategory of the broader concept of agency-based registration (ABR). The original concept of 
ABR, as imagined by Human SERVE, was to provide opportunities to register to vote at social 
agencies serving poorer people, such as day care centers or public assistance agencies (Piven and 
Cloward 2000). Within their framework, motor voter reform constituted only a small part of the 
broader scheme to promote voter registration at public agencies. Table 1.1 lists the three stages 
through which the concept of ABR developed over time within Human SERVE. Below, I briefly 
summarize the three-step trajectory in order to highlight the importance attached to ABR by 
reform advocates. 
 
< Insert Table 1.1 about here > 
 
Human SERVE started out using the term “agency-based (voter) registration” (ABR) in a 
very broad and loose way, and they adjusted the definition over time to best achieve the impact 
they sought. At the onset, they used the term “agency” primarily to refer to private non-profit 
agencies providing social services. By “non-profit ABR,” they meant the institutionalization of 
voter registration services at these non-profit social service agencies (Stage 1). This reform was 
considered a major jump from door-to-door canvassing. However, they quickly realized that 




in 1983 and 1984 on what they called “volunteer-based ABR” at public agency sites (Stage 2). 
This change allowed citizen volunteers to organize voter registration drives in public agency 
buildings and premises, but it did not necessarily assume involvement by agency staff. Still, 
some employees voluntarily participated in voter registration activity, mainly during break times. 
Frustrated by the slow pace of progress, Human SERVE shifted its goal by 1985 to achieving 
“institutionalized ABR,” under which voter registration would be sanctioned or even required by 
some formal rules (statutory or administrative) at human service public agencies (Stage 3). At 
this stage, the idea of ABR came to include the motor voter option and started to draw greater 
attention. 
The popularity of motor voter reform was related in particular to the fact that the system 
managed to maintain a partisan-neutral image. In contrast, the idea of ABR at public agencies 
serving the less-advantaged population always met strong opposition. The fact that its targets and 
their partisan leanings were clear made the reform divisive along partisan lines. While voter 
registration at DMV offices issuing non–driver’s license ID cards could have benefited members 
of low-income groups who did not own their own cars, motor voter reform was also expected to 
cater to the younger and more mobile populations who tended to be slightly more Republican 
than Democratic in the 1980s (Norpoth 1987). Thus, although the image of some pro-Democratic 




In other words, ABR could have opened up the door to voter registration to those who 
were previously alienated from politics, while the motor voter was not expected to change the 
composition of the electorate even if it actually helped push up voter registration or turnout rates. 
Thus, whether the motor voter was accompanied by ABR made a huge difference in terms of 
substantive impacts the legislation was expected to have, and distinguishing between these two 
helps determine the factors that helped introduce truly inclusive reform. 
1.3.2 Active/Passive Implementation 
Another important way to subcategorize motor voter legislation is by the type of 
implementation involved. How the reform was implemented determined whether motor voter 
reform had any actual impact. In other words, politicians could claim credit for introducing a 
popular reform while nullifying its impact by sabotaging it at the implementation phase. That is 
why reform advocates not only pressed for the issuance of executive orders and the passage of 
legislation but also persistently followed up with the implementation process. In practice, the 
reform was implemented with a wide range of commitment and enthusiasm. At one extreme, a 
“unified” application form was used, which combined the driver’s license application and voter 
registration into a single process so that the applicant only had to check a box for voter 
registration. Another example of active implementation required DMV officers to verbally 




obscure practices, such as simply placing registration forms on tables in DMV offices where 
most visitors would not even notice. No staff involvement was assumed or allowed. At best, 
voter registration forms were displayed—in boxes, for example—in the public area. In between 
these extremes was placing the burden of knowledge on the person who wanted to register to 
vote and requiring them to request registration forms from the administrators.  
Human SERVE used three categories to classify the different patterns of implementation: 
active, passive, and weak (Table 1.2).6 A reform was coded as active if employees of DMV 
offices or other public agencies were required to ask all clients whether they wanted to register to 
vote. Reform also qualified as active if DMV intake forms were either amended to include a 
voter registration option near the top of the form or fully combined with voter registration into a 
single form. Reform was treated as passive if clients had to take the initiative by informing DMV 
employees that they wanted to register. Sometimes, signs were posted indicating that voter 
registration was available in the office. Clients had to tell employees that they wanted to register, 
                                                  
6 There was no unified interpretation of these categories, even among advocates. Here, I define them based on 
the usage of the terms found in the Human SERVE manuscripts. Some scholars who analyze the impact of 
motor voter reform categorize the types of administrative procedures. For example, Knack (1995) uses a 
dichotomized classification where “active” motor voter states are defined as those in which applicants for 
driver’s licenses are asked either by employees or via an item on the application form if they wish to register to 
vote. This definition is consistent with the version of the motor voter required by the NVRA. “Passive” motor 
voter programs are defined as those in which, at best, forms are merely available on tables or countertops or 
upon specific request by patrons. Mitchell and Wlezien (ICPSR 6496) apply a similar classification 




and employees provided voter registration forms, but they might not assist in completing the 
forms. Lastly, reform was regarded as weak if employee involvement was not assumed or 
permitted, and voter registration forms, often mail-in forms, were simply made available in 
public areas. 
 
< Insert Table 1.2 about here > 
 
The active type of reform had the potential of being effective (i.e., registering new and 
more people through the system), but passive or weak reform was not guaranteed to have any 
significant impact on registration. Put another way, politicians had to ensure that the reform 
would be carried out in the active form if they really intended to use it to increase registration. 
Otherwise, by implementing it in a passive way, they could pretend to support a popular reform 
while being assured that it would bring little change to the constituency that had elected them 
into office. In this paper, I group the weak type of implementation with the passive type and 
compare it to the active type in order to untangle the factors that worked in favor of cosmetic and 




1.3.3 The Path of Reform 
Finally, it should be noted that motor voter reform was introduced at the state level 
through five different paths: legislation, gubernatorial executive order, initiative, judicial 
settlement, and administrative practice. This was partly due to the multi-track approach taken by 
Human SERVE and other reform advocates. When we focus on the first motor voter reform in 
each state,7 among the 31 states that adopted the motor voter before 1993, 22 came in the form 
of state legislation, five were announced through gubernatorial executive orders, two were 
introduced by initiatives, and the remaining two were started as informal administrative practices 
(Table 1.3).8 Some states introduced the motor voter more than once, either through multiple 
                                                  
7 Some states adopted agency-based registration before the first introduction of motor voter reform via any 
path. All of them were done by either gubernatorial executive order or administrative practice, and, according 
to reform advocates, they were poorly implemented and short lived in most cases. 
8 North Dakota is entirely omitted from the statistical analysis in this paper because its laws do not require 
voter registration (thus, there was no possibility for the state to adopt the motor voter). Five other states (Idaho, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) were exempted from the NVRA because of the 
practice of Election Day registration (EDR). However, these states are retained in the data set for this paper. 
EDR allows constituents to register on Election Day, which makes further relaxation of registration systems 
unnecessary, at least in theory. However, some states adopted both EDR and the motor voter, which suggests 
that the existence of EDR did not prevent the adoption of the motor voter at the state level. One example of a 
state that adopted both EDR and the motor voter is Minnesota. Town clerks in Maine and county clerks in 
Oregon were also permitted to register voters on Election Day, but registration was not normally conducted at 
the polling places in these states (Smolka 1977). Further, Idaho and New Hampshire adopted retroactive EDR 
provisions after 1993 in order to be exempted from the NVRA. There is no reason to assume that these states 
had no possibility of adopting the motor voter before the NVRA was passed. Therefore, states with EDR are 




legislations or through different paths. Sometimes this was done to improve or strengthen the 
system, or it was re-introduced because the previous system was never implemented. Different 
factors may have affected the possibility and the timing of the introduction of motor voter reform 
depending on the path it took and whether there were precedents in the state. Thus, it may be 
misleading to bundle all the reform as a single type of event. Although it would be best to 
analyze influential factors for each of the five different paths and first-, second- or third-time 
introductions respectively, their small number makes independent statistical estimates for each 
group difficult. Therefore, I focus on the first legislation of motor voter reform in each state 
(Table 1.4) in the analysis below.  
 
< Insert Table 1.3 about here > 
< Insert Table 1.4 about here > 
 
1.4. Data Collection 
The most important variable in this study is the timing (i.e., year) in which the first motor 
voter legislation passed in each state. However, no comprehensive data set containing the year 
each state adopted the motor voter program has been available prior to this study. Most data sets 




earliest federal election year after the adoption of motor voter reform.9 These data do not 
provide accurate years of adoption and thus are not suited for an event history analysis of motor 
voter reform. In addition, these data sets often contradict each other. The reason seems to be the 
difficulty of pinning down exactly when the system was put into practice in each state.  
In establishing the dates for the motor voter legislation in each state, I used the Human 
Serve Fund Collection (2000) archived under Manuscript & Archival Collections at Columbia 
University Rare Book & Manuscript Library. The collection was donated by Human SERVE, 
which kept extensive records of correspondence they exchanged with state and local officials, 
memos, brochures, and other related materials. Using them, I collected information not only on 
the reform introduced through state legislation but also on the reform adopted through 
administrative practice or consent decree, which would have been hard to track down otherwise. 
The collection also enabled me to list the type of implementation for each reform and whether it 
was actually implemented. The full list of all instances of motor voter and ABR reform, with 
information for their paths, implementation types, and whether they were actually implemented, 
is shown in Appendix A. Note that although many states adopted the motor voter or ABR more 
                                                  
9 The most comprehensive data set is the one created by Glenn E. Mitchell II and Christopher Wlezien in 1995 
(Voter Registration and Election Laws in the United States, 1972–1992 [ICPSR 6496]. Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research). The data set was used in Mitchell and Wlezien 




than once, either through the same path or different paths, this paper focuses on the first 
legislation of motor voter reform, even if it was preceded by one or more kinds of reform 
through non-legislative paths. The data from the Human SERVE archives were supplemented 
with and double-checked against descriptions in Piven and Cloward (2000).10   
Another set of variables constructed from the Human SERVE archive materials is the 
measure of Human SERVE activities in each state. The numerous boxes of files covered the full 
history of the organization, but records were not kept in a way in which one could reconstruct the 
decisions and strategies the organization made and adopted in a consistent way, from time to 
time and from state to state. There was no systematic overall or yearly record kept of organizing 
activities, in terms of location or personnel, throughout the life span of the organization. 
Although Human SERVE had direct and close contact with many governors, state secretaries, 
                                                  
10 To cross-check the years of motor voter reform by state, other data sets were referenced. Although the data 
sets constructed by Mitchell and Wlezien (ICPSR 6496), Knack (1995), and Rhine (1996) were not suitable for 
this event history analysis, they were consulted to determine the most plausible dates of adoption when other 
sources of information conflicted. In addition, the 1996 FEC survey of NVRA compliance was used to confirm 
dates (“Dates of Implementing the Provisions of the National Voter Registration Act,” 
http://fecweb1.fec.gov/votregis/nvra5.htm ). I also e-mailed people who served as electoral officers in each 
state in November 2003 and asked when they started their motor voter programs. Many of the responses I 
received did not seem very reliable in dating the first instances of motor voter reform in each state, either 
because the respondents were relying on unofficial memories or because respondents found it difficult, even 
after consulting official records, to figure out exactly when their states started to employ the motor voter 
system. However, many of these responses helped to narrow down the period of initial motor voter reform in 




and legislators, it was hard to determine the quantity and magnitude of Human SERVE 
involvement in the legislative processes of each state.  
Given all these limitations, I created two rough measures based on the information 
available through the archived materials. One is a yearly measure of Human SERVE activity, 
which takes the value of 0, 1, or 2. The state is coded 0 for the year if there was no record of 
direct organizing or advocacy activities in the state, or no record of correspondence between 
Human SERVE and politicians (including governors, secretaries of state, other statewide 
officials in charge of election affairs, legislators, mayors, and county officials) in the state. 
Human SERVE did not come into existence until 1983, and thus all states are coded 0 for the 
period of 1975–1982. Some states did not have any record of contact or involvement until some 
years later. The state is coded 1 if there was a record of at least one letter sent out from Human 
SERVE to a politician in the state and no record of the politician getting back to them. This 
means that Human SERVE at least attempted to contact some politician in the state, but it might 
have been one-way communication. The state is coded 1 for all subsequent years once it has 
been assigned 1 unless it is coded 2 for some specific years. This is because politicians would 
leave office after a few years, their terms lagged, and it was not easy to tell how long the impact 
of each communication and correspondence lasted. I decided it was fair to assume that some 




politicians. The state is coded 2 if there was any record suggesting that Human SERVE had 
meaningful two-way communication with some politicians or was directly involved in the 
organizing or advocacy activities. Some of the examples include the following: Human SERVE 
received letters from state-level politicians (either in favor of or opposed to the reform 
suggestion made by Human SERVE); some notes were kept by Human SERVE suggesting that 
at least one state-level politician turned out to be sympathetic or positive about or interested in 
the reform11; a motor voter bill drafted by Human SERVE was submitted to the state legislature; 
Human SERVE testified at a public hearing; and some motor voter or ABR reform was adopted 
at the city or county level. The state is coded 2 only for the years these cases applied, and scores 
were not aggregated to be more than 2 even if more than one case from the above criteria applied 
to the state for the same year. Therefore, this measure captures the yearly variation of Human 
SERVE involvement within each state.  
                                                  
11 It was not clear from the collection why some political actors were sympathetic to the reform and supported 
the bills, or how the reform bills made their way onto the political agenda in each state. Some of the Human 
SERVE notes suggest that concerns over budget constraints and the possibility of fraud were raised by 
opposing legislators, but no consistent data were ever discussed by either side. The information on the reform 
adopted in other states was always welcomed by supporting politicians in the form of exact wordings for the 
bills and executive orders, and Human SERVE circulated model versions extensively. Politicians seemed to 
have paid less attention to the practices in neighboring states than to the total number of states that had already 




The second is a constant time-invariant measure based on the overall depth of the Human 
SERVE involvement within the state throughout the observed period, which takes the value of 0, 
1, 2, or 3. The state is coded low (1) if there were few records of any Human SERVE activity 
throughout the observed period. This includes sending out letters to politicians without any 
recorded response. The state is coded middle (2) if there was some Human SERVE activity 
within the state but it was very limited in terms of scope or period. The state is coded high (3) if 
it was clear that the state was given some priority by Human SERVE. Examples of this category 
include the following: Human SERVE kept close communication with important state-level 
politicians for an extended period of time, wrote drafts for submitted motor voter bills, testified 
at hearings, helped build a coalition among local advocacy groups, or actively mobilized or 
organized support in the state. All states are coded 0 between 1975 and 1982, during which 
Human SERVE did not exist. States are coded 1 for 1983 and 1984, regardless of their overall 
activity level, because Human SERVE did not focus on institutionalized ABR (including motor 
voter) until 1985.12 
There are two caveats to these Human SERVE measures. There is some possibility that 
the Human SERVE activities were endogenous to the probability of motor voter reform within 
                                                  
12 I also created two other versions of this variable: assigning 0 to all states for 1975–1982 (version 2) and for 
1975–1984 (version 3), while applying the constant three-level coding to the remaining years. Both versions 




the state. Human SERVE itself claimed that it adjusted its strategies, goals, and the amount of 
resources it put into certain states at certain points based on the perceived feasibility and 
likelihood of reform. However, it is not clear how the organization judged the prospect of reform 
in each state, and the data and all other information suggest that there were even reverse cases 
(such as Human SERVE’s deep and lengthy involvement in seemingly hopeless states). The 
second point is that Human SERVE was not the only important advocacy group. There were 
many other key NGOs, national and local, in each state that worked on voter registration reform. 
Human SERVE admitted that those other groups often played more important roles in some 
states. It should be noted that the information available through the Human SERVE collection 
did not allow for measurement and testing of the impact that the NGO forces as a whole had on 
the reform processes. 
 
1.5. Models 
This section contains a brief discussion of the variables used in the statistical analysis. 
The unit of analysis is a state-year (N = 670), and the study covers the period from 1975 to 1992. 
The observation starts in 1975, the year the first motor voter model was adopted in Michigan, 
and ends in 1992, the year before the NVRA passed, after which any state-level legislation 




independent variables. Note that all the variables that take non-discrete values are expressed in 
terms of percentage instead of proportion. Table 1.6 displays the pairwise correlations among 
these variables. The relatively high and negative correlations between the Human SERVE 
activity measures and the turnout rate may suggest that the organization targeted low turnout 
states. 
 
< Insert Table 1.5 about here > 
< Insert Table 1.6 about here > 
 
Dependent variables. There are two sets of dependent variables, and both represent the 
first motor voter legislation in each state. The first represents whether the legislation was 
accompanied by ABR. It is coded 1 if the legislation was not accompanied by ABR (MV-only) 
and 2 if it was accompanied by ABR (MV-ABR). The second represents the implementation 
type that followed the legislation. It is coded 1 if active implementation followed and 2 if passive 
implementation followed. For both variables, it is coded 0 for the years without any event up to 
the first legislation, and the state drops out of the dataset once the event has taken place (i.e., the 
variable is coded as missing for the rest of the observed period). Because I argue that MV-only 




each other, the two outcomes for each dependent variable should not be treated as if we can 
impose a hierarchical order between them. Therefore, I use multinomial logit to estimate the 
models. North Dakota is omitted from the dataset because no voter registration is required in that 
state. Nebraska is also omitted from the analysis because its unicameral legislature operates 
without partisan designation. Some states had biennial sessions during the period (part or whole) 
under observation.13 Because those states in no-session years should be considered not at risk of 
the event, I dropped those no-session state-year observations from the dataset. 
Independent variables. The explanatory variables include those necessary for testing the 
hypotheses (partisan control of state government, electoral competitiveness, and ideology). In 
addition to measurement of Human SERVE activity, those factors that can be considered to have 
affected the necessity of reform (poverty rate, size of African American population, and turnout 
rate) are included. The region (South) dummy is included in the models using the data of all 
states in order to control for the potential impact that the historical and cultural background 
unique to the South had on the reform prospect. Also, a separate regression with the data 
excluding the Southern states was run for each specification, because the implication of having a 
                                                  
13 There were 31 states with biennial sessions after WWII, but the number fell to nine by the mid-1970s. The 
following states have eliminated biennial sessions (years in parentheses show when they started annual 
sessions): Washington (1981), New Hampshire (1985), Kentucky (2001), Arkansas (2009), and Oregon (2011). 




unified Democratic government could have been quite different within and outside the South. 
The last is a time counter to capture any time trend. Because the Human SERVE variables have 
been discussed previously, I explain the remaining variables below.  
To measure the impact of partisan institutional control of the state government, I use two 
separate dummy variables for a unified state Democratic government and a unified state 
Republican government, respectively, rather than a trichotomous variable (Medoff et al. 2011), 
which combines the two into one variable.14 Using the trichotomous version imposes the 
assumption that unified governments by both parties have symmetrical effects on the outcome, 
while in reality, they may not. The use of two unified government dummy variables makes a 
divided government the base category. These variables are used to test Hypothesis 1. 
To test Hypothesis 2, I created a variable representing electoral competition at the district 
level in the form of percentage of state legislators from competitive districts.15 Competitive 
districts are those in which the winner received less than 60% of the total vote. As discussed 
                                                  
14 The trichotomous version would “equal to 1 if the Republican Party controls both houses of the state 
legislature and the governor’s office, 0 if there is divided government (i.e. one political party controls one or 
two branches of the state government—senate, house or governor’s office—but not all three), and -1 if the 
Democratic Party controls both houses of the state legislature and the governor’s office in year t” (Medoff et al. 
2011). 
15 The variable is created from ICPSR21480 State Legislative Election Returns, 1967–2003. Observations for 
Vermont are missing in the original data prior to 1986. Therefore, the entries for the state in the subsequent 




earlier, incumbents from safe seats would have no incentive to change the electoral regulations. 
However, incumbents from competitive districts might have hoped to claim credit for 
introducing the popular reform. They may have opted to gamble on the (potentially) positive 
impact of the reform if the reform was popular and considered partisan-neutral. To test 
Statements 2b and 2d, I also use the percentage of Democratic incumbents from competitive 
districts in separate models.  
With the general political ideology of the citizens of the state, I test Hypothesis 3, the 
impact the political culture of the state had on expansive voter registration reform. People in 
more liberal states might have thought that access to voter registration should be open to as many 
citizens as possible and the government should guarantee it, while people in conservative states 
could have been more likely to think that the right to vote was a civic privilege and that people 
should make a personal effort to exercise it. State politicians were likely to have a general idea of 
the ideological predispositions of their constituents, and this recognition might have influenced 
or limited the way they reacted to electoral reform proposals. For this variable, I use Erikson, 




state’s population who identified themselves as liberal minus the percentage who identified 
themselves as conservative, in the CBS/New York Times poll conducted annually for each state.16  
The dummy variable for the Southern states measures the impact of political culture as 
well as the region-specific historical background. The Southern states are known for their history 
of restrictive electoral regulations, which targeted African Americans specifically. Because ABR 
was originally conceptualized by its advocates to open up access to voter registration to the 
socioeconomically less advantaged, I also use the percentage of the population who lived in 
poverty and the percentage of the African American population in each state. Turnout rate (in the 
form of the percentage of the highest vote to voting age population) is another variable that 
might have potentially affected decision making regarding voter registration reform.17 States 
with low turnout may have had an incentive to improve their electoral regulation.  
Finally, the time counter is included to account for the impact of time. Although the first 
motor voter reform took place in Michigan in 1975, the time counter created for this paper does 
not start ticking until 1983, when Human SERVE came into place. (The variable takes the value 
                                                  
16 I have also tried the time-invariant policy liberalism measure built by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) 
under many different model specifications, but the outcome patterns were consistent with the results from 
using the citizen ideology measurement. Thus, I use the citizen liberalism measurement in the rest of the paper. 
17 Turnout data is taken from Michael P. McDonald (2012), “Presidential Voter Turnout Rates, 1948–2008,” 




of 0 between 1975 and 1982, and takes 1 for 1983, 2 for 1984, and so on.) It is clear that voter 
registration reform saw a different level of momentum after 1983, largely due to the nationwide 
“voter registration war” (Piven and Cloward 2000), and Human SERVE was organized in the 
same context. Therefore, distinguishing the pre-1983 and post-1983 periods by setting the time 
counter accordingly should capture the realistic time trend if it existed. 
 
1.6. Statistical Analysis 
In testing the factors that have affected the timing, probability, and nature of motor voter 
reform, I employ the event history analysis technique, which was first introduced by Berry and 
Berry (1990). With all the revisions and applications, it has become a popular and widely used 
method for studying state policy diffusion (Yamaguchi 1991; Beck and Katz 1995; Beck et al. 
1998; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). I use the pooled cross-sectional time-series data and 
estimate multinomial logit models with Stata.  
Table 1.7 presents the results from simple logit regressions in which all motor voter 
reform is bundled together as a single type of event. Models 7A and 7B show the regressions 
with the Human SERVE annual activity variable, and Models 7C and 7D show the same with the 
Human SERVE constant priority variable. In all regressions, Stata dropped the dummy variable 




Table 1.8, there was no motor voter legislation under unified Republican state 
governments, and having a unified Republican state government perfectly predicted a no-event 
outcome. The time counter and competitiveness were positive and statistically significant in all 
models, which suggests that the reform was more likely as time went on, and with more 
incumbents from competitive districts. Human SERVE activity variables were positive and 
statistically significant in Models 7A, 7B, and 7C. The South dummy and ideology were 
consistently insignificant. However, the following multinomial regressions show that most of 
these variables had different degrees of impact, depending on the type of motor voter reform and 
implementation. 
 
< Insert Table 1.7 about here > 
< Insert Table 1.8 about here > 
 
Table 1.9 shows the regression results for multinomial logit with the legislation type 
(whether the reform included ABR) as the dependent variable. The first six models were run 
using the data for all states. The second set of six models replicates the specification of the first 
set except for dropping the South dummy, and was run using the data for non-Southern states. 




have each of poverty rate, African American population, or turnout. The second regression 
(Model 9B) contains the percentage of Democratic legislators from competitive districts instead 
of the cross-partisan version used in other models. The time-invariant measure of Human 
SERVE activity is used in Model 9C, while all other models include the annual version. I used 
the same pattern of specification for Models 9G to 9L, with the South dummy dropped. This 
combination of 12 models was applied to the other set of regressions with the implementation 
type as the dependent variable (Table 1.10). 
 
< Insert Table 1.9 about here > 
< Insert Table 1.10 about here > 
 
Some consistent patterns emerged from the first set of six regressions in Table 1.9. The 
coefficients for the unified Republican dummy were large, negative, and statistically significant 
at the conventional 5% level throughout the models for both MV-only and MV-ABR outcomes. 
This is understandable given the fact that there was no single case of motor voter legislation 
under unified Republican governments. The unified Democratic dummy was completely 
irrelevant for the adoption of MV-only, but it was positive and significant in five models for the 




being under a divided government in terms of the adoption of MV-ABR. This outcome is in line 
with Statement 1a and thus provides support for Hypothesis 1. Note that for the MV-ABR 
outcome, the South dummy was negative and large in all models, significant in three, and 
insignificant in three. This implies that it was very difficult to adopt MV-ABR in the South. 
Cross-partisan competitiveness (Models 9A and 9B) and Democratic competitiveness 
(Model 9B) were positive and significant in models with ideology for the MV-only outcome, but 
not even close to significant at the 10% level for the MV-ABR outcome. These results suggest 
that having more legislators from competitive districts, either in total or just Democratic, made 
the adoption of partisan-neutral MV-only more likely, while it did not seem to have enhanced 
adoption of MV-ABR. This outcome supports Statement 2a, but not Statement 2b. While 
Hypothesis 2 seems to be supported in general by the data, Hypothesis 1 does not find support 
here.  
The Human SERVE activity measure (annual or constant) was positive and significant in 
five models for the adoption of MV-ABR while quite irrelevant to the adoption of MV-only. 
This is intuitive given the fact that their original goal and emphasis to the end was the promotion 
of ABR. The ideology (liberalism) variable was irrelevant for both MV-only and MV-ABR. This 
provides poor support for Hypothesis 3. While the poverty rate was insignificant for both 




negative and significant for MV-ABR. Having a larger African American population seems to 
have helped with the adoption of MV-ABR, while having a history of poor turnout made the 
same reform more likely.  
The second set of six regressions in Table 1.9 shows the regression outcomes for the data 
with non-Southern states. There was no major change in the overall patterns, but the unified 
Democratic government was less significant than it was in the previous set. The poverty rate was 
negative and significant for MV-ABR, which implies that the higher the poverty rate, the less 
likely that MV-ABR was adopted in non-Southern states. The legislation, which was more likely 
to register the poor, was less likely to pass in states with more people in poverty.  
As for the regressions with the implementation type as an outcome (Table 1.10), the first 
set of six models with all state data presented the following patterns. While the unified 
Republican government was consistently and largely negative and significant for both active and 
passive implementation, the unified Democratic government was never significant for active 
outcome and was positive and significant for passive outcome in only two models (10D and 10F). 
This provides limited support for Hypothesis 1. Cross-partisan competitiveness was positive and 
significant in all five models for passive implementation. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2. 





When the Southern states were dropped from the data set for the second set of six 
regressions in Table 1.10, different patterns emerged. For the passive outcome, the unified 
Democratic government was now positive and significant in five models. Having a unified 
Democratic government did not seem to have promoted active implementation as Hypothesis 1 
would predict, but it made at least a reform with passive implementation more likely than a 
divided government would have. Cross-partisan competitiveness was again positive and 
significant in five models for the passive outcome, suggesting that having more incumbents from 
competitive districts made the state more likely to adopt reform followed by passive 
implementation that was expected to bring limited impact. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
but again provides no support for Hypothesis 1. The ideology remained completely insignificant 
across all models, providing no support for Hypothesis 3. 
The coefficient estimates from multinomial logit regressions are not easy to interpret, 
because the effect of each variable changes depending on the values of the other variables. 
Therefore, we need to look at the marginal effects in order to understand the magnitude of the 
impact each variable had on the outcome. I estimated marginal effects using Models 9G and 10G, 
basic models without Southern states. Based on the estimates for Model 9G, the probability of 
adopting MV-only increases from .01 to .11 when competitiveness increased from its minimum 




environment at the following levels: divided government, in 1987, mean Human SERVE annual 
activity level (= .6), and mean liberal ideology (= -12). A 10% difference is already substantive, 
but it turns out that the impact of increased competitiveness is magnified under a more 
(presumably) favorable environment for reform. The probability of adopting MV-only increases 
from .06 to .34 when the competitiveness increases from its minimum value to its maximum 
value, with other variables set at unified Democratic government, in 1987, strongest Human 
SERVE annual activity level (= 2), and most liberal ideology (= 37).  
Based on the estimates for Model 10G, the probability of adopting reform with passive 
implementation increases from .00 to .10 when the competitiveness increased from its minimum 
value (0%) to its maximum value (36%), with other variables set at the values to represent 
divided government, in 1987, mean Human SERVE annual activity level (= .6), and mean liberal 
ideology (= -12). Again, the impact of increased competitiveness is magnified under a more 
favorable environment for reform. The probability of reform with passive implementation 
dramatically increases from .06 to .80 when competitiveness increases from its minimum value 
to its maximum value, with other variables set at unified Democratic government, in 1987, 
strongest Human SERVE annual activity level (= 2), and most liberal ideology (= 37).  
Based on the estimates from Model 10G, having a unified Democratic government 




from .00 to .04 when other variables are set at mean competitiveness (= 18), in 1987, mean 
Human SERVE annual activity level (= .6), and mean liberal ideology (= -12). However, having 
a unified Democratic government increases the probability of reform with passive 
implementation from .41 to .80 when other variables are set at maximum competitiveness (= 
36%), in 1987, strongest Human SERVE annual activity level (= 2), and most liberal ideology (= 
37). This suggests that having a unified Democratic government in a non-Southern state could 
have dramatically improved the prospect for reform with passive implementation when the 
environment was favorable.  
Finally, we look into the regression outcomes with a dependent variable with 
four-category outcomes. Because the two dependent variables used in previous analyses measure 
the same set of motor voter legislation events along two different dimensions, there are in fact 
four possible combinations of registration locations and implementation methods. As shown in 
Table 1.11, there were eight cases of active MV-only, nine passive MV-only, three active 
MV-ABR, and six passive MV-ABR. The results of multinomial logit regressions are shown in 
Table 1.12. Model 12A uses the data from all states, and Model 12B uses non-Southern states. 
With a smaller number of events in each category, it was more difficult to estimate coefficients 
for each outcome type with precision, but some interesting patterns were observed. For 




MV, but largely negative and significant for active MV. This is contrary to Hypothesis 1. In both 
models, competitiveness was positive and significant for passive MV-only, which supports 
Hypothesis 2. The ideology was positive and significant for active MV-only, which partially 
supports Hypothesis 3. Liberal ideology of the state did not seem to promote ABR that targeted 
the poor, but it promoted fully committed implementation of the partisan-neutral reform. Human 
SERVE activity was positive and significant for active MV-ABR, while the South dummy was 
large, negative, and significant for active MV-ABR. The activity of Human SERVE helped this 
most inclusive form of reform, while the Southern states seem to have been very resistant to it. 
 
1.7. Conclusion  
The statistical analysis of the first motor voter legislation in the U.S. states provided some 
support for Hypothesis 1: The Democratic Party is interested in mobilizing the poor. Unified 
Democratic state governments were more likely than divided state governments were to adopt 
motor voter with ABR. However, they were no more likely to enhance active implementation of 
the reform than divided governments were. Still, they promoted reform with passive 
implementation more than divided governments did, especially outside the South. The 




but they did not seem committed enough to enforce active implementation so that some impact 
on the outcome was ensured. 
Hypothesis 2, Electoral competition enhances mobilization efforts by parties through 
expansive electoral reform, found support mostly in the form of weak (partisan-neutral or 
impact-neutral) reform. Having more state legislators from competitive districts increased the 
probability of adopting MV-only and passive implementation. Electoral competition, which is 
certainly partisan competition, seems to have motivated incumbents across party lines to open up 
the electoral universe by making voter registration easier, but only in a subtle way that would not 
dramatically change the constituency that elected them into office. The implication of these 
findings is that simple electoral competition in the United States may not induce parties to 
mobilize those politically alienated at the lower end of the socioeconomic strata. 
Hypothesis 3, Liberal political culture promotes inclusive electoral institutions, found no 
support in the two-outcome models (Table 1.9 and Table 1.10). However, in the four-outcome 
models (Table 1.12), it turned out that the liberal culture promoted active implementation of 
MV-only. This suggests that the liberalism of the state may not have necessarily ensured 
favorable attitudes toward the targeted mobilization of the poor, but may have helped ensure that 
adopted partisan-neutral policies were duly implemented so that they would have the impact they 




explain why the same formal institution seems to have had varied degrees of impact in different 
regions, as pointed out by Springer (2012). 
Finally, the leading advocacy organization, Human SERVE, did well, reviving the 
momentum for motor voter reform in the 1980s and taking it all the way to national legislation. 
Much of the state-level ABR legislation might not have passed without their efforts, although 
persuading politicians and bureaucrats into following up with active implementation seems to 
have been a daunting task. Through their struggle, Human SERVE illuminated the importance of 
examining implementation schemes in the context of policy reform rather than in the context of 






Table 1.1 Development Stages of Human SERVE Concept of Agency-Based Registration 
 
Stage 1 : Non-profit ABR (1983) 
Voter registration at non-profit agencies providing social services. 
 
Stage 2 : Volunteer-based ABR (1983-84) 
Voter registration at public agencies by citizen volunteers. 
No official involvement by agency staff during work time. 
Voluntary participation by agency employees during break time. 
 
Stage 3 : Institutionalized ABR (1985-)  
 Voter registration at human service public agencies. 
 Sanctioned or required by formal rules.  
 Includes the motor voter option. 
 
 
Table 1.2 Agency-Based Registration Implementation Types (Coded by Human SERVE) 
 
ACTIVE type: Staff-active 
 DMV officers are required to verbally inform all customers of the voter registration option. 
 Intake forms are amended to include a voter registration option near the top. 
 Application forms are completely combined with voter registration so that applicants only 
need to check a box for voter registration. 
 
PASSIVE type: Client-initiated 
 Signs may be posted that voter registration is available in office. 
 Clients need to have prior information about the service availability. 
 Clients have to ask officers directly for voter registration forms. 
 Staff may not assist to complete the forms. 
 
WEAK type: Forms available 
 Voter registration forms (often mail-in forms) are available somewhere in public area. 
 Voter registration form may be displayed in a box. 





Table 1.3 First Introduction of the Motor Voter 
 
 Legislation Exec. Order Initiative Admin. TOTAL 
1975 MI    1 
1976 PA    1 
1977 OH    1 
1978     0 
1979     0 
1980     0 
1981     0 
1982     0 
1983 NC, OR, TN   AK 4 
1984 WA* NY*, TX CO  4 
1985 MD*    1 
1986  VT   1 
1987 IA*, MN*, NV OK*   4 
1988 CT*, LA NJ* AZ  4 
1989 RI*   ME 2 
1990 HI, IL    2 
1991 ID, MT, MS*, NM, WV    5 
1992 KS    1 
TOTAL 22 5 2 2 31 
      
* Motor voter with agency-based registration    
States that never adopted the motor voter via any path before 1993: AL, AR, CA, DE, FL, 






Table 1.4 First Legislation of the Motor Voter 
 
 Active Passive  Weak TOTAL 
1975 MI   1 
1976   PA 1 
1977 OH   1 
1978    0 
1979    0 
1980    0 
1981    0 
1982    0 
1983  NC OR, TN 3 
1984   WA* 1 
1985   MD* 1 
1986    0 
1987 IA*, NV, MN*   3 
1988   CT* 1 
1989  AK, RI* LA 3 
1990 IL  HI 2 
1991 MT, TX, NJ* NM ID, WV, MS* 7 
1992 KS, NY*   2 
TOTAL 11 4 11 26 
     
* Motor voter with agency-based registration   
AK, NJ, NY, and TX adopted the motor voter via some non-legislative paths before the 
motor voter legislation was first enacted. ME, OK, and VT adopted the motor voter via 






Table 1.5 Descriptive Summaries of the Variables 
All States 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Legislation 670 0.05 0.28 0 2 
Implementation 670 0.06 0.32 0 2 
Unified Dem 670 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Unified GOP 670 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Year Counter 670 2.52 3.21 0 10 
South 670 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Competitive (%) 658 15.0 8.1 0 36.1 
Competitive (Dem) (%) 658 7.5 4.6 0 25.0 
Human SERVE (Annual) 670 0.59 0.77 0 2 
Human SERVE (Constant) 670 0.88 1.09 0 3 
Ideology 639 -14.3 12.8 -66.7 36.9 
Poverty (%) 670 13.4 4.5 3.7 27.2 
Black (%) 670 9.9 9.7 0.2 35.9 
Turnout (%) 670 17.4 22.9 0.2 71.5 
Non-South 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Legislation 476 0.06 0.30 0 2 
Implementation 476 0.07 0.33 0 2 
Unified Dem 476 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Unified GOP 476 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Year Counter 476 2.5 3.2 0 10 
Competitive (%) 464 17.6 7.5 0 36.1 
Competitive (Dem) (%) 464 8.4 4.5 0 24.0 
Human SERVE (Annual) 476 0.58 0.77 0 2 
Human SERVE (Constant) 476 0.83 1.0 0 3 
Ideology 445 -11.4 13.6 -66.7 36.9 
Poverty (%) 476 11.7 3.4 3.7 24.8 
Black (%) 476 5.4 5.5 0.2 23.9 
Turnout (%) 476 19.0 24.4 0.3 71.5 
 
Legislation First MV legislation without ABR (1), with ABR (2). No event =0. 
















Table 1.7 Logit for First Motor Voter Legislation (Single Outcome) 
    
    
    
    
    
 
Dependent variable: First motor voter legislation [0,1] 
Note: Unified Republican state government variable is dropped by Stata. 
 
 
Table 1.8 First Motor Voter Legislation and Government Status 
 
  Unified D Divided Unified R Total 
MV-only 7 10 0 17 
MV&ABR 5 4 0 9 
Total 12 14 0 26 
 
  
                                           (0.542)    (0.589)   (0.551)    (0.592)  
 First MV Law  Unified Dem                  0.820      1.043     0.807      1.046   
                                                                                     
                                             All     Non-South    All     Non-South 
                                           Model 7A  Model 7B   Model 7C  Model 7D  
                                                                                     
                                           (0.357)    (0.398)                       
               Human SERVE (annual)         0.744*    0.795*                        
                                           (0.025)    (0.032)   (0.022)    (0.028)  
               Competitive Districts (%)    0.058*    0.078*     0.054*    0.076**  
                                           (0.746)              (0.758)             
               South                        -0.589               -0.696             
                                           (0.097)    (0.105)   (0.084)    (0.092)  
               Year Counter (from 1983)     0.203*    0.245*     0.213*    0.262**  
                                                                (0.186)    (0.230)  
               Human SERVE (invariant)                           0.416*     0.434   
                                           (0.017)    (0.018)   (0.017)    (0.018)  
               Ideology (Liberalism)        0.026      0.033     0.027      0.033   
                                 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                                     
 N_Clust                                      46        33         46        33     
 N                                           574        380       574        380    
 R2_P                                        0.18      0.21       0.17      0.20    
                                           (0.839)    (1.137)   (0.797)    (1.049)  




























                                                                                                                          
                                                        Model 9A   Model 9B   Model 9C   Model 9D   Model 9E   Model 9F  
                                                                                                                          
                                                       (1) All states
                                                          (0.032)               (0.030)    (0.030)    (0.030)    (0.031)  
              Competitive Districts (%)                   0.069*                0.065*      0.052      0.056      0.052   
                                                          (0.849)    (0.812)    (0.823)    (0.758)    (1.020)    (0.808)  
              South                                        0.182      0.012      0.148     -0.927     -0.633     -0.588   
                                                          (0.125)    (0.125)    (0.101)    (0.123)    (0.123)    (0.134)  
              Year Counter (from 1983)                     0.171      0.158     0.243*      0.229      0.230      0.244   
                                                          (0.620)    (0.631)    (0.651)    (0.627)    (0.592)    (0.591)  
              Unified GOP                                -15.907**  -15.439**  -15.371**  -15.441**  -16.162**  -20.985** 
                                                          (0.697)    (0.674)    (0.696)    (0.602)    (0.629)    (0.637)  
    MV_only   Unified Dem                                  0.262      0.063      0.229      0.483      0.486      0.490   
                                                                     (0.052)                                              
              Democrats from Competitive Districts (%)               0.103*                                               
                                                          (0.492)    (0.501)               (0.479)    (0.487)    (0.485)  
              Human SERVE (annual)                         0.561      0.576                 0.379      0.454      0.513   
                                                                                (0.242)                                   
              Human SERVE (invariant)                                            0.017                                    
                                                          (0.018)    (0.017)    (0.017)                                   
              Ideology (Liberalism)                        0.029      0.029      0.030                                    
                                                                                           (0.044)                        
              Poverty                                                                       0.071                         
                                                                                                      (0.038)             
              Black                                                                                    0.003              
                                                                                                                 (0.018)  
              Turnout                                                                                             0.007   
                                                          (1.005)    (0.916)    (0.912)    (1.179)    (0.908)    (0.948)  
              Constant                                   -5.647**   -5.248**   -5.331**   -6.499**   -5.751**   -5.870**  
                                                                                                                           
                                                          (0.043)               (0.037)    (0.040)    (0.035)    (0.043)  
              Competitive Districts (%)                    0.045                 0.052      0.055     0.072*      0.050   
                                                          (1.134)    (1.078)    (1.334)    (0.972)    (1.495)    (0.986)  
              South                                       -2.121     -2.357*    -2.475     -1.771    -4.651**   -2.739**  
                                                          (0.115)    (0.116)    (0.118)    (0.130)    (0.135)    (0.115)  
              Year Counter (from 1983)                    0.277*     0.280*      0.187     0.305*     0.310*      0.159   
                                                          (0.667)    (0.709)    (0.794)    (0.765)    (1.060)    (0.747)  
              Unified GOP                                -15.423**  -14.972**  -14.271**  -15.091**  -14.763**  -20.248** 
                                                          (0.870)    (0.914)    (0.847)    (0.796)    (1.077)    (0.827)  
    MV_ABR    Unified Dem                                 1.739*      1.682     1.791*     1.696*     2.152*     1.646*   
                                                                     (0.066)                                              
              Democrats from Competitive Districts (%)               -0.033                                               
                                                          (0.428)    (0.387)               (0.383)    (0.469)    (0.406)  
              Human SERVE (annual)                        1.113**    0.982*                1.253**    1.155*      0.743   
                                                                                (0.347)                                   
              Human SERVE (invariant)                                           1.199**                                   
                                                          (0.040)    (0.038)    (0.054)                                   
              Ideology (Liberalism)                        0.015      0.008      0.013                                    
                                                                                           (0.104)                        
              Poverty                                                                      -0.107                         
                                                                                                      (0.066)             
              Black                                                                                   0.136*              
                                                                                                                 (3.672)  
              Turnout                                                                                            -7.978*  
              Constant                                   -7.519**   -6.453**   -8.148**   -6.930**   -9.635**    -2.841*  
                                                                                                                           
                                                     * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                                                                           
    N_Clust                                                 46         46         46         48         48         48     
    N                                                       627        627        627        658        658        658    


























                                                                                                                        
                                                      Model 9G   Model 9H   Model 9I   Model 9J   Model 9K   Model 9L  
                                                                                                                        
                                                      (2) Non-South
                                                          (0.043)               (0.044)    (0.039)    (0.037)    (0.041)  
              Competitive Districts (%)                   0.089*                0.087*      0.068     0.074*      0.064   
                                                          (0.135)    (0.129)    (0.114)    (0.131)    (0.131)    (0.155)  
              Year Counter (from 1983)                     0.233      0.201     0.335**    0.292*     0.303*     0.373*   
                                                          (0.691)    (0.708)    (0.721)    (0.667)    (0.640)    (0.653)  
              Unified GOP                                -15.913**  -14.997**  -16.055**  -16.882**  -15.710**  -15.967** 
                                                          (0.814)    (0.780)    (0.814)    (0.671)    (0.687)    (0.737)  
    MV_only   Unified Dem                                  0.526      0.140      0.456      0.763      0.787      0.780   
                                                                     (0.070)                                              
              Democrats from Competitive Districts (%)                0.130                                               
                                                          (0.548)    (0.576)               (0.529)    (0.546)    (0.556)  
              Human SERVE (annual)                         0.623      0.686                 0.440      0.493      0.792   
                                                                                (0.330)                                   
              Human SERVE (invariant)                                           -0.112                                    
                                                          (0.021)    (0.019)    (0.019)                                   
              Ideology (Liberalism)                        0.030      0.030      0.033                                    
                                                                                           (0.050)                        
              Poverty                                                                       0.036                         
                                                                                                      (0.060)             
              Black                                                                                   -0.007              
                                                                                                                 (0.019)  
              Turnout                                                                                             0.030   
                                                          (1.606)    (1.416)    (1.454)    (1.532)    (1.263)    (1.360)  
              Constant                                   -6.472**   -5.872**   -6.065**   -6.821**   -6.535**   -7.441**  
                                                                                                                           
                                                          (0.047)               (0.041)    (0.043)    (0.037)    (0.048)  
              Competitive Districts (%)                    0.066                 0.073      0.079     0.078*      0.066   
                                                          (0.130)    (0.124)    (0.122)    (0.163)    (0.134)    (0.124)  
              Year Counter (from 1983)                    0.268*     0.250*      0.153     0.343*     0.290*      0.174   
                                                          (0.692)    (0.736)    (0.851)    (0.759)    (1.045)    (0.712)  
              Unified GOP                                -15.238**  -14.477**  -14.254**  -16.523**  -14.473**  -15.504** 
                                                          (0.878)    (0.889)    (0.842)    (0.890)    (1.060)    (0.826)  
    MV_ABR    Unified Dem                                  1.684      1.525     1.761*      1.671      2.015     1.627*   
                                                                     (0.069)                                              
              Democrats from Competitive Districts (%)               -0.017                                               
                                                          (0.443)    (0.398)               (0.441)    (0.476)    (0.420)  
              Human SERVE (annual)                        1.036*     0.906*                1.194**    1.115*      0.708   
                                                                                (0.344)                                   
              Human SERVE (invariant)                                           1.234**                                   
                                                          (0.034)    (0.032)    (0.047)                                   
              Ideology (Liberalism)                        0.035      0.025      0.038                                    
                                                                                           (0.098)                        
              Poverty                                                                      -0.208*                        
                                                                                                      (0.073)             
              Black                                                                                    0.107              
                                                          (1.469)    (1.002)    (1.641)    (2.111)    (2.067)    (1.273)  
              Constant                                   -7.539**   -6.090**   -8.242**   -6.334**   -9.190**   -4.007**  
                                                                                                                 (2.794)  
              Turnout                                                                                            -5.824*  
                                                                                                                           
                                                     * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                                                                           
    N_Clust                                                 33         33         33         35         35         35     
    N                                                       433        433        433        464        464        464    



























    
                                                                                                                          
                                                        Model 10A  Model 10B  Model 10C  Model 10D  Model 10E  Model 10F 
                                                                                                                          
                                                       (1) All States
                                                          (0.042)               (0.037)    (0.038)    (0.037)    (0.042)  
              Competitive Districts (%)                    0.027                 0.028      0.031      0.027      0.011   
                                                          (1.134)    (1.104)    (1.188)    (1.068)    (1.405)    (1.047)  
              South                                       -1.186     -1.330     -1.278     -1.369     -1.747     -1.645   
                                                          (0.120)    (0.127)    (0.124)    (0.115)    (0.111)    (0.118)  
              Year Counter (from 1983)                     0.229      0.225      0.187     0.263*     0.259*     0.355**  
                                                          (0.713)    (0.763)    (0.826)    (0.666)    (0.660)    (0.668)  
              Unified GOP                                -14.495**  -15.199**  -13.733**  -16.036**  -16.703**  -15.612** 
                                                          (0.849)    (0.847)    (0.852)    (0.823)    (0.777)    (0.835)  
    Active    Unified Dem                                  0.296      0.256      0.270      0.187      0.212      0.066   
                                                                     (0.101)                                              
              Democrats from Competitive Districts (%)               -0.008                                               
                                                          (0.541)    (0.558)               (0.512)    (0.539)    (0.594)  
              Human SERVE (annual)                         0.715      0.673                 0.730      0.687     1.165*   
                                                                                (0.340)                                   
              Human SERVE (invariant)                                           0.671*                                    
                                                          (0.022)    (0.022)    (0.026)                                   
              Ideology (Liberalism)                        0.035      0.033      0.038                                    
                                                                                           (0.062)                        
              Poverty                                                                      -0.070                         
                                                                                                      (0.050)             
              Black                                                                                    0.001              
                                                                                                                 (0.024)  
              Turnout                                                                                             0.046   
                                                          (1.592)    (1.723)    (1.593)    (1.709)    (1.320)    (1.285)  
              Constant                                   -5.610**   -5.059**   -5.729**   -5.190**   -5.900**   -7.178**  
                                                                                                                           
                                                          (0.034)               (0.031)    (0.033)    (0.030)    (0.034)  
              Competitive Districts (%)                   0.078*                0.071*     0.065*     0.080**    0.071*   
                                                          (0.997)    (0.942)    (0.987)    (0.829)    (1.322)    (0.896)  
              South                                       -0.324     -0.586     -0.414     -1.117     -1.818     -0.842   
                                                          (0.135)    (0.138)    (0.112)    (0.136)    (0.154)    (0.139)  
              Year Counter (from 1983)                     0.175      0.166     0.230*      0.218      0.241      0.179   
                                                          (0.581)    (0.600)    (0.632)    (0.641)    (0.663)    (0.617)  
              Unified GOP                                -14.173**  -14.904**  -13.643**  -15.183**  -15.751**  -15.422** 
                                                          (0.729)    (0.753)    (0.749)    (0.673)    (0.791)    (0.663)  
    Passive   Unified Dem                                  1.168      1.001      1.138     1.423*      1.517     1.446*   
                                                                     (0.049)                                              
              Democrats from Competitive Districts (%)                0.087                                               
                                                          (0.449)    (0.457)               (0.439)    (0.492)    (0.411)  
              Human SERVE (annual)                         0.787      0.778                 0.666      0.645      0.505   
                                                                                (0.228)                                   
              Human SERVE (invariant)                                            0.237                                    
                                                          (0.025)    (0.023)    (0.023)                                   
              Ideology (Liberalism)                        0.016      0.014      0.019                                    
                                                                                           (0.050)                        
              Poverty                                                                       0.060                         
                                                                                                      (0.039)             
              Black                                                                                    0.067              
                                                          (0.966)    (0.745)    (0.903)    (1.216)    (1.136)    (0.945)  
              Constant                                   -6.621**   -5.900**   -6.209**   -7.402**   -7.472**   -6.164**  
                                                                                                                 (0.024)  
              Turnout                                                                                            -0.033   
                                                                                                                           
                                                     * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                                                                           
    N_Clust                                                 46         46         46         48         48         48     
    N                                                       627        627        627        658        658        658    





























                                                                                                                        
                                                      Model 10G  Model 10H  Model 10I  Model 10J  Model 10K  Model 10L 
                                                                                                                        
                                                      (2) Non-South
                                                          (0.050)               (0.046)    (0.045)    (0.043)    (0.049)  
              Competitive Districts (%)                    0.031                 0.029      0.035      0.033      0.012   
                                                          (0.126)    (0.140)    (0.139)    (0.122)    (0.117)    (0.121)  
              Year Counter (from 1983)                     0.187      0.173      0.167      0.228      0.227     0.329**  
                                                          (0.724)    (0.784)    (0.826)    (0.683)    (0.679)    (0.691)  
              Unified GOP                                -15.323**  -15.683**  -16.481**  -15.836**  -15.674**  -15.504** 
                                                          (0.999)    (0.995)    (1.007)    (0.987)    (0.938)    (0.982)  
    Active    Unified Dem                                  0.141      0.070      0.105      0.009      0.105     -0.108   
                                                                     (0.128)                                              
              Democrats from Competitive Districts (%)               -0.009                                               
                                                          (0.569)    (0.598)               (0.526)    (0.577)    (0.647)  
              Human SERVE (annual)                         0.900      0.851                 0.900      0.821     1.492*   
                                                                                (0.363)                                   
              Human SERVE (invariant)                                            0.652                                    
                                                          (0.022)    (0.022)    (0.025)                                   
              Ideology (Liberalism)                        0.036      0.034      0.038                                    
                                                                                           (0.069)                        
              Poverty                                                                      -0.085                         
                                                                                                      (0.056)             
              Black                                                                                    0.025              
                                                                                                                 (0.026)  
              Turnout                                                                                            0.054*   
                                                          (1.921)    (2.134)    (1.803)    (1.980)    (1.560)    (1.644)  
              Constant                                   -5.622**    -4.949*   -5.534**    -5.049*   -6.107**   -7.500**  
                                                                                                                           
                                                          (0.044)               (0.041)    (0.037)    (0.035)    (0.041)  
              Competitive Districts (%)                   0.122**               0.119**    0.106**    0.109**    0.109**  
                                                          (0.161)    (0.159)    (0.124)    (0.178)    (0.175)    (0.173)  
              Year Counter (from 1983)                     0.305      0.252     0.358**    0.373*     0.376*      0.335   
                                                          (0.721)    (0.728)    (0.808)    (0.729)    (0.897)    (0.721)  
              Unified GOP                                -14.561**  -15.076**  -15.977**  -14.892**  -14.609**  -15.092** 
                                                          (0.758)    (0.796)    (0.773)    (0.758)    (0.848)    (0.737)  
    Passive   Unified Dem                                 1.807*      1.359     1.811*     2.116**    2.197**    2.112**  
                                                                     (0.062)                                              
              Democrats from Competitive Districts (%)                0.115                                               
                                                          (0.579)    (0.573)               (0.566)    (0.603)    (0.499)  
              Human SERVE (annual)                         0.686      0.756                 0.592      0.551      0.435   
                                                                                (0.282)                                   
              Human SERVE (invariant)                                            0.215                                    
                                                          (0.032)    (0.026)    (0.030)                                   
              Ideology (Liberalism)                        0.028      0.022      0.029                                    
                                                                                           (0.068)                        
              Poverty                                                                      -0.022                         
                                                                                                      (0.071)             
              Black                                                                                    0.048              
                                                                                                                 (0.024)  
              Turnout                                                                                            -0.022   
                                                          (1.419)    (0.941)    (1.308)    (1.642)    (1.318)    (1.337)  
              Constant                                   -8.231**   -6.691**   -8.000**   -8.203**   -8.814**   -7.987**  
                                                                                                                           
                                                     * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                                                                           
    N_Clust                                                 33         33         33         35         35         35     
    N                                                       433        433        433        464        464        464    









     Total          11         15          26 
                                             
    MV&ABR           3          6           9 
   MV-only           8          9          17 
                                             
       Law      active    passive       Total
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                                                     All States  Non-South 
                                                     Model 12A   Model 12B 
                                                                            
                                                      (0.942)     (1.776)  
                         Constant                     -7.458**   -10.996** 
                                                      (0.023)     (0.026)  
                         Ideology (Liberalism)         0.005      -0.019   
                                                      (0.041)     (0.054)  
                         Competitive Districts (%)     0.091*     0.149**  
                                                      (0.632)     (0.930)  
                         Human SERVE (annual)          0.960       1.136   
                                                      (1.372)              
                         South                         0.154               
                                                      (0.207)     (0.264)  
                         Year Counter (from 1983)      0.081       0.320   
                                                      (0.732)     (1.137)  
                         Unified GOP                 -17.935**   -16.918** 
                                                      (1.110)     (1.190)  
         MVxPassive      Unified Dem                   1.139      2.600*   
                                                                            
                                                      (1.837)     (2.318)  
                         Constant                     -5.469**    -5.117*  
                                                      (0.022)     (0.021)  
                         Ideology (Liberalism)         0.047*     0.047*   
                                                      (0.054)     (0.073)  
                         Competitive Districts (%)     0.046       0.044   
                                                      (0.629)     (0.661)  
                         Human SERVE (annual)          0.087       0.281   
                                                      (0.917)              
                         South                         0.124               
                                                      (0.134)     (0.140)  
                         Year Counter (from 1983)      0.259       0.183   
                                                      (0.755)     (0.757)  
                         Unified GOP                 -18.568**   -17.484** 
                                                      (0.950)     (0.744)  
         MVxActive       Unified Dem                   -1.046    -17.119** 













                                                                            
                                                     All States  Non-South 
                                                     Model 12A   Model 12B 
                                                                            
                                                      (1.550)     (1.963)  
                         Constant                     -7.435**   -7.817**  
                                                      (0.048)     (0.037)  
                         Ideology (Liberalism)         0.029       0.056   
                                                      (0.058)     (0.068)  
                         Competitive Districts (%)     0.065       0.101   
                                                      (0.404)     (0.441)  
                         Human SERVE (annual)          0.575       0.379   
                                                      (1.259)              
                         South                         -1.170              
                                                      (0.129)     (0.166)  
                         Year Counter (from 1983)      0.298*      0.315   
                                                      (0.670)     (0.693)  
                         Unified GOP                 -18.142**   -16.793** 
                                                      (0.981)     (1.024)  
         MV_ABRxPassive  Unified Dem                   1.326       1.312   
                                                                            
                                 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                            
         N_Clust                                         46         33     
         N                                              627         433    
         R2_P                                           0.21       0.27    
                                                      (1.435)     (1.681)  
                         Constant                    -39.860**   -38.705** 
                                                      (0.026)     (0.027)  
                         Ideology (Liberalism)         -0.037     -0.037   
                                                      (0.053)     (0.052)  
                         Competitive Districts (%)     0.007       0.016   
                                                      (0.674)     (0.705)  
                         Human SERVE (annual)         16.886**   16.191**  
                                                      (1.030)              
                         South                       -19.467**             
                                                      (0.136)     (0.136)  
                         Year Counter (from 1983)      0.280*     0.298*   
                                                      (1.137)     (1.143)  
                         Unified GOP                 -16.671**   -15.428** 
                                                      (1.341)     (1.352)  




2. Why Kōbo? A Candidate Selection Method for Party-Building Under the 




Kōbo, an open recruitment candidate selection method (CSM) has been widely adopted 
by political parties in Japan, including the two major parties (at least up to the 2012 election), the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The Japanese term 
kōbo literally means public advertisement of a post, i.e. the opening of a position is publicly 
announced, and anyone who is interested and qualified can apply. The precise institutional design 
of kōbo differs from party to party, but they can be broadly grouped into two categories based on 
the location of implementation within the party structure: centralized and decentralized. The 
centralized kōbo is managed primarily by the party’s national headquarters, while the prefectural 
branches and the district chapters play dominant roles under the decentralized type. The former 
became well known for its use by the DPJ for elections for the House of Representatives (or HR, 
Shugiin) in the Diet from 2000 to 2009, while the latter was implemented widely by the LDP for 
the 2012 HR election.18 The decentralized version was more conducive to conflict resolution 
                                                  
18 The development of kōbo took a very different form under the LDP. The LDP did not widely conduct kōbo 
for national offices until the 2005 HR election, for which 20 candidates were chosen through a special 




among nomination competitors and worked well for a party like the LDP, with entrenched local 
organizations. Parties with relatively short histories and fewer developed organizations have 
typically employed the centralized form. In this paper, I focus on the latter, specifically the kōbo 
system adopted by the DPJ. The DPJ used kōbo through its party-building period, as it emerged 
from a young opposition party in the late 1990s into a ruling party by beating the long-time 
dominant LDP in 2009. This paper covers four HR elections between 2000 and 2009. 
Until the very end of the 20th century, politics in Japan was widely regarded as the world 
of “special people” (such as those born into political families, for example), and the road to 
national politics seemed closed to ordinary people (Hayashi and Tsumura 2011). The DPJ kōbo 
purported to open up the nominations to those who previously had no access to politics by 
actively recruiting non-traditional type of candidates. By recruiting candidates through kōbo, the 
DPJ tried to present itself to the public as a “hirakareta seito” (open party), in contrast to the old 
closed LDP. However, most of these outsider aspirants naturally had no pre-established support 
organization, which would have helped them win elections. Thus, the fact that the DPJ kōbo 
specifically targeted these “ordinary people” as candidates poses a puzzle: Why would a party 
actively seek candidates whose expected electability was much lower than those who were 
                                                                                                                                                                 
prefecture-level kōbo). For the 2009 HR election, the LDP nominated only six candidates in total through 
prefecture-level kōbo. The LDP established the practice of prefecture-level kōbo for all open HR districts after 




traditionally regarded as quality candidates? In this paper, I argue that the main motivation 
behind the DPJ kōbo was to fill in vacant single member districts (SMDs) over its party-building 
period, rather than genuinely seeking fresh outsider types. In that sense, kōbo was a rational 
strategy for the DPJ, which was a relatively new party building itself up in order to compete 
evenly against the LDP under the mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system.19  
After the electoral reform of 1994, with the transition from the single non-transferable 
vote in multi-member districts (SNTV/MMD) to the mixed system of SMD and proportional 
representation (PR) for HR elections, it became imperative for opposition parties aiming to take 
over power to adopt kōbo. In order to win a majority of seats, at the very least, a party had to 
field candidates in a majority of the SMDs. Especially for fledgling parties such as the DPJ, it 
was considered important to field candidates in as many SMDs as possible, even where the party 
seemed hopeless, because of expected contamination effects SMD candidates would have on the 
PR vote. However, under the Japanese Clientelistic system, it was not easy for opposition parties 
to attract quality candidates without any pork barrels to deliver. The parties suffering from an 
inadequacy of candidates thus had to turn to outsider amateurs through kōbo. For outsider 
aspirants, kōbo was their only opportunity to seek office, even if they had to run in weak, 
                                                  
19 Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) combines first-past-the-post SMD with PR party list. The difference 
from mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) is that, under MMM, the two tiers work completely 




hopeless districts. Many of these kōbo-selected challengers lost elections and faded into the dim 
memory of history, while the top cream of them won seats and survived as members of 
Parliament (MPs). Through this process, the party established itself, and gradually started to 
attract quality candidates. This paper argues that the DPJ-style kōbo was a necessary strategy for 
a party-building era under MMM by showing that the DPJ kōbo created increasingly more 
insider candidates over time.  
The importance of studying kōbo is ever increasing with its adoption by relatively new 
third parties, such as the Your Party (Minna no To, 2009-), the Tax Cut Japan (Genzei Nippon, 
2010-), and the Japan Restoration Party (Nohon Ishin no Kai, 2012-). The versions of kōbo used 
by them are more or less similar to the one adopted by the DPJ. While these new forces purport 
to be “open” and attempt to develop “fresh” images by using kōbo, the actual implementation 
and decision-making process has rarely been transparent. This study of the DPJ case provides a 
valuable opportunity to examine what could happen under a non-transparent centralized kōbo 
system, which has become a very common CSM for young Japanese parties. Using the list of 
kōbo-selected candidates obtained from the DPJ national headquarters, in addition to information 
collected from newspaper articles, I built an original data set covering backgrounds of all DPJ 
candidates who ran in SMDs for the HR elections between 2000 and 2009. With the data, I show 




insider candidates over time. Using case studies based on the interviews with DPJ Diet members 
and party officials, I will illuminate how the lack of transparency during the selection processes 
allowed this to happen.  
The rest of the paper is organized in the following order. In the second section, I elaborate 
on my argument that recruitment of outsiders was not the DPJ priority, by examining the strategy 
of targeting candidates with low electability and placing the DPJ kōbo in a broader context of 
CSM studies. The third section offers a brief introduction to the Japanese CSM and explains how 
the DPJ kōbo was implemented. The fourth section investigates the characteristics of kōbo 
candidates by examining them on the openness scale and revealing how insiders increasingly 
used kōbo over time. The case studies in the fifth section will reveal how manipulative the DPJ 
kōbo system was in reality, by showing the limit of non-transparent CSM with an exclusive 
selectorate. A brief conclusion follows.  
 
2.2. Kōbo for Party-Building under MMM 
The common image of DPJ kōbo targeting non-traditional outsider aspirants came largely 
from the way the Japanese media has portrayed the system. The DPJ itself of course repeatedly 
propagated the image of an open party by using kōbo. The party emphasized that its goal was to 




by using kōbo was not unique to the DPJ, but was also employed by other young parties striving 
for power. The claim resonated especially well against the backdrop of political stagnation 
through the 1990s and the 2000s during which the competence of politicians became an alarming 
buzzword in the media. It was an era when people witnessed the collapse of traditional 
faction-based recruitment mechanism, seshu (hereditary succession of support bases and 
electoral turf within bonds of kinship, typically from a father to his son) became rampant, and the 
influx of new blood to the Diet halted. The media repeatedly questioned the leadership and 
policy expertise of MPs of the ruling parties, implying that Japanese politics was in hopeless 
chaos largely because it was filled with hereditary MPs, and the path to the Diet was closed to 
talented people who would have been able to offer solutions. This situation led to the 
development of a rosy idea: We would get better politicians if we opened the door to those who 
had been excluded, and kōbo would do this magic. Thus the seshu-infested status quo, which was 
so outrageously exclusive, helped kōbo look like a drastic reform, when in reality, it was no more 
than simply opening up entry to the nomination process without expanding the selectorate or 
adding transparency to the decision making process.  
Most of the newspaper coverage referring to kōbo had been disproportionately positive so 
far. Few elaborated on the potential risks of throwing many amateurs into the Diet or the 




training system. This uncritical attitude by the media was applied to kōbo of any party. One 
should not overlook, however, the fact that an interest in democratic representation has been 
mostly missing in the discourse about kōbo. People felt that the problem with politics was that it 
was dominated by a narrow circle of insiders, and they expected kōbo to change the composition 
of the candidate pool. This concern did not develop into a question about how representative the 
MPs were in terms of the electorate. This low interest in the concept of representation explains 
why little attention has been paid to the impact of CSM reform on the outcome of candidate 
selection.  
Given the dominant media-created image of kōbo, the question is how important it really 
was for the DPJ to recruit outsiders. The DPJ did not intend to stigmatize the traditional 
candidates, who were well prepared for running electoral campaigns and had higher electability. 
In fact, it wanted to recruit those quality candidates if it could. However, most of the vacant and 
available districts were difficult ones, with incumbents from other parties. Quality challengers 
would not run for these very difficult seats but would wait for better opportunities. The party had 
difficulty attracting them and had no choice but to recruit outsider candidates through kōbo. 
These candidates would appreciate the opportunity to run in even difficult districts because they 
were precious and otherwise not available opportunities for them to become MPs. 




electability. Several indicators have been looked at when determining this trait. In the U.S., for 
example, prior experience in public office has been used as an indicator of candidate quality 
(Banks and Kiewiet 1989; Jacobson 1990). In Japan, where a system of koenkai (local support 
groups developed by and attached to individual MPs) developed under SNTV/MMD (Curtis 
1971) and is still influential under SMD. Almost two decades after the electoral reform, scholars 
often define candidate quality in terms of the organized base of support. Based on this standard, 
the list of backgrounds for quality candidates typically includes prefectural governors, assembly 
members, city mayors, members of the House of Councilors (HC, Sangiin) of the Diet, and heirs 
to ex-HR members (Scheiner 2006). Scheiner also adds national-level bureaucrats and television 
news reporters to this list because they attract strong support. Wiener (2011) further adds 
graduates of political training academies (such as Matsushita Institute of Government and 
Management), city councilors, and aides to MPs. Since the DPJ was not very far away from the 
LDP in terms of ideology, with many of its MPs originally splitting from the LDP, and because 
local politicians often ran in elections unaffiliated to any major national political parties, many 
quality candidates had no problem choosing between the LDP and the DPJ based on expected 
electoral opportunities. However, local politicians, the main source of quality candidates, were 
strongly attracted to the ruling party under the Japanese system of Clientelism based on financial 




candidates (Scheiner 2006). Because of this problem, Scheiner suggested in 2006 that the 
opposition might have to wait for a further break-up of the LDP and those defectors to join them. 
It was true that the electoral prospects of the DPJ largely improved after the Liberal Party 
merged with it in 2003; however, instead of just waiting for windfall joiners, the DPJ adopted 
kōbo to tackle the problem. 
The targets of the DPJ kōbo were outsiders. These were the exact opposite of traditional 
quality candidates. Typical examples of outsider candidates included company employees, 
bankers, lawyers, and doctors. They were low quality candidates in terms of electability when 
measured by the traditional standards of an organizational support base. A party seeking power 
by targeting low electability aspirants may seem odd, but the DPJ had no choice. It needed 
candidates immediately and lacked the time and resources to train new stock inside the party. 
They needed willing outsiders to jump in as self-prepared candidates. Developing local party 
organizations was a pressing task for the party in order to build a steady support base, and 
putting enthusiastic outsiders in charge of this task by sending them into districts as nominated 
candidates was a relatively low-cost strategy for the party. Fielding many outsider candidates 
helped promote the image of an open party. Fielding candidates in the vast majority of 300 
SMDs was necessary in order to convince voters that the party was seriously trying to take over 




young party in anticipation of contamination effects, i.e. improvement of the party’s performance 
in the PR tier by fielding candidates in corresponding SMDs (Herron and Nishikawa 2001).  
Many outsider candidates lost elections and faded into the dim pages of history, while the 
party continued building and developing. This does not mean that outsider candidates were 
deceived into believing that they had better electoral prospects than they actually had. They were 
not irrational suicide candidates, either, in that they were maximizing their probability of 
winning seats. The DPJ kōbo did not allow kōbo-selected candidates to apply for the districts 
with DPJ incumbents. Most of the competitive districts were not available for kōbo-qualified 
aspirants because insiders, through traditional recruitment paths, had already taken them. The 
DPJ had a hard time filling those districts with incumbents from other parties, and kōbo was 
conducted to find candidates to run in those spots. Seeing limited electoral hopes, quality 
candidates would not run but chose to wait for better opportunities.  
But why, then, would even weaker, outsider candidates decide to run? Because it was still 
the best opportunity for them. Banks and Kiewiet (1989) explain why it is rational for weak, 
un-experienced candidates not to wait for an open-seat competition but to run when the 
opposition party incumbents are running in the U.S. congressional races. Under SMD, there is 
little hope for a candidate to win in the general election without being an official candidate of the 




when the seat is open and all the quality candidates jump in to compete in the primary, it is best 
for her to run against the opposition incumbent when she can at least win the party nomination 
unopposed, even if the odds of winning in the general election is very small. The weak candidate 
maximizes her probability of winning a seat by challenging the opposition incumbent. The same 
logic applies to the DPJ outsider aspirants. They would apply for kōbo knowing that only those 
difficult seats would be available for them, because it was still their best opportunity. Outsider 
candidates had no chance to secure nomination for safe districts by challenging DPJ incumbents 
or by competing against well-connected insider aspirants through traditional paths. Kōbo was the 
only realistic opportunity for them to secure DPJ nomination, and thus it was a rational strategy 
for them to apply.  
Although the DPJ kōbo was successful in recruiting these amateur outsiders to a certain 
extent, I argue in this paper that this was not its priority. Kōbo was not a reform that would 
guarantee any dramatic change in the nomination outcome. It allowed the entry of outsider 
aspirants to the selection process, but whether it was going to have any impact on the nomination 
outcome was unclear at best because of the limited nature of the reform. Hazan and Rahat (2010) 
emphasize the importance of studying CSMs in a systematic way by listing its four major 
dimensions: candidacy, selectorate, decentralization, and appointment/voting. Candidacy defines 




Centralization/decentralization refers to the location of the decision-making. Appointment/voting 
refers to the way the nomination decision is made. During the past few decades, CSM reforms 
took place along the selectorate dimension in many developed democracies, and the trend of the 
world seems to be in the direction of the expansion of selectorate, specifically in the form of 
direct primaries. The Conservative Party in the U.K. has experimented with open primaries in 
more than 100 districts during the latter half of the 2000s (Williams and Paun 2011). Nigeria 
recently revived its candidate selection system by legislating optional primaries into law (Shoji 
2011). All major political parties in South Korea have tried to appeal to voters by making them 
look as democratic as possible. They have done this by introducing regular, online, mobile phone, 
or even SNS primaries (Go 2012). In Taiwan, both of the two major parties institutionalized 
candidate selection methods, which allowed opinion polls to determine the nomination. Note, 
however, that the Taiwanese polling primary did not necessarily ensure more participation by 
party members or voters since participants had to be randomly chosen in order to receive a 
survey phone call (Yu et al. 2012).  
 
< Insert Figure 2.1 about here > 
 




along the candidacy dimension. The DPJ kōbo opened up candidacy entry without expanding 
selectorate. While it did not change the location of decision-making within the vertical structure 
of party organization, it may have centralized the process by giving increased leverage to the 
national headquarters. The decision-making of DPJ kōbo has never been transparent and has 
never used primaries. Figure 2.1 shows this DPJ reform on the conceptual “openness” map of 
CSM. The candidacy openness scale is on the y-axis and the selectorate openness scale is on the 
x-axis. Hazan and Rahat (2010) use the concept of inclusiveness instead of openness to point out 
that one cannot democratize a CSM or expect a CSM reform to have a substantive impact on the 
nomination outcome unless the inclusiveness (openness) on the selectorate dimension is 
enhanced. The U.S. primaries are very open on both dimensions and are located at the upper 
right corner, exemplifying the most democratized form of CSM. On this map, the DPJ moves up 
along the vertical candidacy axis with an introduction of kōbo while remaining low on the 
horizontal selectorate axis. The DPJ kōbo, which opened up candidacy without reforming on 
other dimensions, was not a guarantee for an impact on the outcome. In fact, as will be revealed 
in the case studies later in the paper, DPJ kōbo was susceptible to all kinds of manipulation. I 
argue in this paper that, although the kōbo system did attract outsiders, that was not the priority 
for the party. For the DPJ, the pressing issue was how to overcome the insufficiency of 




in this paper that it was a necessary strategy for a young party building itself under MMM, by 
showing that the party did not exclude insiders from using kōbo once the party became large 
enough to attract those quality candidates.  
 
2.3. Candidate Selection in Japan 
The LDP (1955-), the long-time ruling party in postwar Japan, used to have each of its 
habatsu (faction) recruit candidates under SNTV/MMD before the 1994 electoral reform (Krauss 
and Pekkanen 2011). The supply of human resources came mainly from a traditional quality 
candidate pool, such as local and national electable office-holders, national-level bureaucrats, 
and heirs of MPs. For other smaller parties, it was the norm to recruit candidates from affiliated 
organizations, such as trade unions or from within the hierarchy of party organizations. By the 
early 1990s, the prevalence and evils of seshu under the LDP regime was widely criticized 
(Inada 2009; Uesugi 2009). After the LDP-dominated 1955 regime collapsed in 1993, the 
non-LDP coalition government reformed the electoral system in 1994 by introducing MMM (a 
combination of SMD and PR) for the HR elections. Three hundred SMDs were apportioned to 47 
prefectures in proportion to the population size. For the PR tier, the whole nation was divided 
into 11 block districts to elect 200 seats in the 1996 election and 180 seats for the 2000 and later 




dual candidates were stricken off the PR lists once they were elected in the SMDs. Parties could 
list multiple candidates at the same rank on their PR lists, and if the party was entitled to fewer 
seats than the number of candidates listed at that rank, candidates had to compete against each 
other by sekihai-ritsu (seat loss ratio, i.e. the proportion of their vote in SMDs to the winners in 
the districts). It is widely agreed that the major motivations behind this reform were to remedy 
the problem of corrupt campaign finance and elections based on pork-barrel politics under 
SNTV/MMD, and to enhance the establishment of a two-party system with a realistic prospect 
for power shifts between the two. Hazan and Voerman (2006) argue that electoral reforms have 
consequences for parties’ candidate selection methods. This surely was the case in Japan. In a 
middle size district under SNTV/MMD, multiple faction-based candidates from the LDP often 
competed against each other (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004), which made elections more expensive 
(Cox and Thies 1998). Parties also had to nominate an appropriate number of candidates in order 
to maximize its seats (Browne and Patterson 1999). However, the fact that the elections were 
faction-centered and candidate-centered made the official nomination by the party not critical. 
The LDP often took conservative independents under its wing after they won elections. In 
contrast, under SMD, parties had to narrow down their field of aspirants to a single candidate in 
each district in order to win the election. The party nomination thus became critically important 




Although its first practice appeared slightly before the introduction of SMD, kōbo was 
widely adopted in response to the new electoral system. In its early days, mainly opposition 
parties tried out kōbo. The Socialist Party of Japan (1945-1996), then suffering from a shortage 
of candidates, was the first of the major national parties to recruit candidates for elected positions 
through kōbo in 1990, although the practice was limited to the local city/ward levels. It is widely 
recognized that the first political party to adopt kōbo for national elections was the People’s New 
Party (Nihon Shinto, 1992-1994). It fielded three candidates recruited through kōbo in the 1993 
HR election. One of them was Yukio Edano, who later became a leading figure in the DPJ. After 
the 1994 reform, it became imperative for any opposition party vying for power to field 
candidates in most of the 300 SMDs. The New Frontier Party (Shinshinto, 1994-1997) used kōbo 
extensively for candidate recruitment and fielded candidates in as many as 235 districts in 1996 
for the first HR election under SMD. It was the first time for the largest opposition party to field 
candidates in a majority of HR districts since the SPJ in the 1958 general election.  
 
< Insert Figure 2.2 about here > 
 
The kōbo system was made more visible by the DPJ. The DPJ was formally established 




three smaller parties into the old DPJ, which had been established in 1996. The members of the 
new DPJ came from different backgrounds: some of its leading figures originally belonged to the 
LDP, while others came from the Democratic Socialist Party, which had been established by the 
conservative wing of the old Socialist Party. In 2003, another major conservative force, the 
Liberal Party, dissolved, and joined the DPJ right before the HR election, which increased DPJ 
seats to 137 in the HR and 67 in the HC. Figure 2.2 shows the proportion of seats the DPJ and 
the LDP won in the HR elections from 2000 to 2009. Although the DPJ was still regarded as one 
of the small parties at the time of the 2000 HR election (in which the DPJ won only 80 seats 
under SMD and 47 seats under PR), its electoral prospect in the 2003 HR election was suddenly 
boosted by the grand merge with the LP. The DPJ won 105 seats under SMD and elected 72 
candidates on the PR list. Facing the extremely popular LDP Prime Minister Jun-ichiro Koizumi, 
the DPJ lost hugely in the 2005 HR election (in which the DPJ won in only 52 SMDs and elected 
61 on the party list). This forced many candidates who lost twice in a row to drop out, which in 
turn left the DPJ with many districts to fill for the 2009 HR election. This development took 
place over a decade and was the backdrop against which the DPJ experimented with its new 
kōbo system.  
 





As an opposition party with limited power, the DPJ had to overcome a serious shortage of 
candidates from the beginning. The party tackled the problem by repeatedly conducting kōbo 
every few years on a massive scale. The DPJ held nationwide general kōbo five times between 
1999 and 2009.20 All of these were conducted in a similar manner, and each kōbo supplied 
candidates for the four HR elections from 2000 to 2009.21 There were 73 kōbo-selected 
candidates who debuted in the 2000-2009 HR elections under the DPJ banner.22 By using kōbo 
extensively, the DPJ almost tied with the LDP by running candidates in as many as 289 SMDs in 
the 2005 HR election (Figure 2.3). There is a consensus that the DPJ was able to take over power 
in 2009 when the political tide favored it because it had prepared by fielding candidates in 271 
                                                  
20 The fifth kōbo  was conducted after the 2009 HR election. In addition to these general ones, the DPJ 
headquarters conducted a female-focused kōbo  in 1999 and a district-specified kōbo  in 2005. The latter 
was special in the sense that vacant districts were listed in advance, which had remained available because they 
were all extremely difficult for the DPJ. The general kōbo  conducted by the national headquarters provided 
candidates for the House of Councilors elections between 2000 and 2010 as well, while some kenrens (i.e. 
prefecture branches) conducted their own kōbo  in parallel.  
21 The author located in newspapers nine cases of kōbo conducted by the DPJ kenrens at the prefecture level 
for the HR elections, between 2000 and 2009, and there might have been more. However, these cases were not 
recognized by the national headquarters, and no systematic records have been kept for them. For this paper, I 
focus on the national kōbo conducted by the headquarters. 
22 Two of these 73 kōbo candidates first debuted in special elections, in 2002 and 2005 respectively, in which 
one won and the other lost. However, for simplification, both of them are treated as novice candidates in the 




SMDs with the help of the kōbo system. After 2009, however, with most districts filled by 
incumbents, interest in kōbo plummeted within the DPJ.23 
 
2.4. DPJ Kōbo in Its Institution 
In this section, I describe the general candidate selection rules for the DPJ and its kōbo 
system. Incumbent MPs are given priority over others and are re-nominated automatically, in 
most cases, in the DPJ. Candidates who lost two elections in a row are not nominated for a third 
time, unless it is agreed on in a fresh selection process that there is no better candidate available. 
Only when the district has no incumbent or held-over candidate from the previous election, does 
the party look for a new candidate. In such a case, the regular candidate selection process for an 
HR race is initiated at the district level.  
Figure 2.4 shows the basic structure of the DPJ organization. Below the national 
headquarters, there are 47 prefectural units called “kenren.” A kenren is a federation of local DPJ 
                                                  
23 After major breakaway by the Ozawa faction in July 2012, the DPJ once again faced the daunting task of 
filling many vacant districts. However, in contrast to the pre-2009 election period during which the constant 
supply of kōbo applicants was sustained by the prospect that the DPJ would take over power soon, the 
unpopularity of the party attracted few aspirants to its kōbo. Interestingly, it was under the LDP, now in 
opposition, that kōbo developed into an established practice, in more decentralized and diverse manners. The 
largest difference to the DPJ kōbo was the fact that the LPD kōbo after 2005 was always conducted at the 
prefectural level, for each specific district that opened up. A selection committee either at the prefectural or 
district level would preside over the process. This institutional design reflected the history of a decentralized 




chapters within the prefecture, and the chapters are organized at different levels such as towns, 
villages, cities, HR districts, and HC districts. The kenren office has the final say on any decision 
within the prefectural boundary. When there is a vacancy, the HR district chapter works with the 
kenren in selecting a candidate. The kenren then asks the national headquarters for endorsement, 
which will make the nomination official. For candidate selection for any national offices, the 
national headquarters reserves the final say. When the district chapter and the kenren fail to field 
or agree on a candidate, the headquarters takes over the selection process. This was common, 
especially in the early 2000s, since the DPJ was a relatively young party with weak local 
organizations in many prefectures. This is where the national kōbo comes in. 
 
< Insert Figure 2.4 about here > 
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The order of a typical DPJ kōbo process between 2000 and 2009, as described by DPJ 
headquarters officials, is shown in Figure 2.5.24 An applicant had to pass three hurdles in order 
to become an official DPJ candidate: passing the kōbo screening (stage 1), securing informal 
nomination for a district from the district chapter and the prefectural branch (stage 2), and getting 
                                                  




the district-designated nomination officially approved by the national headquarters (stage 3). 
Technically, the kōbo system covered only the first stage, and all non-kōbo candidates also had to 
go through the latter two steps. Below, we start from the first stage of kōbo, and then review how 
the latter steps looked in the eyes of kōbo screenees. 
The kōbo recruitments for national elections were directly conducted by the national 
headquarters. The headquarters had to take charge because kōbo was used to find candidates to 
run in vacant districts when the kenrens could not find anyone on their own. The national party 
leaders made it clear by the 2005 election that the party would try to field candidates in all 300 
SMDs. The party also attempted to use kōbo as a public relations opportunity for enhancing its 
image, and the first step of the kōbo process began by putting large, flashy ads in major 
newspapers, spending about 50 to 100 million Japanese yen each time. The first stage screening 
took place at the national headquarters office. The applicants submitted curricula vitae and 
essays, which were examined by five to six DPJ officials. A party official who had participated in 
this paper-screening process described the selection criteria as follows: 
There were applicants who tried to show off their policy expertise in the essays. For 
example, a guy who worked for a bank discussed a grandiose economic theory in his 
essay. We paid absolutely no attention to those policy-related parts. Rather, we looked for 
applicants’ enthusiasm, or let’s say, guts, in their essays. They were working for first-tier 
banks or companies, and they would have to quit in order to run in an election. We 
needed to know whether they were truly determined to pursue a new political career.25  
                                                  




Those who passed the initial document screening advanced to the next round of 
screening—in-person interview sessions. The chair and the vice chair, both incumbent MPs, of 
the party’s election campaign committee participated in this stage. They interviewed each 
applicant for about 20 minutes on what he or she wanted to do as an MP and in which district he 
or she wished to run. Interviewers again paid less attention to applicants’ policy expertise than 
their personality, in an attempt to figure out whether the applicants could endure, sometimes 
“irrational” (as a party official described), hardships in electoral campaigns, get along with the 
local party office holders and supporters, and pursue a political career for an extended period of 
time. There was a reason behind this electorally oriented approach to the screening. The DPJ was 
a hodgepodge of groups with different backgrounds and support bases, thus the selection 
committee could not use policy orientations as selection criteria. This condition led to screening 
based on not only curricula vitae but also on superficial virtues that were not necessarily related 
to becoming a good MP. For example, in addition to education and career records, English test 
scores, experiences of living abroad, youth, and good appearances were signals the committee 
often relied on. It is said that the DPJ kōbo produced a generation of young good-looking 
elite-like MPs who might have been more attractive to voters than their older cohorts, but lacked 
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Although the total number of applicants for the DPJ national kōbo increased from 564 in 
1999 to nearly 2000 in 2009 (Figure 2.6), the odds of passing this first stage of screening 
remained about one to nine (Figure 2.7). Only those kōbo-screenees who passed the first stage 
were eligible to advance to the next stage—seeking district nomination. The headquarters served 
as an intermediary by matching these screenees and the kenrens with vacant districts. In 
matching, the applicants’ personal roots in the district or prefecture counted heavily. Finding 
districts to run in was often the toughest hurdle for kōbo applicants. Less than 20% of the kōbo 
screenees eventually became official party candidates and ran in elections. When the DPJ was an 
opposition party, it had many districts with no official candidates. Many of those vacant districts 
were either solidly LDP with little prospect for any DPJ candidate to win, or already had 
informal local favorite sons, making it difficult for parachute kōbo candidates to land in. An 
incumbent MP who was one of the early-time kōbo successes described his experience as 
follows: 
After I passed the kōbo screening, the national headquarters simply handed me a piece of 
paper with the list of “vacant” districts where official candidates had not been nominated 
yet. I kept working for a company while travelling across Japan on my own expense 




marked as “vacant” on the list already embracing a local favorite.26 
Table 2.1 shows the timing of each of the three stages of kōbo as they actually took place for the 
2000-2009 HR elections. The periods for the second stage are punctuated by the first and the last 
cases to obtain district nominations. The fact that it took some candidates more than a year to 
obtain a district nomination after passing the initial kōbo screening shows how difficult it was to 
overcome the second hurdle.  
 
< Insert Table 2.1 about here > 
 
Figure 2.8 shows the percent of applicants who managed to overcome the second hurdle. 
The number of candidates was narrowed down by 12% in the first stage, and 18% in the second 
stage. Only 2% of the initial applicants ended up running in the HR elections. This makes the 
kōbo process look extremely exclusive at a glance. It is, however, difficult to judge the quality of 
competition because the party never revealed any details about the applicants except for those 
who were officially nominated. We do not know the identity, profession, age, background, and 
prior political experience of those applicants who were not nominated. Running for a public 
office in Japan means one has to quit his or her current job before the election, in most cases. No 
                                                  




one wants to quit before knowing if he or she gets the party’s nomination and can actually run in 
an election. Few people would apply for kōbo if their names were not kept confidential, and that 
is why no party has ever released its list of kōbo applicants. Non-disclosure of applicant lists, on 
top of the closed-door screening with unclear criteria, makes the whole kōbo selection process 
extremely non-transparent. We do not know what criteria selection was based on or what pool of 
people those candidates came from. 
 
< Insert Figure 2.8 about here > 
 
The third hurdle, approval by the national headquarters, was not an automatic rubber 
stamp. The person was not officially regarded as a DPJ candidate until obtaining final approval 
from the headquarters. Although the national headquarters normally tried to respect local 
selections and most of the local choices ended up being endorsed, it would suspend approval or 
even replace candidates if kenren-chosen candidates seemed too weak in the polls or did not 
seem to be campaigning hard enough. 
 
2.5. Kōbo Candidates 




candidates to see if kōbo recruited different types of candidates than other traditional recruitment 
paths did. Second, by using a measure for “openness” of candidates, I will show how 
composition of kōbo-selected candidates changed over time. Third, by revealing how media 
treated kōbo-selected insiders and outsiders, I will show how the way the party used kōbo 
changed over time.  
 
< Insert Figure 2.9 about here > 
 
For comparing the kōbo-recruited candidates to others, I divide all 1,200 district-year 
observations of the DPJ responses to HR elections into five categories: incumbent, repeater, 
party-picked novice, kōbo novice, and no candidate. Figure 2.9 shows the frequency of each 
category in each election. The incumbent category covers all incumbents, including those who 
originally debuted through kōbo in the past. The number of DPJ incumbents increased from 2000 
to 2005, but dropped in 2009 because of the huge defeat in 2005. The repeater category covers 
those who lost in the previous election and were trying again. In other words, they were not 
newly nominated but were held over from the previous election. The two novice categories, 
party-picked and kōbo, cover those who ran in the HR election for the first time in each year. The 




headquarters. The party-picked novices are those who were nominated through other traditional 
paths, mainly direct recruitment by kenrens or local chapters. Comparing the characteristics of 
these two novice groups should illuminate the impact of kōbo on the nomination outcome. Those 
who originally debuted as kōbo novices and ran again as either incumbents or non-incumbents 
were categorized with other non-kōbo candidates under the incumbent or the repeater categories. 
This is because if the candidates were elected in the first race, they were automatically given 
re-nomination as incumbents, and those who lost the first time were still given another chance 
almost automatically. From the party’s perspective, nominations for these districts were 
predetermined and were not the target of nomination activities. Thus, keeping novices separate, 
while bundling others together, helps highlight the characteristics of the newly nominated 
candidates. The “no candidate” category covers the districts that had no DPJ candidate running. 
In Figure 2.9, we can see that the number of kōbo novices remains much smaller than that of the 
party-picked novices through the years. The party-picked novices decreased from 2000 to 2005, 
with an increase in incumbents, but the loss in incumbents after 2005 seems to have been picked 
up by all four non-incumbent categories more or less equally.  
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To clarify how the novice, incumbent, and repeater categories cut across the 
kōbo-selected group, Figure 2.10 shows the number of kōbo candidates, using these categories, 
in each HR election from 2000 to 2009. There were 17, 9, 18, and 29 kōbo novices in the 2000, 
2003, 2005, and 2009 HR elections, respectively. Repeaters and incumbents existed only after 
2003. Each of these counted 7, 4, and 5, and 3, 8, and 7, in the 2003, 2005, and 2009 HR 
elections, respectively. Figure 2.11 shows that the ratio of novices among all kōbo-recruited 
candidates increased over time. Figure 2.12 shows the number of kōbo candidates who were 
elected in the categories of novices, repeaters, and incumbents. It reveals how difficult it was for 
the kōbo novices to win. The only exception was in 2009 when the DPJ won by a landslide.  
 
< Insert Table 2.2 about here > 
< Insert Figure 2.13 about here > 
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Some of the typical media-created images of kōbo-selected candidates (and MPs) are 




background characteristics for incumbents, repeaters, party-picked novices, and kōbo novices. 
Figure 2.13 displays the comparison across these four groups visually. The average age at 
election time of incumbents, repeaters, party-picked novices, and kōbo novices were 54.8, 48.5, 
45.3, and 38.3, respectively. The kōbo candidates were younger than the incumbents, repeaters, 
and party-picked novices. However, when we look at the gender balance of the candidates, the 
kōbo category shows little difference from the party-picked category. While both incumbents and 
repeaters were slightly below 8% female, the two novice categories were about 13% female. 
Figure 2.14 shows how the gender balance changed over time within the two novice categories. 
Surprisingly, the female share of the kōbo category starts out right below 30% in 2000, drops to 
just above 10% in 2003, falls to zero in 2005, and recovers to slightly below 15% in 2009. The 
high number of female candidates in 2000 is due in large part to the female-focused special kōbo 
in 1999. After 2000, the female ratio within the kōbo category remains below that of the 
party-picked category. It suggests that kōbo did not necessarily work favorably for female 
aspirants unless some special effort was made to recruit them by the party (and the DPJ did so 
only once at the very early stage of its party building). 
Being a “parachute” candidate means that the candidate did not have local credentials, 
and was sent into the prefecture by the party headquarters. Candidates need to have some prior 




hard to win in rural districts without full support from the local party organizations and 
politicians. This is not easy for parachute candidates to garner. However, since being a parachute 
candidate could be a huge disadvantage, especially in rural areas where “chien” (local 
connection) counts a lot in the voters’ minds, most candidates would claim that they are not 
parachute candidates if they were born or grew up there, went to school or college there, or 
worked (even just for a few years) in the prefecture. For all the 1,070 DPJ candidates for the 
2000-2009 HR elections, excluding the no-candidate category, I checked these three criteria and 
coded the candidate as a parachute candidate if he or she did not fall into any of these categories. 
Table 2.2 shows that only 27.8% of party-picked novices were parachute candidates, while as 
much as 37.1% of kōbo novices were. For many party-picked novices who lost in the first race 
and never ran again, especially those in early elections before candidates had homepages, 
background information was not always available. That means for some party-picked novices, 
the information on local connection may have been missed, and their parachute rate may have 
been overestimated. Thus, the conventional image of kōbo candidates having fewer local 
credentials than candidates selected through some traditional path does seem to be supported by 
the data. The DPJ emphasized the virtue of kōbo in order to contrast itself against the LDP, 
which was suffering from the negative image of hereditary politics. The political family category 




parents), second generation (including third and fourth generations who were born to politically 
prominent parents, but did not inherit their parents’ electoral turfs directly), and others who have 
other types of political lineage within the family, such as having an uncle who served as a mayor. 
No kōbo candidate was seshu in the strictest sense, and the political family rate of 7.6% was 
much lower than that of party-picked novices, repeaters, and incumbents.  
Checking some of the occupational backgrounds, which used to be important under the 
traditional recruitment mechanism, also provides insights into the impact of kōbo. Table 2.2 
shows that only 17.1% of kōbo novices had prior political experience at some local level, while 
as much as 30.4% of party-picked novices did. This relative lack of political experience within 
the kōbo novices seems partially offset by the fact that a larger portion of kōbo novices had 
served as aides to MPs (31.4%) than the party-picked novices (27.6%). The fact that the MP 
aides, those closest to the MPs, took advantage of the kōbo system, defies the open image the 
party tried to promote with kōbo. Another important source of recruitment under the 1955 regime 
was national-level bureaucrats. Some argued that kōbo made it easier for bureaucrats to become 
MPs by providing a shortcut around warming up to party faction bosses. However, the table 
shows that the kōbo novices were actually less likely to have been bureaucrats (7.6%) when 
compared to the party-picked novices (12.7%). The educational records show that the kōbo 




party-picked novices (13.7%).  
In summary, compared to the party-picked novices, the kōbo novices were more likely to 
be parachute candidates, to have more education, and to have worked previously as MP aides. 
They were no more likely to be female and were less likely to have moved up the political ladder 
from lower level offices or have been bureaucrats. In a sense, kōbo seems to have privileged MP 
aides, those who were closer to the power center, and it did not consistently enhance balanced 
gender representation, but, overall, it does seem to have opened the door to some new faces with 
different backgrounds and weaker political ties to the districts.  
In order to test my argument that the composition of kōbo-recruited candidates changed 
over time, I constructed a five-point scale of “openness” for candidates (Table 2.3). Each 
candidate is given one point for being local. Local means the candidate was born or brought up, 
went to school, or worked in the prefecture. Another point is given if the candidate was from a 
political family. This includes being a seshu or second (or later) generation of MPs, or having 
some politicians within the family. An additional point is given for each of the three career 
backgrounds: local politician, MP aide, or bureaucrat. These are all markers of “closedness.” 
Since an open recruitment system should allow people without local credentials, family 




openness score by subtracting the sum of these scores from 4.27 Thus, the scores ranged from 0 
to 4, and the higher the score was, the more “open” the candidate was. Figure 2.15 shows the 
distribution of the openness scores for the four HR elections among all DPJ candidates. The 
overall pattern of distribution turns out to be more or less similar across elections. Figure 2.16 
shows changes in the openness score over time by using the four categories: incumbent, repeater, 
party-picked novice, and kōbo-novice. The kōbo candidates started out at a relatively high score 
(around 3.3), but fell below 2.3 by 2009. The change is dramatic compared to those in other 
categories, which did not change by more than .5. 
 
< Insert Table 2.3 about here > 
< Insert Figure 2.15 about here > 
< Insert Figure 2.16 about here > 
  
What explains the initial high openness score of the kōbo candidates and its constant 
drop? We now turn to detail analyses of kōbo-recruited novices, who debuted in the HR elections 
between 2000 and 2009. Table 2.4 shows the occupational status of these 73 kōbo candidates as 
                                                  
27 Theoretically, a candidate could score up to 5 on this closedness scale, but no candidate covered all three 




of December 1, 2012, by their debut year. There were 46 and 2 incumbents in the HR and the HC, 
respectively.28 Ten of the rest remained in the world of politics, in the form of local politicians, 
party staff, etc. Nine returned to their original occupations, and six were intractable. Table 2.5 
shows the original occupations of these kōbo-selected candidates. The in-preparation category 
represents those who were living without stable, full-time jobs while pursuing (to start) a 
political career. The sudden surge of local politicians in 2009 stands out. Together with the MP 
aides, they constitute the main source of increasing insider types. The employee section, a typical 
source of outsiders, initially starts as a representative and dominant category of kōbo-recruited 
novices, but shows constant decreases over time. Table 2.6 shows the chien (local credentials) 
these candidates had (or did not have). The first category (some connection to the SMD) 
increases in 2005 and jumps up in 2009. The second category (some connection to the prefecture, 
but none to the district) remains almost steady. The no-connection category dips in 2003 and 
2005, but recovers to the 2000 level in 2009. Those with local connections at the district level 
increased constantly in its ratio among kōbo candidates (Figure 2.17). The DPJ kōbo seems to 
have been used increasingly more by those with strong local ties over time. 
 
                                                  
28 Forty-five of them ran in the 2012 HR election. Only one won in SMD, six lost in SMDs but were elected to 




< Insert Table 2.4 about here > 
< Insert Table 2.5 about here > 
< Insert Table 2.6 about here > 
< Insert Figure 2.17 about here > 
 
By using the background information on occupation and others before running in the HR 
elections, I classified all these kōbo novices into two categories: insider and outsider. The 
insiders were those who had some prior political career (such as being local politicians or MP 
aides), had been bureaucrats at the national level, or came from families with professional 
politicians. Outsiders were those who had no clear prior connection to politics, and whose 
professions were not one of those that traditionally served as a pool for future MPs. As shown in 
Table 2.7, the number of insiders among kōbo candidates constantly increased from 1 in 2000 to 
16 in 2009, even though the number of total kōbo candidates dipped in 2003. The number of the 
outsider type dropped in 2003 and 2005, and picked up in 2009. Figure 2.18 makes it clear that 
the proportion of the insiders among kōbo novices increased constantly to 2009.  
 
< Insert Table 2.7 about here > 





As the share of insiders among kōbo-selected candidates increased, we can expect to see 
less kōbo-related publicity efforts by the party. Newspapers would mention in their articles that 
the candidate was selected through kōbo only if the candidate or party positively advertised upon 
announcing nomination. For insider candidates, the party should have seen less value in 
appealing to constituencies the fact that the person was nominated through kōbo. After all, the 
appeal of DPJ kōbo was not its fair or democratic procedures (which did not exist) but about 
recruiting fresh outsider types. Telling the constituency that the party still chose insiders even 
under kōbo would only have damaged the positive image the party had attempted to attach to 
kōbo. In contrast, for outsider candidates, the newspaper coverage was a great opportunity to 
appeal to the voters that they were fresh blood without political baggage or the stigma of insiders. 
To examine how the newspapers reported on the district-level nomination of these 73 kōbo 
novices, I checked coverage in three major newspapers with national circulation in Japan: 
Yomuiri, Asahi, and Maincihi. If kōbo was mentioned in the article covering the nomination 
announcement, the candidate scored 1 point for each newspaper. The scale was made by adding 
the scores from the three newspapers, which ranged from 0 to 3 for each candidate. Figure 2.19 
shows the distribution of scores for the insiders and the outsiders on this newspaper coverage 




who had entered the world of politics as local politicians or MP aides prior to becoming HR 
candidates through kōbo, the label of national kōbo was something they seemed to have wanted 
to downplay.  
 
< Insert Figure 2.19 about here > 
 
The fall of the openness score of kōbo-selected candidates over time and the increase of 
insiders among them suggests that the DPJ had no hesitancy in recruiting insiders through kōbo. 
These insiders, in theory, had access to nominations via traditional non-kōbo paths. If the kōbo 
brand was not going to help their public image, why did they seek nomination through kōbo? 
The answer is found in the non-transparent and thus manipulative nature of the kōbo selection 
process. Actors of intra-party politics increasingly used kōbo, in diverse ways reflecting the 
relationship between the national headquarters and the prefectural branches. We next look into 
case studies covering four different patterns of district assignment.  
 
2.6. DPJ Kōbo on the Ground 
Table 2.8 shows the number of kōbo candidates each prefecture fielded in the HR 




candidates have one or more ordinance-designated cities (with a population of more than 
500,000) within the border, and six of them belong to the major metropolitan areas. Okayama, 
ranking at the top, stands out with seven kōbo candidates, equally dispersed across four elections, 
while it is one of the few non-Tokyo metropolitan area prefectures among those ranked high on 
the list. Each prefectural branch looked at the headquarters-led kōbo system in different ways, 
which led to diverse reactions. Below, I investigate how the national headquarters and the 
kenrens perceived and used kōbo, drawing on the interviews of party officials from the 
headquarters and some kenrens. First, I start by reviewing the patterns of kenren reactions to 
kōbo, as perceived by some national headquarters staff. Then, I discuss four case studies on how 
kenren officials reacted to kōbo.  
 
< Insert Table 2.8 about here > 
 
2.6.1 Placement of Kōbo Candidates as Seen by DPJ Headquarters 
Although a few MPs participated at the first screening stage, and many mediated (or 
interfered) at the second district-assignment stage, the full-time veteran paid-staff at the DPJ 
national headquarters electoral campaign section were the only ones who consistently oversaw 




were three patterns of positive reactions by kenrens to the kōbo screenees.29 The first group was 
those kenrens that needed an injection of “parachute” candidates because their organization was 
too weak to find candidates on their own and some districts would remain vacant until the last 
moment. This was the case in some of the rural LDP-stronghold prefectures. To these difficult 
districts, the headquarters sent in kōbo candidates when they were lucky enough to find someone 
who would dare to wage desperate campaigns against senior LDP incumbents. When there was 
not even a kōbo candidate to take up this costly mission, the party still tried to field someone 
from among party staff. The second was a group of kenrens of the urban metropolitan prefectures 
where voters paid little attention to the local roots of candidates. There, the kenrens had no 
problem using (parachute) kōbo candidates when they needed to. The third were those kenrens 
with party leaders open to the idea of kōbo, even though they had relatively well-maintained 
party organizations and thus candidate supplies. In good contrast to the last category, according 
to the party official, there were kenrens whose local organizations had their own strength and 
unique culture, which made them stay away from kōbo.  
None of the suggested patterns explains how the insiders came into kōbo. For this, the 
stories told by the kenren side offer a better glimpse into the real life of kōbo. Below, I discuss 
four patterns of kenren reactions to the headquarters-led kōbo, which emerged from interviews 
                                                  




with several kenren officials. The first is the “pure prototype” case, under which an outsider 
candidate could either turn out to be a Cinderella or a dispensable sacrifice for the party, 
depending on the electoral luck and the way the party treated her. The second is the 
“kōbo-as-a-brand” strategy, the case in which kōbo was used as a stamp of vindication by the 
kenrens and the candidates. Kōbo was used to check the quality of newcomers by the kenren, and, 
after passing, its authority was used both by the kenren and the aspirants to preempt or solve 
internal conflicts. The third is the “black box” function of kōbo, where the system was used as a 
tunnel for mediation and manipulation by and among party leaders who were attempting to 
nominate insiders. The fourth is the “unrecognized” kōbo, where the seal of kōbo carried by 
insider aspirants was ignored or denied in the local context.  
2.6.2 Case Study 1: Kōbo in its Prototype 
It seems true that the kōbo system managed to attract a certain number of fresh faces who 
embodied the typical image of kōbo candidates: young, aspirations and enthusiasm to reform 
politics based on personal experience and civic common sense, work experience in business or 
other fields that would bring down-to-earth expert knowledge to the Japanese national political 
scene, and no previous connection to the world of politics. However, as shown in Figure 2.12, 
their success rate for the first election, except for 2009, was very low, and many left politics 




candidates as dispensable pieces. Occasionally, however, some kenrens took responsibility for 
the kōbo challengers and supported the candidates through the first victory. Miho Takai, who 
debuted in 2000 in the second district of Tokushima, falls into this rare category. 
Tokushima has only three SMDs, and Miho Takai has been the only kōbo HR candidate 
from the prefecture, although the kenren conducted kōbo for the HC elections in 2007 and 2010. 
Takai was only 28 years old when she applied to a special, female-only kōbo at the DPJ 
headquarters in 1999. She had worked in retail business in Tokyo, and had become interested in 
politics while on an unpaid leave studying English in the U.S. After she passed the kōbo 
screening, the national headquarters contacted the kenren of Tokushima, where Takai was born 
and lived until she finished high school. The kenren was having a problem filling the second 
district, where a strong three-term LDP incumbent, Shun-ichi Yamaguchi, was running. Although 
there were some skeptical voices, according to a kenren staff, the branch decided to take her 
under the lead of a senior MP from the first district, Yoshito Sengoku. The kenren, out of its few 
full time staff members, sent a 20-year veteran into the second district with Takai to help her set 
up her own office and get organized in the district. Takai lost in 2000, lost again in SMD, but was 
elected on the PR list in 2003, lost in SMD, and was awarded the election as a runner-up on the 
party list in 2005, and finally won in SMD in 2009.  




staff stayed in her district for five years. The staff described why this was possible: 
We were able to invest our energy in the second district because Sengoku in the first 
district had strong and stable support base.…Sure, Takai had no prior campaign 
experience, but each election is different, and it was a learning process for us, too.…We 
wanted to build a system under which any enthusiastic person with talent but no resource 
could become an MP.… We also wanted to cultivate a younger support base for the party 
with Takai.30  
However, Takai’s success story did not lead the kenren to think that the system of kōbo itself was 
superior to other CSMs. The same staff explained why: 
Our kenren had had no interest in kōbo until the national headquarters introduced Takai 
to us.…Kōbo worked under the specific conditions at the time. Whether we would use 
kōbo in the future depends.…If we can find a quality candidate through our personal 
network, we don’t have to use kōbo. Also, kōbo works only when the party is popular.31  
A pure outsider made her dream come true with full support from the party. However, we 
have to keep in mind that the case of Tokushima was very unusual. Out of 73 kōbo novices, only 
35 were elected (25 in SMDs and 10 on the party list) at the first elections. Considering that 28 
of them debuted in 2009, when the DPJ won by a landslide, most kōbo candidates needed to be 
(mentally and financially) prepared for losing the first time, which would not have been easy 
without support from the party. Takai was extremely lucky, for being matched up with the 
Tokushima kenren by the national headquarters. 
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2.6.3 Case Study 2: Kōbo as Branding 
The default institutional design of the DPJ national kōbo was to screen the applicants first 
at the headquarters, then for the headquarters to introduce those who passed to the kenrens with 
vacant districts. However, there were cases in which the kenrens used the legitimacy of national 
kōbo actively, when they had managed to find candidates on their own, in an attempt to preempt 
or solve intraparty conflict. This was the case for the Okayama kenren, which had the highest 
number of kōbo candidates (7) over the four elections, in spite of its relatively small number of 
SMDs (5). 
In Okayama, according to party officials, the kenren actively recommended aspirants for 
national offices who contacted the kenren first to apply for national kōbo before nominating 
them at SMD. The aspirants approached the kenren or influential MPs from Okayama first in an 
attempt to build personal relationships. After knowing the aspirants in person, the kenren leaders 
advised them to apply for national kōbo. This was to ensure, through double screening, that the 
quality of candidates met certain criteria. In addition, they used the legitimacy of this screening 
to persuade local politicians and staff to accept the candidates. Keisuke Tsumura, a kōbo-selected 
candidate for the HR in 2003, and his mentor, Satsuki Eda (House of Councilors), initiated this 
pattern, which was later repeated by three other kōbo candidates from the prefecture. All four of 




politics directly without serving in the prefectural assembly or city councils. The aspirants 
naturally tended to be unknown within the party at the beginning, and that was why this strategy 
of branding by kōbo was meaningful. Eda, an extremely influential figure in Okayama, 
personally believed in the merit of opening the door to people with more diverse backgrounds, 
and played an important role in enhancing the use of kōbo in the prefecture. However, Tsumura 
emphasized the contingent nature of kōbo.  
The best is to find a good candidate on our own without using kōbo.…We then 
recommend him/her to apply for national kōbo.…Having the national headquarters 
introduce us a kōbo candidate is only a second best, because we don’t know the candidate 
well. There are times we can’t find a candidate even this way. Then, the last resort is to 
accept a self-promoted aspirant.…We have used kōbo so far, but it does not mean that the 
Okayama kenren was very progressive or cared about transparency.…It is important to 
keep all options available, and choose a CSM that is most relevant at the time.…We may 
even quit using kōbo in the future if it turns out that kōbo does not help us find certain 
types of candidates we are looking for.32 
Use of kōbo as a tool of legitimacy took an even more stark form in Gunma. The DPJ 
kenren in Gumna prefecture struggled from intense internal schism between the old Socialist 
Party faction and the conservatives. According to one of the long-time party leaders, three out of 
four kōbo-selected candidates from Gunma were first recruited directly by the conservative 
leaders.33 Some of them were outsiders, and the rest were insiders. The conservative leaders then 
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talked the national headquarters into validating these handpicked candidates with the kōbo stamp 
so that it would make it easier for them to persuade the Socialists into accepting the selection. In 
this case, the three candidates were recorded as kōbo candidates at the national headquarters, but 
they, in fact, had been handpicked at the local level.  
These examples show that kōbo had important internal use. Curiously, although it was the 
kenren who actively used the kōbo system, its legitimacy came from the vertical power structure 
with the national headquarters at the top. The DPJ kōbo had no implication for development of 
intraparty democracy. It would be used when convenient, within the same small circle of kenren 
decision makers. These people could happen to be promoting either outsider type candidates or 
insider type candidates. It proves that the kōbo system itself was neutral to the selection outcome, 
especially when the kenrens tried to use it for their internal management.  
2.6.4 Case Study 3: Kōbo as a Black Box (or a Magic Box for Headquarters) 
The fact that handpicked candidates could be registered as kōbo-qualified ex-post 
reminds us of the behind-the-scenes nature of the entire kōbo process. After all, not just the list 
of applicants was never released, but also the decision-making during the screening was kept 
confidential. The process of assignment to districts was the least institutionalized part of the 
whole kōbo process, and the lack of transparency often confused not just the outsider aspirants, 




many as six kōbo candidates ran in HR elections between 2000 and 2009. Although there were 
some successful cases of kōbo candidates from the prefecture, a kenren leader (also a prefectural 
assembly member) offered a grimmer picture from the loser’s perspective based on his own kōbo 
experience.  
I was the only one to formally apply for kōbo, requesting to be assigned to that specific 
district. But the headquarters added two more competitors from nowhere who did not 
even apply for kōbo, and I was made to compete against them. The headquarters told us 
to campaign for a certain period in the district so that they could evaluate our ability to 
mobilize by conducting polls. The result of the polls was never disclosed.…One day, I 
received a call from the headquarters. I knew that I was not selected. They never told me 
why.…There is no transparency. It’s politics. Factions and deals.34  
We can easily imagine that there were many other cases of fixed kōbo like this elsewhere. Stories 
like this never appear in newspapers, and there is no way we can verify these interviews against 
some official records. Still, we should note that what the party official described was not a 
corrupt incident but an expected practice in line with the institutional design. The national 
headquarters staff admitted what could have been confusing for kōbo applicants. 
There are people who don’t understand. They think just passing the kōbo screening 
ensures their nomination in some district.…We have to tell them, “It’s not like that. Kōbo 
does certify that you are suitable to become our candidate. But, there are also people who 
raised their hands outside kōbo. Prefectural assembly members, for example. They, too, 
are entitled to compete. Kōbo is just like a semi-final game. It allows you to proceed to 
the final. But, kōbo is not the only path to the final.”…But, we started to recommend to 
those assembly members and other (insider) applicants to officially file for kōbo. 
                                                  




Otherwise, people doubt the fairness of our selection process.35 
At Stage 2 in Figure 2.5, non-kōbo aspirants were allowed to join the competition. In other 
words, Stage 2 was the regular starting point for all before the extra path through kōbo was 
added. This was the point that was not easy for some kōbo applicants to digest, and that made the 
kōbo system susceptible to manipulation by the headquarters.  
The institution of DPJ kōbo opened up the door to candidate selection, but by no means 
guaranteed transparency or fairness in the selection process. For example, the party headquarters 
could use kōbo to disguise their manipulation of faction-based selections. One example was the 
second district of Fukuoka, where a special election for the HR seat was held in April 2005. 
Masanori Hirata was nominated as a candidate after a vote at a special joint committee by the 
kenren and the headquarters.36 He belonged to the political training academy run by an 
extremely influential faction boss, Ichiro Ozawa, and it was said that Katsuya Okada, who fought 
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36 The predecessor DPJ incumbent resigned over a scandal regarding falsification of his academic records, and 
it was an uphill fight for the DPJ. The DPJ Fukuoka kenren tried to field its own candidate, but could not agree 
on a single person. To this, the national headquarters tried to interfere, take leadership, and assign a kōbo 
candidate to fill the district, which made the kenren disgruntled. In the end, they set up a special committee 
with nine members from the kenren and four from the headquarters. The headquarters recommended two 
candidates from the national kōbo pool who had passed the screening: Masanori Hirata, a lawyer who worked 
for a UK-based investment management company, and an ex-bureaucrat from Ministry of Health, Labour, and 
Welfare. The kenren promoted an ex-executive of a foreign finance company. The committee voted on these 




over the campaign chieftainship with him, picked Hirata in an attempt to appease him. The 
selection was, on the surface, carefully managed to mend the schisms within the kenren, between 
the kenren and the headquarters, and within the national headquarters. However, the composition 
of the special committee was deliberately designed so that at the end, the national headquarters 
could prevail. The headquarters even used the opinion polls to influence and sway the committee 
vote.  
As the example of Fukuoka shows, the DPJ kōbo screenees did function at times as the 
reserves of candidates the national leaders could use at their leisure. However, as the same case 
shows, the kenrens did not always let the national headquarters exert influence over nomination 
decisions easily. Moreover, the joint committee in the Fukuoka case was a very unusual 
compromise that the national headquarters had to make. Below, we look into the mindset of the 
local party officials who did not look at the national headquarters-led kōbo favorably. 
2.6.5 Case Study 4: Unrecognized Kōbo 
Fukuoka has 11 SMDs with the largest population in Kyushu, the most southwesterly of 
Japan’s four main islands. In this prefecture, the DPJ had four kōbo candidates run in the HR 
elections between 2000 and 2009. However, the party official in charge of the kenren (also a 
prefectural assembly member) said, aside from Hirata who is discussed above, he had recognized 




headquarters. According to him, one of the remaining two kōbo candidates first served as an aide 
to a prominent MP of the DPJ, and ran for mayor in Fukuoka next. His hard work impressed the 
kenren staff, and they persuaded him to run for the HR seat. There was no involvement by the 
national headquarters, he said. As for the remaining kōbo candidate, he described as follows: 
I have never heard that he was a kōbo candidate. None of us knew that…That was not 
taken into consideration during the selection. That was not a criterion we used when 
selecting him.…His predecessor, who decided to run for a mayorship, introduced him to 
us as his successor.…His recommendation was the most important.…Even if he had 
passed the national kōbo screening and we had known it, that would have meant 
absolutely nothing to us. Not even 1% of consideration.37 
The kōbo candidates themselves might have applied to national kōbo in parallel while building 
personal connections at the local level. In any case, the kōbo label was not given any credit at the 
local level, or was even received with hostility. The party official went on, saying: 
We feel no pressure to ensure transparency for candidate selection process. It’s not voters’ 
business. Voters judge in the general election after we chose candidates.…Those who 
apply to kōbo are almost never party members. They come to the DPJ only because they 
want to become MPs, and they become party members only after getting 
nominated.…What we cannot justify to party supporters is this inconsistency.…All they 
want is to shortcut and jump into national politics. Most of those applicants have no prior 
experience in electoral campaign.…People say kōbo candidates are a mixture of wheat 
and chaff, but they are all junk.38 
In sum, there were cases in which kōbo discovered new outsider talents, and improved 
the public image of the party. However, the loose institutional design gave the headquarters 
                                                  
37 Interview S6, October 7, 2012. 




leeway to take advantage of kōbo and use it as a means to interfere with the nomination 
decisions at the kenren level. Some kenrens utilized the kōbo label strategically to unify the party 
behind their choice. Other kenrens either did not take any kōbo candidates or ignored the kōbo 
label, even when their handpicked candidates had one. The DPJ kōbo opened the door to 
outsiders, but the loose and non-transparent institutional design was not meant to induce specific 
outcomes. The party kept kōbo open to insider aspirants who came knocking on its door as the 
party grew in strength and prospects. The party eventually met its ultimate goal of taking over 
power, using kōbo as a flexible tool. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
The DPJ gradually established itself as a reliable alternative to the ruling LDP, and its 
emphasis on publicity shifted from presenting it as a fresh, clean, and youthful party to a capable, 
expert, and reliable party. As kōbo decreased in its value as a publicity tool, the party showed no 
hesitancy to defy the image of an open party by selecting more insider quality candidates through 
kōbo. This suggests that recruiting amateur outsiders was a mere tactic for a transitional period. 
After it took power by winning 308 seats in the 2009 HR election, more than 50 HR members 
were lost by defection, and the DPJ lost the 2012 HR election hugely, further reducing its seats 




Japanese experiment for developing a two party system under SMD is over. What role did kōbo 
play in the rise and fall (so far) of the DPJ? 
The DPJ kōbo indeed opened up the door to candidate selection, but no change was made 
to the selectorate. Hazan and Rahat (2010) argue that, even if positive changes are made on other 
dimensions, a CSM cannot be democratized unless the inclusiveness of selectorate increases. In 
fact, the DPJ kōbo contributed little to enhance intraparty democracy. There was no reason for 
the local leaders or members to perceive kōbo as a right or privilege they won, and, thus, its 
practice did not become binding as a precedent. The kōbo became dormant after the DPJ took 
power because there were few vacancies left for the DPJ to fill, and the party protected 
incumbents just as mindlessly as the LDP did. As the future of the DPJ started to look doomed, 
with many MPs defecting to other parties and the party support among the electorate plummeting, 
it also turned out that the DPJ type of kōbo functioned only when the party was popular. For 
example, the DPJ Tottori prefectural branch held kōbo for the first time in its district in July 2012, 
but there was not even a single applicant. One DPJ party official said, “kōbo is an obsolete word 
within the DPJ now.”39 Even before the 2012 defeat, many DPJ officials recognized that they 
could not rely solely on kōbo as a way to recruit new candidates any longer. Some pointed at the 
political training academies run by kenrens as a possible alternative. Many of them, however, are 
                                                  




schools only in name, and just offer lectures by prominent guest speakers every other month or 
so. The proper question probably is not whether kōbo is good for parties in general, but whether 
it was a good strategy for a young party in its party-building period to rely heavily on centralized 
kōbo. Kōbo did not just add untrained amateur MPs with weak loyalty to the party, which 
probably helped the fall of the party, but it also distracted the party from the pressing task of 
developing strong nationwide organization and nurturing the stock of local politicians who 
would stay with the party through the difficult times.  
One question needs to be addressed in future studies in order to understand further the 
problem political parties in Japan are facing. Why can political parties in Japan get away with not 
reforming their CSM on the selectorate dimension? In neighboring East Asian countries, such as 
South Korea and Taiwan, the repeated attempts to reform nomination methods by political 
parties have centered on the size and nature of the selectorate. Why, only in Japan, are political 
parties free from this pressure? The Japanese voters’ attitude toward political parties may be one 
of the factors that are to blame. Voters take candidates nominated by parties as a given. However, 
that does not mean that they trust party labels. With deep skepticism toward established political 
parties, both politicians and voters look for a quick solution in building new parties, rather than 
in reforming things within the existing parties. Yet, those new parties rely on the same kōbo 




The fact that even something like kōbo was (and still is) considered a major reform probably tells 
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2000 HR March 1999 July 1999 June 2000 July 1999 June 2000
2003 HR April 2002 July 2002 September 2003 July 2002 September 2003
2005 HR February 2004 October 2004 August 2005 August 2005 August 2005
2009 HR May 2006 May 2007 August 2009 September 2008 August 2009
District Nomination




The table shows the timings of Stage 1 (kōbo) and the timings for the kōbo screenees (the 
earliest and the last cases) to pass Stage 2 and Stage 3 for the 2000-2009 HR elections. It shows 
how long it took for the last person to obtain the approval of nomination by the headquarters. For 
example, for the 2009 HR election, submission of applications was closed in May 2006, but for 
some applicants it took until August 2009 to be approved by the headquarters.  
 
 
Table 2.2 Background characteristics by candidate types , 2000-2009 HR elections 
 
Incumbent Repeater Party-Picked Novice Kōbo Novice
Age 54.8 48.5 45.3 38.3
Female 7.4% 7.8% 13.9% 13.7%
Parachute 17.1% 23.3% 27.8% 37.1%
Political Family 34.0% 17.7% 13.1% 7.6%
Local Politician 29.1% 30.6% 30.4% 17.1%
MP Aide 26.4% 31.0% 27.6% 31.4%
Bureaucrat 16.4% 8.9% 12.7% 7.6%








Table 2.3 Building Openness Score 
 
Local Credentials  
Native, Educated, or Worked 1
Family Connection





Openness Score = 4 - (Local + Family + Career)  
 
A candidate scored 1 point for having local credentials. This applied if he or she was born, 
brought up, educated, or have worked in the prefecture. For the family connection, a candidate 
scored 1 point if he or she inherited the district from a parent (=seshu), if he or she was second, 
third, or fourth generation of a political dynasty (especially MPs, but others included), or if he or 
she had relatives who had served in elected offices. For the career path, a candidate scored 1 
point each for previously serving as a local politician (ex. city councilor, or prefectural assembly 
member), as an aide to MPs (or some equivalent public officials), or was originally a 
national-level bureaucrat. Theoretically, one could have been all three. However, in reality, there 
was no kōbo candidate who had done all three, while there were some who had done a 
combination of two of them. The calculated scores thus ranged from 0 to 4. Since all points 
represented how “closed” the candidate was, the total was subtracted from 4 to build the 






Table 2.4 Occupational status of kōbo candidates by debut year as of November 1, 2012 
 
 2000 2003 2005 2009 Total
HR 3 5 10 28 46
HC 1 0 1 0 2
In Politics 4 2 3 1 10
Previous Job 6 1 2 0 9
Intractable 3 1 2 0 6
Total 17 9 18 29 73  
 
HR represents incumbents in the House of Representatives of the Diet. HC represents the same 
for the House of Councilors. “In politics” means that they remained in politics outside the Diet, 
for example as local politicians or party staff. “Previous job” means they were back to their 
original profession such as lawyers or doctors. “Intractable” represents the number of those 
whose status could not be tracked down on the Internet. 
 
 
Table 2.5 Occupation status at the time of DPJ kōbo application 
 
 2000 2003 2005 2009 Total
Local politician 0 0 0 11 11
MP aide 1 2 7 5 15
Bureaucrat 0 0 0 1 1
Business 1 0 0 2 3
Employee 9 5 3 2 19
Professional 5 1 4 3 13
Media 0 0 0 2 2
NPO 1 0 1 0 2
In preparation 0 1 3 3 7
Total 17 9 18 29 73  
 
The table shows the distribution of the occupational status of the DPJ kōbo candidates at the time 






Table 2.6 Number of kōbo candidates by “chien” (local credentials) 
 
 2000 HR 2003 HR 2005 HR 2009 HR Total
District 6 4 9 16 35
Prefecture 3 3 5 4 15
None 8 2 4 9 23  
 
“District” shows the number of those who had some connection to the SMDs they ran in, for 
example having gone to high school there. “Prefecture” category is for those who had some 
connection to the prefecture but did not have any direct connection to the SMDs they ran in. 
“None” represents those who had no connection to the prefecture their SMDs belonged to. 
 
 
Table 2.7 Number of kōbo candidates by insider/outsider 
 
  2000 HR 2003 HR 2005 HR 2009 HR Total
Insider 1 2 9 16 28
Outsider 16 7 9 13 45
Total 17 9 18 29 73  
 
The table shows the division of insiders and outsiders of kōbo candidates by their debut year. 
The insider category includes those who had some prior political career (such as being local 
politicians or MP aides), had been bureaucrats at the national level, or came from families with 
professional politicians. The outsider category includes those who had no clear prior connection 
to politics, and whose professions were not one of those that traditionally served as a pool for 
future MPs. The table shows that the number of insiders steadily increased over time and even 





Table 2.8 Number of kōbo candidates by prefecture, 2000-2009 
 
Prefecture Population SMDs
Okayama 1,943,655 5 2 2 1 2 7
Tokyo 12,988,797 25    6 (6) 6 (6)
Chiba 6,183,743 13 1 2 (1)  3 (2) 6 (3)
Kanagawa 9,005,176 18 1   4 (3) 5 (3)
Shizuoka 3,787,982 8 1  1 3 (2) 5 (2)
Saitama 7,170,362 15 2 (1)     2 (2) 4 (3)
Gunma 2,006,903 5 1 1 1 1 (1) 4 (1)
Fukuoka 5,066,856 11   2 2 (1) 4 (1)
Hyogo 5,599,359 12  1 1 1 (1) 3 (1)
Tochigi 2,010,732 5 1 (1)     1 (1) 2 (2)
Ishikawa 1,166,656 3    2 (1) 2 (1)
Kumamoto 1,815,985 5  1  1 (1) 2 (1)
Osaka 8,840,372 19 2    2
Ibaraki 2,967,404 7 1  1  2
Nagano 2,160,873 5 1  1  2
Miyazaki 1,132,025 3 1  1  2
Aichi 7,414,098 15  1 1  2
Hiroshima 2,866,571 7   2  2
Yamaguchi 1,456,800 4   2  2
Fukushima 2,042,816 5    1 (1) 1 (1)
Kagoshima 1,711,089 5 1    1
Toyama 1,095,217 3 1    1
Tokushima 789,269 3 1    1
Yamagata 1,179,964 3  1   1
Niigata 2,383,650 6   1  1
Miyagi 2,340,029 6   1  1
Gifu 2,086,590 5   1  1
Tottori 591,150 2   1  1
Total --- --- 17 (2) 9 (1) 18  29 (22) 73 (25)
2000 2003 2005 2009 Total
 
 
The table shows prefectures with at least one kōbo-selected candidate running in the HR 
elections from 2000 to 2009, with their estimated population (as of October 1, 2009) and the 
number of SMDs. The numbers under each year show the kōbo candidates who debuted in that 
























































































Each bar is shaded by the proportion of seats the two major parties, the LDP and the DPJ, won in 
the HR elections between 2000 and 2009. The first two textured patterns on the left represent the 
LDP’s share by the seats won in SMDs and under PR, respectively. The black and the gray 
sections on the right represent the same for the DPJ. The white parts in the middle stand for the 
seats won by other smaller parties. It shows that the DPJ started out by winning slightly more 






















The graph shows the changes in the number of SMD candidates each of the two major parties 
fielded in the four HR elections between 2000 and 2009. The light-gray triangles represent the 
LPD, and the black circles represent the DPJ. The number of SMD candidates of the DPJ 


















Figure 2.4 Structure of DPJ organization 
 




































































Each bin represents a separate round of national kōbo conducted by the DPJ national 
headquarters. There were five general kōbo and two special kōbo (shown with asterisks). A 
whole bar, with the light gray bottom and the dark gray top, together represents the total number 
of applicants. The dark gray part represents those who passed the first-stage screening and 
became entitled to seek for district nomination. The light gray part represents those who failed to 
pass the first-stage screening. Broadly speaking, the number of kōbo applicants increased 
substantively over time. 
*1  Special female-focused kōbo conducted in August 1999.  






















The graph shows the ratio of applicants who passed the first-stage screening (excluding the two 
special kōbo). Overall, the pass rate averaged around 12%. The female-focused special kōbo in 
August 1999 (not shown in the figure) had exceptionally high pass rate at 66.1%. The 



















The graph shows the percentage of the kōbo candidates, who secured district nomination and 
actually ran in the HR elections, as a fraction of those who passed the first stage screening. This 
secondary pass rate was about 18% on average. Being narrowed down by 12% on the first-stage 
screening (Figure 7), and then further narrowed down by 18% on the second-stage nomination, 










































Each bar represents the number of DPJ kōbo candidates who ran in SMDs for an HR election 
between 2000 and 2009. The white part of the bar represents the novice candidates, i.e. who ran 
in a HR election for the first time. The dark gray part represents those who debuted as kōbo 
candidates but lost in the prior elections and were running again. The black part represents the 
incumbents who originally debuted through kōbo. While the number of kōbo novices dipped in 























The white part of each bin shows the ratio of novices to the rest (repeaters and incumbents) 
among kōbo-selected candidates who ran in each of the HR elections between 2000 and 2009. 
















































Each bar represents the proportion of candidates who fall into the background category listed at 
the bottom. The gray, textured, white, and black bars represent incumbents, repeaters, 





















































The graph shows the frequency counts of the candidates with each score for the four HR 











The figure shows changes in the mean openness score over the four HR elections for incumbents, 
repeaters, party-picked novices, and kōbo novices, respectively. The mean openness score for the 
kōbo novices fell constantly from 3.29 in 2000 to 2.28 in 2009. It started as the highest group 






















Each bar shows the proportion of those with connection to the district (dark gray), those with 
connection to the prefecture but without connection to the district (light gray), and those without 
connection to the district or prefecture (white) among kōbo novices who debuted each year. The 


























The gray part of each bar represents the ratio of the “insider”  candidates among kōbo novices 
























Each bin represents the frequency count of the DPJ kōbo novices (2000-2009) with each value of 






















3. Preserving Party Unity by Giving Up Control: The Direct Primary in Nineteenth 




Democratization of political processes involves the devolution of power formerly 
controlled by limited circles of political elites. Why do elites sometimes enact programs of 
democratization and thereby give up the power that has allowed them to monopolize a political 
system? Democratization of the internal organizational structure of political parties has been an 
important subject since a German sociologist, Robert Michels (1911), revealed the iron law of 
oligarchy observing the counterintuitive hierarchical development of the supposedly democratic 
leftist political parties in Europe.  
While policy-related decision-making processes have been an important focus of the 
field for a long time, the candidate selection method (CSM) has re-emerged over the past two 
decades as another important subfield, partially motivated by the more frequent use of the direct 
primary system by political parties in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This trend has drawn the 
attention of many scholars for the reason Schattschneider (1942) duly pointed out seven decades 




who can make the nominations is the owner of the party.” In this regard, the well-known 
example of the U.S. direct primary system has always been puzzling in the eyes of outside 
observers, as an extreme case of democratization of the CSM.   
The origins of this U.S. primary system have been conventionally explained in the 
context of the Progressive Era reforms or the southern white primaries. During the past decade, 
some revisionist researchers offered alternative explanations pointing at rapid modernization and 
an emergence of aggressive candidates as the driving forces behind the reforms. Meanwhile, 
along with the development of formal theories exploring the causes and impacts of the direct 
primary reforms, many of the empirical studies on other countries and regions focused more on 
the relationship between party competition and the adoption of the direct primary. This study 
re-opens the investigation of the historical origins of the U.S. primaries by going even farther 
back into the nineteenth century, and presents the findings with broader implications by focusing 
on the impact of party competition.  
This paper is an attempt to contribute to the understanding of the factors affecting the 
timing of democratization of CSM in the form of an adoption of the direct primary system, 
drawing on the case of nineteenth century Pennsylvania. The U.S. states were undoubtedly the 
pioneers in widely adopting the direct primary, but past research has largely focused on the 




try to shed new light on the understanding of the historical origins of the system by looking into 
the practices during the earlier “party by-laws” period in the nineteenth century. As one of the 
first U.S. states to enjoy full development of party competition by the early nineteenth century, 
Pennsylvania proves to be the best case to study. By using a new data set on party activities in 
most of the 67 counties of Pennsylvania, which I constructed from hundreds of local newspapers, 
I hope to make a unique contribution to the understanding of both the candidate selection reform 
by political parties in general and the reality of local party activities in nineteenth century United 
States.  
Drawing on the historical evidence from Pennsylvania, I argue that the stronger the 
party, the more likely it was to adopt the direct primary. The value of winning the nomination 
increased in the strength of the party, which led to intensified competition over nominations. 
Bitter losers would defect and ruin the prospects of the party in the general election, and thus the 
party leaders were consistently obsessed with the maintenance of party unity. The direct primary 
helped keep the party united by presenting the primary winner as a focal point (Schelling 1960) 
for the party voters, while making defection more embarrassing through its transparent 
procedures. Rather counter-intuitive findings are that the devolution of nomination power was 





This paper is structured in the following order. The first section reviews some major 
explanations for the introduction of the direct primary system. The second section discusses case 
selection and the nature of the data. The third section explains different CSMs, reviews their 
overall development in the state, and examines the transition patterns between the CSMs. The 
fourth section summarizes findings from the case studies and discusses their theoretical 
implications. The fifth section tests different hypotheses empirically. A brief conclusion follows. 
3.2. Explaining the Adoption of the Direct Primary 
The adoption of the direct primary—a shift that opens up control over candidate 
nomination to party members (and to regular voters who owe no allegiance to the party in the 
U.S.)—poses a simple question: why would party leaders ever agree to give up their control over 
this extremely important activity? In this section, I first briefly review some explanations for the 
adoption of the direct primary. The first four focus on U.S. cases. The rest of the arguments were 
developed based on empirical studies on other countries or regions, or on formal theory, and they 
address the impact of party competition from different angles. An introduction to my argument 
follows.   
The most conventional explanation for the origins of the U.S. direct primaries is that the 




schemes on unwilling party leaders by drafting them into state laws, in hopes that it would 
weaken the grip over the nomination by corrupt party bosses and machines. This story line was 
propagated by established contemporary scholars like Merriam (1928), who himself shared in the 
Progressive ethos. The dominant CSM before the advent of the direct primary was the delegate 
convention system, under which delegates chosen by party voters at local meetings would gather 
at the next higher level of the hierarchical representative structure: the county convention. There, 
the delegates would nominate the county office candidates and choose the delegates to the 
higher-level (congressional, regional, or state) conventions, where the higher office candidates 
would be nominated. Under this indirect system of nomination, there was plenty of room for 
party leaders to negotiate with delegates and to manipulate the final outcome at each level of 
decision making. According to the Progressive reformers, legislating the mandatory statewide 
direct primary was the only way to take power away from the corrupt machine bosses and 
uneducated immigrants who were mobilized by them. No systematic empirical analysis, however, 
has been conducted to investigate why party elites in the state legislatures would accept such 
legislation.40 
                                                  
40 Lawrence, Donovan and Bowler (2013) argue that the anti-party explanation finds better support than the 




Ware (2002) proposes an alternative argument: that the legislation of the direct primary 
at the state level right after the turn of the twentieth century resulted from an effort for party 
institutionalization initiated by the party elites themselves as they tried to adjust to the changing 
times of urbanization and industrialization. The direct primary, according to Ware, was 
introduced partly in an attempt to cope with the problem of size (i.e., the rapidly growing number 
of the electorate with which each local political party organization had to deal). The delegate 
convention system relied on regular face-to-face negotiation and deal-making among the party 
elites. The party voters chose the people to delegate their decision-making power rather than 
choosing candidates per se, and the delegate system functioned when the party voters knew these 
delegates in person. Rapid industrialization drastically increased mobility and changed the 
composition of the society to the extent that this old system could no longer function. When 
parties looked for a possible alternative, Ware argues, the direct primary turned out to be almost 
the only realistic choice. This conclusion, however, is not necessarily self-evident. The direct 
primary was not instituted in most other countries that underwent similar chaos during the 
process of industrialization and rapid social change in the same era. By putting a certain 
emphasis on the influence that the Progressive reformers exercised in defining the direction of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
variables that supposedly, and only indirectly, measure the pressure for reform (third party vote and direct 




the path of reform, and by his insistence that there was no clear alternative to the direct primary 
when nomination reform was sought, Ware inadvertently proves that it is not easy to explain this 
unlikely development of the direct primary without drawing on the unfalsifiable concept of the 
U.S.’s commitment to participatory democracy. According to Ware’s argument, party elites 
reacted more as housekeepers than as stakeholders. However, the shrewd party elites may have 
needed to institutionalize the party organizations in one way or another, but the choice could 
have well been within the structure of the existent delegate convention system. The fix did not 
necessarily have to take the form of the popular vote.  
Furthermore, under the hypothesis of voluntary institutionalization by party elites, the 
direct primary should have appeared in the urbanized areas first, where the impact of 
industrialization was felt most strongly before the tide of statewide legislations. At least, this did 
not seem to have been the case in Pennsylvania: the system did not take hold in Philadelphia, 
which was the largest city of the state, until it was legislated into state law in 1907 and made 
mandatory statewide for the major parties. Further, it was never voluntarily adopted before 1907 
by either of the two major parties in Allegheny County, where the second largest city in the state, 
Pittsburgh, was located. Interestingly, the first appearance of the direct primary in Pennsylvania, 
the oldest known case in the U.S., was in 1842, long before the Progressive Era, and it was 




system spread gradually but steadily inside and outside the state over the following half century. 
We may thus safely assume that the grassroots origins of the direct primary practices preceded 
the statewide legislation in the Progressive era, and its introduction merits an investigation 
independent of the legislated primaries. 
Reynolds (2006) builds on Ware’s argument by emphasizing the importance of 
intensified competition among the emerging individualistic candidates seeking nomination 
during the changing times. Since independence, according to Reynolds, it had been considered 
bad manners to volunteer oneself for a political position. A good man would be called by the 
office, which meant that someone would certainly nominate him even if he showed absolutely no 
interest or even clearly declined to serve. This social norm changed sometime around the 1880s, 
and the culture of deference quickly gave way to more shameless straightforward pursuit of 
offices, although Reynolds did not clarify exactly why this happened. The convention of 
self-restraint faded into the mists of history all of a sudden, possibly because of the loosening of 
the social yoke brought about by industrialization. Reynolds argues that the emergence of the 
hustling candidates made it difficult for political leaders to mediate party conventions, and the 
direct vote became the only solution to restore peace in the nomination processes.  
Reynolds carefully tracks numerous cases in newspapers to prove this shift in political 




suddenly and where all those aggressive candidates came from. They might have been candidates 
who excelled in appealing directly to the voters rather than at negotiating among the delegates, 
and thus wanted to enhance an introduction of the direct primary by embroiling the conventions. 
But, why would they win the intra-party power game? Why would those party elites in power 
give up control of one of the most important party affairs in order to placate the assuming 
candidates? Would they go that far just to sidestep the labor of mediating bargains and 
adjudicating conflicts? One thing this study of Pennsylvania counties reveals is that candidates 
were not graceful in their maneuvering at all, even before the Civil War. They would volunteer 
for local offices or Congressional seats, put up advertisements in newspapers, actively canvass 
among voters before election, and make a huge mess at conventions. Those aggressive 
candidates seem to have been there for a long time, at least in Pennsylvania.  
 V. O. Key (1956), in his study of the southern states, suggests that the one-party rule 
may have necessitated the direct primary because the Democratic nomination was tantamount to 
election in those southern states after the Civil War. Party leaders had to open up the nomination 
processes and provide the white voters an opportunity to participate in politics in order to justify 
their racist and oligarchic regime. It is true that many states, both in the south and the north, 
became so-called one-party states after the Civil War, and the direct primary spread gradually in 




arguing that American democratic values required the party elites to offer voters an additional 
path to meaningful political participation under the one-party rule sounds more like a normative 
judgment than logical reasoning. In fact, Key lists widely shared goals specific to the south at 
that time, such as the political exclusion of African Americans. The direct primary took the form 
of a “white primary,” which was promoted by Democratic leaders who were desperate to 
maintain the white supremacist rule. Toward that goal, they sought a way to disenfranchise the 
black population without alienating poor whites. Given that outright racism was barred by the 
federal constitution, but non-racial voting regulations such as literacy tests and the poll tax would 
disenfranchise not only African Americans but also the poor whites whose vote the Democrats 
desperately needed in some places, the Democratic leaders turned the Democratic primaries into 
de facto elections and limited participation in them to the whites. But why did it have to take the 
form of the direct primary instead of delegate conventions? Given the intense factionalism within 
the Democratic Party, one might argue that primaries were the only way for faction leaders to 
settle these battles. However, there has not been any systematic analysis, to my knowledge, to 
show that the Democratic Party would have broken up or would have lost elections if it did not 
use primaries. It is still unclear why one-party rule would necessitate intraparty democratization, 
or more specifically, the introduction of the direct primary. 




studies on the introduction of the direct primary, based on cases from other countries or regions 
and formal modeling. Many of these works more or less address the impact of party competition 
on the probability of direct primary reform. While some argue that the weaker parties benefit 
more from reform, others suggest that larger parties are more likely to adopt the primary. Using 
formal modeling, Serra (2008) argues that political parties adopt the direct primary because 
letting pre-candidates (nomination seekers) compete under the direct primary helps reveal their 
valence (campaign skills or popularity among party voters), and thus their electability in the 
general election. Party elites do not care about using the primary when their party is dominant, as 
even the lowest quality candidates will be elected anyway. Party elites accept the cost of giving 
up control over nomination and policy positions if and only if they think the benefit of 
nominating a better candidate exceeds the cost. If using the direct primary helps in choosing the 
most winnable candidate, according to Serra, weaker parties should benefit the most from its 
adoption. Hence, the vote share of the party and the probability of direct primary reform should 
be negatively correlated.  
Based on a similar cost-benefit analysis between valence and policy preference of the 
candidate, Snyder and Ting (2011) argue that the primary is more likely to be adopted when the 
constituency is less competitive. Assuming the U.S. model, under which the mandatory primary 




of a candidate revealed to the voters through the primary could lead some party supporters to 
switch to the opposition party candidate if the constituency is competitive and the policy 
preferences of the voters are close to the center. In a non-competitive constituency where the 
voters have more extreme policy preferences, holding a primary helps the dominant party find a 
candidate with higher valence without hurting the electoral prospects of the party because the 
voters will vote for the leading party anyway.  
Ichino and Nathan (2012) also argue that larger parties are more likely to use the 
primary, based on a case study on legislative elections in Ghana. They argue that, in many 
developing countries where clientelism dominates and candidates’ policy preferences do not 
matter, party leaders allow the use of the primary in stronghold districts to avoid defection by 
candidates and sabotage by party supporters in the general election by ensuring that primary 
voters have opportunities for rent-seeking. Kemahlioglu et al. (2009) present a similar 
observation on the use of the primary as a tool to overcome intraparty factionalism. Drawing on 
presidential elections in Latin American countries, they argue that parties or coalitions with more 
internal factionalism and diversity are more likely to use the primary as the method for 
nominating their presidential candidates, considering that the legitimacy of the primary helps 
factions to reach an agreement with respect to candidate selection. Using formal modeling, 




maintenance of party unity and argue that the introduction of the primary helps prevent defection 
by functioning as a commitment device.  
The shared focus on the impact of internal conflicts seen in these new works suggests a 
mechanism similar to the argument that I will advance below. As well, the data that I use in this 
study will offer more insights into this mechanism in one of the earliest evolutions of the direct 
primary. The argument that the direct primary was used to prevent defection is a mirror image of 
the common claim that the direct primary weakened third parties in the U.S. It is widely believed 
that the introduction of the direct primary motivated those candidates who formerly belonged to 
third parties to compete for major party nominations and thus led to the demise of those third 
parties, although there has been no systematic study to support it.41 This paper once again draws 
on the U.S. cases, specifically to explore the impact that party competition had on CSM reforms. 
Drawing on the case study of Pennsylvania counties, I argue that the primaries were introduced 
to preserve party unity by preventing defection. Considering that the larger county parties faced 
graver concerns over defection, they were more likely to adopt primaries. A primary made it 
clear to party voters who was the “focal candidate” (i.e., a candidate around whom party voters 
should rally) and therefore helped party voters to coordinate among themselves for winning the 
                                                  
41 Hirano and Snyder (2007) show that at least there was no such effect immediately after the introduction of 




election. The direct primary system made defection less attractive through its transparent 
procedures as well.  
For this study, the unit of observation is a county party organization. Three of the 
previously discussed hypotheses (the Progressive reforms, voluntary institutionalization, and 
hustling candidates) focused more or less on the period of statewide direct primary legislation 
from 1903 to 1937, during which 45 states introduced the direct primary system. The focus on 
the legislation phase leads those hypotheses to fail to recognize fully the significance of the fact 
that the direct primary was first adopted voluntarily by county party organizations in the form of 
private bylaws, and spread not only in Pennsylvania but also widely across the country, long 
before the Progressive Era. The legislation at the state level may not have been possible without 
knowledge of these successful practices at the local level. The experiments by county party 
organizations were in fact often cited by state-level reformers and party leaders who promoted 
the direct primary legislation. Even Reynolds (2006) admitted that “[t]he proper unit of analysis 
for understanding the appeal and adoption of direct nominations is the county rather than the 
state” (p. 144).  
During the nineteenth century, the main arena of political party activity was at the 




county organizations were free to govern their own party affairs any way they liked.42 Party 
organizations developed around the nomination processes at the county level because, in many 
states, legislative seats were apportioned based on the unit of county, and many county offices 
were publicly elected. Each county organization tried different CSMs at different times in an 
attempt to manage better party affairs and win elections. The necessary conditions for an 
introduction of the direct primary could have been quite different when reforms took the form of 
state legislation and voluntary party activity. Looking at the reforms during the voluntary “party 
by-law” period helps us understand when and why elites would democratize in a more general 
context.  
 
3.3. Case Selection and Data 
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between party competition and 
democratization of CSM, drawing on the county-level experience in nineteenth century 
Pennsylvania, where the oldest known practice of the direct primary began in 1842. Among the 
                                                  
42 This county organization-centered style of party activity in Pennsylvania continued well into the post-WWII 
era (Mayhew, 1986). Note that, while boss rule and machine politics were typically Democratic phenomena 
elsewhere, the machines of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh were Republican through the latter half of the 




U.S. states, Pennsylvania is an ideal site for examination of factors that affected the development 
of the direct primary because in most of its 67 counties, parties experimented with different 
versions of nomination reforms throughout the nineteenth century. The delegate convention 
system, which was the dominant method of choosing candidates before the spread of the direct 
primary, first developed in the Mid-Atlantic region, including Pennsylvania, where elections 
were closely contested from the early period after Independence (Luetscher 1903). Intense party 
competition propelled the early emergence within the state of numerous local newspapers, in 
which plenty of records of nomination activities can be found. This makes Pennsylvania an ideal 
state for this study. 
In Pennsylvania, candidate nomination schemes had been a point of contention since the 
early nineteenth century. However, because of the limit on data availability for the first half of 
the nineteenth century, this paper focuses on the latter half of the nineteenth century, a period 
which is often considered to have been under Republican one-party rule. Although the 
Republican Party was in the lead in state politics for the greater part of the post-Civil War period, 
its dominance was not complete until the economic crisis in the early 1890s. Before then, even 
the well-known Cameron–Quay–Penrose machine was still in the making. (For a more detailed 
discussion of Pennsylvania politics in the nineteenth century, how boss rule and machines 




Appendix C.) Given this competitive environment, the Republicans could certainly lose elections, 
especially at the county level, when unsatisfied factions or candidates defected and ran as 
independents, occasionally with some help from the opposition party. Party lines were not very 
rigid, and parties could not prevent bolting nor punish those who defected. The better the 
electoral prospect for the Republican Party, the more severe the internal factionalism and the 
bigger the temptation to defect. The minority Democratic Party could often become politically 
effective by inducing Republican defection and supporting these insurgents, in hopes of 
weakening the leading party. Thus, the Republican Party could never rest assured of victory, and 
the local leaders were constantly obsessed with the prevention of defection. They talked about 
party unity all the time, and the best adjective to describe a successful county convention was 
harmony. This situation, I argue, was the direct driving force behind the direct primary reforms. 
Although the Republican Party adopted the direct primary more widely because of its leading 
status, the same applied to the Democratic Party in the counties where it remained dominant. 
The unit of analysis for this study is the “county-party-year,” and my data search 
attempted to cover most of the 67 counties in Pennsylvania, excluding Philadelphia, from 1801 
to 1906.43 Given the fact that there was at least one election for some county-level office every 
                                                  
43 Some counties were established after 1801. Thus, the number of counties in the data is smaller than 67 




year, county party organizations made nominations every year, and they could adopt any CSM 
each year. I collected nomination-related data for this project from thousands of microfilm rolls 
of more than 300 local newspapers published in nineteenth century Pennsylvania, archived at the 
State Library of Pennsylvania in Harrisburg. To my knowledge, no previous study on nineteenth 
century local party organizations in the U.S. has covered most counties in a single state in this 
fashion. (For further details of the data generation procedure and exclusion of Philadelphia from 
the data set, see Appendix D.) Local newspapers gradually started showing information related 
to party nomination activities around the 1800s, although they remained scattered and the 
concept of the political party was not firmly established until much later. The observation ends 
right before 1907, when Pennsylvania legislated the statewide mandatory direct primary into law. 
The major historical political forces in each county are classified into two categories in the data 
set: Democrats and non-Democrats. The former includes Anti-Federalists, early Republicans 
(usually called “Democratic Republicans” in the academic literature to distinguish them from the 
modern Republican Party), Jacksonians, and Democrats. The latter encompasses Federalists, 
National Republicans, Whigs, Anti-Masons, Know Nothings (or the Native American Party), and 
Republicans.44  
                                                  
44 When the ruling party (e.g., the Democrats in the Antebellum Era) split because of factional strife, its 




3.4. Candidate Selection Methods and Bird’s-Eye Views of Reform Processes 
In this section, I first introduce the five major candidate selection methods that were 
observed in nineteenth century Pennsylvania. Next, I present bird’s-eye views of the 
development of different CSMs and then discuss the transition patterns among them. 
3.4.1 Candidate Selection Methods 
In nineteenth century Pennsylvania, county party organizations were independent not 
only from each other but also from the state party. Their internal schisms reflected the factional 
divisions of the state party leaders at times, but these factions would also take stands on policy 
issues inconsistent with what the state party campaigned for, especially when they contradicted 
local interests, such as internal development. They had complete freedom in the way they 
managed intraparty affairs at the county level, and party organizations in each county adopted 
                                                                                                                                                                 
dissenting faction often built a coalition with the opposition party (e.g., the Federalists), in which case both the 
minor faction of the major party and the opposition party were classified as the non-Democratic party together. 
The Whigs, the Anti-Masons, and the Know Nothings were separate political entities, but they often had to 
work with each other in order to maximize their threat to the ruling Democratic Party. Often, they came up 
with fusion tickets, both at the state and local levels. There was continuance or overlap in the personnel among 
these forces, especially in rural counties. As a result, in most counties, the electoral campaigns took the form of 
two-way competition most of the time, even during the Antebellum Era. The non-Democrat category is 
equivalent to the Republican Party after the Civil War. The Liberal Republicans and the Independent 
Republicans, who challenged the mainstream Republican machine, are classified as non-Democrat unless they 
clearly allied with the Democratic Party and avoided a three-way race. When there were nomination records of 
both mainstream and insurgent Republicans from the same county, the former classification is adopted as an 




any CSM they found convenient or developed countless versions that best suited their conditions.  
Although there were countless variations in the CSMs adopted by county organizations 
and it was often difficult to track them down in detail, most cases fall into one of the following 
five broad categories: mass meetings, uniform delegate system, graded delegate system, Clarion 
County system, and direct primary (or popular vote).45 The latter was also called the Crawford 
County system by contemporaries. Mass meetings had little structure, especially in terms of 
representation, while the remaining four methods were more or less better structured with rules 
for representation. The two delegate systems had an indirect mechanism of decision making in 
common, but differed in the apportionment rules of delegates. The Clarion system and the 
primary shared the direct vote feature, but the Clarion system converted primary votes into final 
outcomes via the winner-take-all scheme. Below, I describe each system in turn. 
During the first few decades of the early nineteenth century, many county parties 
seemed to have used the form of CSM called mass meeting, where any voter could walk in and 
participate in the nomination process. In many cases, delegates were also sent in from each 
township, and it is not clear how the meetings were managed or how the nominations were made. 
                                                  
45 There were many county-party-years in which some information on nomination activity was available but 
for which the rules were unclear. These cases were omitted from the data set unless it was clear that the 





Because these mass meetings were usually held at the county seats, attendees tended to 
overrepresent the residents of the county seat area. This may have been the reason why many 
county parties adopted the uniform delegate system as a next step, implying that the uniform 
delegate system emerged from concerns over sectional interests.  
The uniform delegate system assigned a uniform (i.e., equal) number of delegates to 
each subdivision of the county (in most cases, townships)46 for representation at the county 
convention. In most typical cases, all townships in a county were assigned two delegates each, 
regardless of the size of their area, population, or party vote. This method was probably based on 
the concept of sectional interests, which played an important role, especially in the early 
nineteenth century, when road conditions were poor and internal development was a dividing 
issue. This uniform delegate system overrepresented sparsely populated rural areas while 
underrepresenting the densely populated urban areas within a county. In turn, this problem led to 
the development of the graded delegate system. 
Under the most typical graded delegate system, each township in a county was assigned 
different numbers of delegates in proportion to the party vote cast in the previous gubernatorial 
election. Each township was entitled to one delegate, no matter how small its party vote had been 
in the previous gubernatorial election, and each was also apportioned an additional delegate for 
                                                  




every 51–100 party votes after the first 100 votes. For example, two townships with 35 votes and 
150 votes, respectively, would be equally entitled to one delegate each. Two townships with 151 
votes and 250 votes, respectively, would be equally entitled to two delegates each. The ratio of 
apportionment changed across time and counties, but the minimum rule of one delegate per 
township was universal. Therefore, sparsely populated areas continued to be overrepresented to 
some extent. Both the uniform and the graded delegate systems relied on majority rule for 
decision-making at county conventions, under which no one could win the nomination unless he 
won a majority of the total delegate votes cast. 
The system that became known for practices seen in Clarion County was an attempt to 
reflect the township’s vote power in the general election more accurately in the nomination 
process. Under this system, a candidate who won the plurality in a township meeting (which was 
called a “primary” at the time) received the entire party vote cast in the township in the previous 
gubernatorial election. Then, these numbers from each township were tallied at the county 
convention to determine the countywide winner. It was a big jump from the two previously 
discussed delegate systems because it was the primary vote—not the delegates—that determined 
the outcome of the nomination. In a sense, this system can be regarded as a version of the direct 
primary, the main difference being the winner-take-all “unit vote” rule based on the unit of 




which adopted this Clarion County system remained relatively small compared to other CSMs. 
This system could result in different outcomes from those which may have resulted from a 
simple tally of popular vote (i.e., the direct primary). The Crawford County system was a simple 
direct popular vote by party supporters, under which the raw tallies of votes cast in each 
township determine the nomination winner under plurality rule. 
3.4.2 General Overall Patterns 
Figure 3.1 plots the total number of CSM observations across the entire state of 
Pennsylvania by each of the four different CSMs from 1800 to 1906. The lowess lines are fitted 
for each CSM in order to make it easier to grasp the long-term trends. Simple annual counts are 
used instead of relative ratios because the mass meeting—the form used in the early nineteenth 
century—is not included in the dataset and there are lots of missing data across years. 
 
< Insert Figure 3.1 about here > 
 
The uniform delegate system is plotted with a green short-dash line. This is the CSM 
that spread first, and it remained dominant until after the Civil War. The number of counties 
using the system increased until 1850 and then reached a peak during the 1850s. It started 




observations over the first 50 years of the period studied here probably reflects the increasingly 
constant printing of party activities in local newspapers and the improvement in the survival rate 
of newspaper copies over time more than gradual switches from the mass meeting system to 
other CSMs. The graded delegate system, plotted with a blue dash-dot line, started picking up 
impetus around 1830, jumped up in popularity during the late 1860s and the early 1870s, and 
caught up with the uniform system by the mid-1870s. More than 45 county parties used the 
graded system at its peak, and the system remained the leading CSM until the early 1900s. The 
drop in its count after the mid-1890s may have partially reflected the rapid commercialization 
and depoliticization of newspapers toward the turn of the century, which led to less and less 
printing of party activities. The Clarion County system, plotted with a pink thin-dash line, 
remained an extreme minority CSM throughout the nineteenth century. It first appeared in the 
1840s, picked up a short momentum during the 1880s, but never reached the count of 10 county 
parties per year, and settled at the level of five or fewer county parties for the rest of the period. 
In stark contrast is the development of the direct primary system, which is plotted with a red 
solid line. It spread slowly before the Civil War, jumped up during the latter half of the 1860s, 
stagnated for a while at around fifteen county parties for approximately fifteen years, and then 
picked up momentum in the late 1880s. It surpassed the uniform delegate system in the early 




county parties.  
Breaking these counts down by party reveals the distinct trajectories that each party 
followed, especially for the direct primary. In Figure 3.2, the top and bottom panels show the 
patterns of Democrats and non-Democrats, respectively. Overall, non-Democrats provided fewer 
observations during the first half of the nineteenth century compared to Democrats. This may 
have been caused by the fact that non-Democrats were constituted by sequences of different 
parties that were “not Democrats.” Although they overlapped in human resources and 
organizational infrastructure to a certain degree in each county, the repeated coming and going 
must have hindered development of steady party organizations. As for the uniform delegate 
system, Democrats hit the ceiling at around twenty counties in 1840, while non-Democrats took 
more than 15 years longer to reach their peak at the same level. A resurgence of the uniform 
delegate system, which the Democrats experienced in 1890, merits attention. The early 1890s is 
the time when the Republican Party cemented its position as a dominant party in Pennsylvania, 
and the Democrats lost their foothold by taking the blame for the severe economic depression. 
The uniform delegate system might have been considered good for the Democratic county 
organizations where the party became very weak. 
 





As for the graded delegate system, both parties followed similar patterns, picking up 
rapidly after 1870. The difference is the height of the ceilings they hit in the early 1890s, 
respectively. The Democrats adopted the graded delegate system at a slightly higher level than 
the Republicans, uniformly across more than 20 counties. The rate of adoption of the direct 
primary is where the two parties show the greatest difference. While the Democrats adopted the 
direct primary in fewer than 5 counties until the mid-1880s, the Republicans adopted it en masse 
in the late 1860s. More than 10 Republican county organizations held onto the direct primary for 
two decades, after which more and more counties joined, one after another, until the count 
passed 25 in 1902. With the Republicans, the direct primary surpassed the graded system 
temporarily as early as in the late 1860s, lagged a little behind it for two decades from the 
mid-1870s to the mid-1890s, and then clearly beat it after the mid-1890s. Historically, in 
Pennsylvania, the direct primary was first used among the Democrats, but the Republicans were 
its main promoters after the Civil War. The Democrats, on the other hand, seem to have adapted 
to the changing times by making greater use of the graded delegate system. 
We now further break down the data by region. Interestingly, the differences between 
different regions seem starker than between parties. Figure 3.3 shows the map of Pennsylvania 




panels of CSM trends by region and party. In the West, Democrats and non-Democrats shared a 
pattern in which the direct primary became the leading CSM in the post-Civil War period. 
Compared to the Democrats, the non-Democrats stand out for their rapid increase in the number 
of counties using the direct primary, which reached a high of 10 in the 1890s. There seem to be 
two breakthrough points for the Republican practice of the direct primary, one at 1866 and the 
other at 1892. The use of the uniform delegate system in the West remained at the lowest level 
across regions for both parties. The West is almost the only region where Republicans tried the 
Clarion County system at all.  
 
< Insert Figure 3.3 about here > 
< Insert Figure 3.4 about here > 
 
In the Central region, the graded delegate system dominated among Democrats after the 
mid-1850s. The graded system spread in the Central region after 1870 and became dominant 
after 1880 among Republicans. Only in 2 counties at most did the Democrats adopt the direct 
primary at one time, while Republicans stagnated at around two counties until they reached the 
peak of 6 counties in the mid-1890s.  




to the end. The Democrats had a long history of steady practice of the uniform delegate system 
since 1830, while the Republicans exhibited the same pattern at a slightly lower level by 1850. 
While both the graded delegate system and the direct primary continued to pick up counties 
toward the end of the observed period, the Democrats turned out to be more cautious in adopting 
the direct primary. The Republicans showed breakthrough points for increased use of the direct 
primary, similar to those of their counterparts in the West, at 1870 and 1890.  
The last region, the Southeast, shows distinct patterns for each party. The Democrats 
decreased in their use of the uniform delegate system after 1880, and the graded system picked 
up momentum in the late 1870s. Their use of the direct primary is not much more widespread 
than in the Central region. The non-Democrats developed party organizations early in this region. 
The uniform delegate system, which was constantly used in about six counties, remained the top 
CSM until its use dramatically dropped after 1890. The graded delegate system increased its 
share constantly from 1850, and became the leading CSM by the end of the nineteenth century. 
The direct primary was applied in only one or two counties at a time by the Republicans, which 
was the lowest rate across the four regions. Given the fact that the state developed from east to 
west and the population density in the Southeast remained more than three times higher than the 
population density in all other regions through the nineteenth century, this finding defies the 




Southeast is the only region where Democrats used the direct primary at a higher rate than the 
Republicans. 
Figure 3.5 shows maps for each party by decade from the 1840s to the 1890s, with 
counties shown in color where the direct primary was used at least for one year during the 
decade. With Democrats, the system started out in the West and gradually spread east, but the 
largest cluster was at the southwest corner of the state, which remained the Democratic 
stronghold throughout the century. Figure 3.6 contains maps colored in gradations, based on the 
degree of non-Democratic vote share. The ratio was created by taking an average of the 
two-party vote share in the presidential and gubernatorial elections over the decade. The bluish 
categories represent counties where the Democrats were the majority party (vote share 
above .50, .55, and .60, respectively from lightest to darkest blue), and the reddish categories 
represent counties where the non-Democrats (or Republicans) held majority status (vote share 
above .50, .55, and .60, respectively from lightest to darkest red, which are expressed in terms of 
the non-Democratic vote share in the legend list). Many of the colored direct primary counties 
for the Democrats in Figure 3.5 overlap with those counties in blue in Figure 3.6, especially at 
the southwest corner, until most of the region turned Republican in 1890s. It gives the impression 
that, for the Democratic Party, being the leading party in the county may have been a prerequisite 





< Insert Figure 3.5 about here > 
< Insert Figure 3.6 about here > 
 
The non-Democrats in Figure 3.5 started adopting the direct primary in the West and the 
Northeast in the 1850s. The system spread mainly in the West with more and more counties 
becoming majority Republican. The system also spread to some predominantly Republican 
counties in the Northeast and to Lancaster in the Southeast, which retained a non-Democratic 
majority throughout the century. The regional pattern is striking for the Republicans: party 
organizations in the West were clearly the leading force in adopting the direct primary. Some 
tendency for the majority party to adopt the system was observed for the Republican Party as 
well.  
So far, we have looked at the annual counts of CSM observations and decade-by-decade 
regional patterns. We next look into the transition patterns between the CSMs (i.e., how each 
party organization moved from one CSM to another over the years).  
3.4.3 Transitions across Systems 
The overall trends observed in Figure 3.1 might lead some to expect that there were 




direct primary. Reality was not that simple. In only 1 county (Columbia), the Democratic CSMs 
evolved in this sequence. The non-Democrats did the same in 8 counties (Beaver, Bradford, 
Lancaster, Lebanon, Northumberland, Perry, Pike, and Schuylkill). Table 3.1 lists all variations 
of reform sequences observed in Pennsylvania throughout the nineteenth century. Both parties 
showed more than 20 different versions respectively. Democrats had 11 counties that retained the 
uniform delegate system throughout the observed period, while non-Democrats had just 4 
counties. There were 8 Democratic and 7 non-Democratic counties which used only the graded 
delegate system. The mode pattern of sequence for both parties was from the uniform delegate 
system to the graded delegate system, which was experienced in 13 and 10 counties by the 
Democrats and the non-Democrats, respectively. There were also cases in which county parties 
jumped from the uniform delegate system to the direct primary. 
 
< Insert Table 3.1 about here > 
 
The interesting part is that there were many cases in both partisan camps where county 
parties moved back to either of the two delegate systems after trying the direct primary. Eleven 
of those were Democratic and 9 were non-Democratic. Any kind of switch-back being possible, 




suggests that transitions between different CSMs were not irreversible or unidirectional. 
Theoretically, each county party could choose which CSM to use every year, regardless of the 
type of CSM used in the previous year or the sequence of transition it had gone through in the 
past. Each county party was at risk of event annually, facing the choice between all CSMs. 
The top image in Figure 3.7 shows the full conceptual model embodying all of the possible 
multidirectional transition patterns. This model contains the mass meeting system in addition to 
the four CSMs that are coded in the data set. Each CSM has four arrows pointing to and from 
each of the other four CSMs, in addition to one arrow that comes back to itself. Regardless of the 
state of the county party in the previous year, it had five options to choose from in the current 
year. The bottom figure is a simplified model that is used in the later statistical analysis. With the 
difficulty of identifying its detailed structure in addition to the scarcity of newspaper records in 
the early nineteenth century, the mass meeting category had to be dropped in the process of data 
collection.47 The simplified model collapses two delegate systems into one category while 
merging the Clarion County system to the direct primary category. The simplified model is used 
to highlight the shifts between the delegate-mediated CSM and the direct vote CSM; this is 
                                                  
47 This does not cause much of a problem in the statistical analysis, which focuses on the post-1860 period, 
given that it was extremely rare for county parties to switch back to the mass meeting style after the Civil War. 
Even when parties used the name “mass meeting,” they normally employed some identifiable scheme of 
representation for decision making, which was distinct from the free participation style of the old mass 




because, with the introduction of the latter, party elites lost their control over nomination.  
 
< Insert Figure 3.7 about here > 
 
3.5. Case Studies and Theoretical Implications 
In this section, the case studies reveal how some county parties ended up adopting the 
direct primary. I summarize one in-depth case study of the oldest known practice of the direct 
primary by the Crawford County Democrats, from the Antebellum Era, and eight small case 
studies of direct primary adoption in the post-Civil War period. I will then discuss why the direct 
primary was a solution to the internal schisms which county parties suffered chronically, by 
applying the concept of focal point (Schelling 1960) to the function of primaries in the 
nineteenth century. 
3.5.1 The Birth of the Crawford County System 
The Crawford County Democrats started using the direct primary in 1842, and this 
remains the oldest known practice of the system in the U.S. to date. The system was named the 
“Crawford County system” after its birth place, and it was already well known to contemporaries 




better known across and outside the state of Pennsylvania during the Gilded Age and was widely 
cited by Progressive reformers as a successful example.48 The name was used invariably across 
space and time well into the twentieth century until the national wave of statewide legislation 
replaced it with the term “direct primary.” 
There were complicated storied and multiple factors behind the adoption of the direct 
primary by the Crawford Democrats in 1842. (A detailed summary is found in Appendix E.) The 
county Democrats, at that time, were the dominant party, though they had continually suffered 
through enduring and intense internal factionalism. Embittered nomination losers would bolt and 
run in the general election, often with support from the Whigs, and even won offices at times. 
The schisms were partly based on the sectionalism within the county derived from internal 
development and canal building, which led to fierce controversies over the sectional balance of 
representation at county conventions and within each nomination ticket. This brought concerns 
over the malrepresentation caused by the CSM design to the fore at county conventions each year. 
The Democrats, who were using the uniform delegate system at that time, attempted to solve the 
problem by introducing the graded delegate system, in vain, and ended up adopting the direct 
primary. The failure of a deadlocked county convention and the fear of defection provided a 
direct impetus for party leaders to introduce the direct primary. The new system did not eliminate 
                                                  




defection, but it brought certain electoral success and unity to the Democratic Party. Because the 
reform was elite-initiated and was not considered a democratization of the CSM, the system was 
easily abolished when the party lost its majority status in the county in the late 1840s.  
3.5.2 Eight Post-Civil War Case Studies 
We now turn to the findings from eight small case studies from the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. The eight sample cases were chosen to represent two major parties from each 
of the four regions. The criteria used in selecting the cases were: (1) the county party had the 
largest number of CSM observations in the region from 1860 to 1900, so that rich information 
was available; and (2) the party used both the delegate system and the direct primary at least for 
some consecutive years respectively during the period under observation, so that one or more 
transitions between the delegate and popular vote systems could be observed. As a result, the 
following county parties were selected: Westmoreland (Democrat) and Warren (Republican) 
from the West; Cambria (Democrat) and Blair (Republican) from the Central region; 
Northumberland (Democrat) and Tioga (Republican) from the Northeast; and Cumberland 
(Democrat) and Lancaster (Republican) from the Southeast. The fact that in no region was the 
same county selected for both parties implies that both major and minor parties in the same 
county could not meet the two criteria at the same time. The population size of the county does 




Figure 3.8 shows the population change (using interpolated census data) for each county, in the 
unit of 1,000 persons. Note that both relatively rural (Warren) and highly urban (Lancaster) 
counties are included. Some experienced a rapid population increase, while others remained slow 
to change.  
 
< Insert Figure 3.8 about here > 
 
Figure 3.9 shows the two-party vote share and the CSMs of each county party in the 
sample. Among the two connected lines, the black solid line represents the two-party vote share 
in gubernatorial elections, and the gray dash line represents the same in presidential elections. 
The annual use of each CSM is plotted at the bottom of each panel. The gray hollow circle, blue 
circle, gray cross, and red square symbols represent the uniform, graded, Clarion County, and 
direct primary systems, respectively. Note that all county parties practiced both the delegate 
system (uniform or graded) and the popular vote system (Clarion or direct primary) at some 
point after 1860. The horizontal line in the middle indicates the midpoint of the two-party vote 
share, at 0.5, where the two major parties are at parity. All county parties in the sample turned out 
to be above this line, which means that they held the leading status in their counties most of the 




party activity in newspapers. We now know that the eight sample cases have a strong positive 
bias in representing parties in the leading status.  
 
< Insert Figure 3.9 about here > 
 
Figure 3.10 displays the paths of transition among different CSMs that each county 
party went through. All county parties show different patterns of sequence. The Republican Party 
in Tioga County is the only unit which experienced only one transition, from the uniform 
delegate system to the direct primary. Three other county parties switched CSMs twice, while the 
remaining four went through five transitions. There were cases in which two or more reforms 
took place, one after another, in a short time span, implying that a recent reform might have 
made the party organization more susceptible to further reforms.  
 
< Insert Figure 3.10 about here > 
 
In the Tioga case, prevention of defection and preserving unity was the utmost concern 
for the majority Republican Party. The party faced internal schism based on sectionalism, lengthy 




party elites were ambivalent about reform when they decided to try with the direct primary, and 
some elites kept on attempting to return to the delegate system after the reform. However, once 
the system was installed, voters grew attached to the system and refused to give it up. The other 
seven cases showed different trajectories of reform, but similar issues and concerns were 
observed across the party-line and regions. (An in-depth study of one case, the Tioga 
Republicans, and brief description of the remaining seven cases are found in Appendix F and 
Appendix G, respectively.) 
Table 3.2 presents the check list of issues that were discussed by the contemporaries in 
the two detailed case studies of the Crawford Democrats and the Tioga Republicans. For all eight 
mini-case studies, each item is checked if there were comments or incidents pertaining to the 
issue. Party unity is checked if an editorial (normally written by one of the party leaders) drew 
on the importance of “harmony” within the party, or the problems of factionalism or dissention 
were addressed as threats to the party during the period leading up to the adoption of the direct 
primary. Bolting is checked if there was an incident of bolting preceding the adoption of the 
direct primary. Sectional balance is checked off when, for example, the necessity of balancing 
sections on a ticket was discussed, or overrepresentation of a certain area (usually urban) in 
nomination was criticized by those opposed to the direct primary. All of these three items directly 




category is about the democratic value or rhetoric emphasized by proponents or opponents of 
reforms. One person, one vote is checked if the institutional design pertaining to the 
proportionality of representation was an issue, and CSM rule change by popular vote is checked 
if some argument about the procedural legitimacy, such as “CSM should not be changed without 
popular consultation,” was made. The third category is about practical management of county 
conventions, which may have provided immediate impetuses for scrapping the delegate system. 
Deadlocked convention is checked, for example, if a convention collapsed without making 
nominations. Lengthy balloting is checked if the party suffered from repeated ballots for making 
nominations at a convention. Because of the majority rule adopted by most county parties under 
the delegate system, numerous ballotings were often necessary when no contenders were able to 
win a majority of the delegate vote and none would drop out of the race. The table shows that 
county parties more or less shared similar concerns. While the necessity of party unity for 
winning the election was a dominant concern, we should note that the debate and the reform 
process were mostly elite-centered. Party elites would use rhetoric points such as “balanced 
representation” or emphasize the legitimacy of the “popular vote” at their convenience, but the 
real motivation behind this was winning the competition among elites. They would learn—only 






< Insert Table 3.2 about here > 
 
Although I mentioned earlier that the transition between the different CSMs was not 
unidirectional, and that county parties could go back to the old CSM they used to practice, 
increasing use of the direct primary suggests that there might have been some tendencies for 
county parties to stay with the direct primary once they had adopted it. Looking at how the direct 
primary stayed in place once introduced in these sample cases explains part of the mechanism 
behind this unidirectional tendency of transition from the delegate system to the direct primary. 
Table 3.3 lists all of the decision-making records of eight sample cases that were located during 
the data collection procedure regarding the use of the direct primary. There were two different 
types of decision making: by popular vote and not by popular vote. The latter category includes 
decision making by delegates at a county convention, either in the form of votes or resolutions 
(mostly by acclamation), or by the county committee at closed-door meetings. In most cases, the 
decision making took the form of voting among more than one CSM. In the table, the winner 
CSM is marked with a “W” and the loser with an “L.”49  
                                                  
49 Almost every time it was put to the popular vote, the records were printed somewhere in newspapers and 
were thus easily located unless the copy was missing. When the decision was made by the delegates or the 





< Insert Table 3.3 about here > 
 
Surprisingly, all sample county parties made decisions on the use of the direct primary 
multiple times. This shows that it took a while for the system to be accepted and to establish 
itself. Five of the eight sample parties had three or more popular votes taken on the use of the 
direct primary. There were 20 popular votes taken in total among eight sample county parties, 
and 18 out of 19 cases, with known results, endorsed use of the direct primary. The odds of 
approval of the direct primary by popular vote were much higher compared to non-popular vote 
decision-making, among which only 9 out of 12 decisions came out in favor of nomination by 
direct vote. Rejection of the direct primary took place only before and during the 1870s, and 
never after 1880. This suggests that rejecting the direct primary became increasingly difficult 
over time even for party leaders, given that the direct primary’s popularity rose among 
rank-and-file party voters. Note that most of the popular votes were taken with the direct primary 
already in place. Some fraction of party elites repeatedly tried to repeal the system after it was 
installed, but ended up having to put it to the popular vote, and was repeatedly defeated by party 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Therefore, the list in Table 3 may not be complete, especially regarding the non-popular vote type, but it still 




voters. Once the direct primary for nomination was introduced, there was strong pressure to put 
any proposal for CSM reform to the popular vote, too. It was not very likely that those voters 
would vote to deny their own right to vote. Hence, the irreversibility of the reform, at least to 
some extent, was observed. 
3.5.3 Focal Candidate 
 The case studies in the previous two sections suggest that party unity was the foremost 
concern for county party elites in nineteenth century Pennsylvania. The larger the party vote 
share, the better the prospects of winning in the general election, and the more fiercely competed 
for the nominations were. Therefore, the majority party was more likely to suffer from the 
defection problem than the minority party. But, why would this situation lead to adoption of the 
direct primary by the leading party? I explain it below using the well-known concept of a focal 
point, which was first introduced by Thomas Schelling. According to Schelling (1960), the focal 
point is “each person’s expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do” 
(p. 57). In other words, it is a way to reach an agreement in the absence of communication, and it 
works because it seems a natural or relevant choice to the persons in question. 
There are reasons to think that the direct primary functioned to prevent defection. 
Candidates had to publicly announce their candidacy in advance under the primary system, while 




convention under the delegate system. At county conventions, party leaders and delegates 
engaged in negotiations. After some deal-making, potential candidates could withdraw before the 
first balloting, which happened quite often. Candidates did not necessarily have to step forward 
on their own but could have others nominate them (and pretend that they were not interested). 
All sorts of things went on without leaving a trace in the recorded official proceedings. Under the 
delegate system, nomination seekers could pretend that they never had a fair chance at the county 
convention, and therefore argue that their defection was justified. With the introduction of the 
direct primary, the full list of candidates was printed in newspapers before the primary day, and 
the tables of full returns for each candidate were reported in newspapers after the primaries. 
Party leaders were able to make defection more embarrassing for nomination losers by making 
the process transparent. Put in another way, the popular vote system enabled party elites to 
credibly point at who was the focal candidate for each race, and thereby helped line up party 
voters’ support behind a single contender for each office in the general election. Here is how.  
Although, in reality, there were offices to which more than one person was to be elected 
at the same time, we assume for now that only one person was to be elected per office. We also 
assume the U.S.-style two-party system, which did apply in most counties in Pennsylvania. 
When a defector X from the majority party—let us say the Republican Party for now—can freely 




critically on the expectation of the Republican voters. If, for any reason, expectations form 
among some Republican voters to the effect that X has a better chance of winning against the 
Democratic candidate D than the official Republican nominee Y, then these voters will abandon 
Y and support X. The logic follows from Duverger’s law, and this could lead to a disastrous 
outcome for the Republican Party.  
In other words, in the event of defection, the Republican voters face a coordination 
problem: they must coordinate among themselves and rally behind either X or Y to win in the 
general election. But how should they decide? In modern politics, public opinion polls may play 
a critical role in such cases, by allowing party voters to coordinate on the more promising 
candidate. What about in the nineteenth century, when no opinion polls were available and the 
level of information was low? The Republican defector X could easily manipulate some party 
voters into believing that he was more competitive electorally than Y against D. If the process of 
intra-party coordination was incomplete, so that Republican voters could split their votes 
between X and Y, then D might actually win the election unless the total Republican vote share 
was more than two-thirds among the constituency. If there were more than one defector, a 
coordination failure among the Republican voters might still allow D to win, even if the 
Republican share of the electorate was greater than two-thirds.  




one of the contenders, Y, as the focal candidate, so that all Republican voters would see the 
person as the obvious “leading contender” to beat D. Running in the general election would then 
be self-defeating for X, as the Republican voters would coordinate on Y. And how might 
Republican leaders establish Y as the focal candidate? This could be accomplished through the 
use of the direct primary. The winner of the popular vote would have proved his popularity 
among voters. (The results were much more credible than the outcomes of deal-making at a 
delegate convention). If X decided to defect and run in the general election after losing the 
primary or without competing in the primary, voters would know it. Party voters have a strong 
incentive to rally around the primary winner. Winning the primary thus becomes the equivalent 
of leading in the polls.  
Party leaders introduced the direct primary in order to establish someone as the focal 
candidate in the minds of Republican voters rather than to select the most popular or electable 
candidate. The introduction of the direct primary made defection very unattractive and had the 
effect of preventing it to a certain extent. It was a way to induce party unity and hence assure a 
victory over the opposite party. Therefore, the attractiveness of the direct primary increased as 
the party’s vote share increased. The same logic applied to the Democratic Party as well as to the 
Republican Party. Ironically, the stronger the party, the more likely party leaders were to give up 




One thing to note here is that the ideological or issue dimention in terms of calculation 
by party elites or intra-party schisms is missing in the logic of the focal candidate. In local 
newspapers, only sectional interests within a county (in terms of urban/rural enmity) and 
personal feuds were addressed as the background for factionalism and potential defections. It 
may have been the case that, at the county level, the policy position was not what intra-party 
conflicts centered around. Or, there might have been some ideological element in the factional 
strife, but I could collect no data to trace its impact. 
3.6. Statistical Analysis 
If the focal candidate hypothesis is correct, the party vote share and the probability of 
adoption of the direct primary should be positively correlated. In this final section of the paper, I 
test this hypothesis through statistical analysis. Below, I start by discussing dependent and 
independent variables used in the regressions. Next, I estimate simple logit regressions using raw 
yearly data. In order to test the robustness of the findings, I will run ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions using the 5-year moving average of all variables, which is expected to ameliorate the 
problem presented by the missing data. 
The unit of analysis is county-party-year, assuming that each county party had a chance 




representing whether the county party in a certain year applied the direct primary or not. In order 
to focus on the shift between the use of delegates and the unmediated popular vote, I collapsed 
the two types of the delegate system (uniform and graded) into a single category while merging 
the Clarion County system into the direct primary category. Thus, the variable takes the value of 
zero if some version of the delegate system is used and one if the popular vote was used. 
Philadelphia County was excluded from this research at the data collection stage, considering 
that information was not available there in a form equivalent to that in other counties.50 It is 
known, however, that the direct primary was never practiced at the county level in Philadelphia 
County by either party before the state legislation in 1907.51 Aside from Philadelphia County, 1 
county for the Democrats and 4 counties for the Republicans had no CSM information for the 
                                                  
50 Philadelphia County had plenty of newspapers published through the nineteenth century, but information on 
county party activities was not obtainable in a form equivalent to that of other counties. Part of the reason was 
that the party organizations in Philadelphia County were structured in very different ways from the rest of the 
state due to the huge size of its population. The party organizations at the ward and city levels were more 
important than those at the county level, and therefore, county conventions were less important than in other 
counties. In addition, most of the newspapers in Philadelphia commercialized very early, and no newspaper 
served as a simple loyal party bulletin board. Information printed in newspapers related to candidate 
nomination activities was scattered at best, and full proceedings of county conventions could not be located for 
any year. 
51 Scattered records suggest that some lower subdivisions of Philadelphia County party organizations tried to 




observed period.52 The analysis covers only four decades, from 1861 to 1900, because there are 
serious limits to the CSM data availability for the earlier period. (See Appendix H for the 
discussion on the missing data problem.) Also, observations for which the vote share was below 
35% or above 65% were excluded from the analysis, considering that the paucity of the CSM 
observations at both extreme ends along the vote share scale could disproportionately impact 
regression outcomes.53  
The independent variables include the following. The lagged party vote share (t-1) in the 
form of mean two-party vote share (%) in the gubernatorial and presidential elections is used to 
measure the party strength in each county. The mean vote shares in gubernatorial and presidential 
elections are used because there are no comprehensive official election returns for state 
                                                  
52 Counties missing observations were Beaver (Democrats), Fulton, Lehigh, Venango, and Wayne 
(non-Democrats). This makes the total number of remaining county party panels in the dataset 127. 
53 The upper images in Figure 3.FN 1 show the availability of CSM data for each party against the lagged vote 
share in the form of lowess lines fitted for the binary variable representing the data availability along the y-axis. 
For the Republican Party, data availability improves with increases in vote share. The stronger the party, the 
more likely the CSM data was available. For the Democratic Party, the pattern is less stable. This may have 
been caused by the paucity of data at the both ends of the vote share scale. Figure 3.FN 2 shows the CSM 
observation density against the lagged vote share for each party. The distribution of the CSM data becomes 
thin below 35% and above 65% in the vote share. The lower images in Figure 3.FN 1 present how the lowess 
lines fitted for data availability against the vote share look when observations below 35% and above 65% are 




legislative or county office elections recorded by the state government for the observed period.54 
Gubernatorial elections took place every 3 years until 1878, and every 4 years thereafter. The 
vote shares in the gubernatorial and presidential elections are carried over in the dataset until the 
next election. The lagged value is used because the nominations were made months before the 
general elections, and the vote in the previous election was taken into consideration when 
choosing among CSMs or allocating delegates. This party strength variable is used to test the 
focal candidate hypothesis. If the party was more likely to use the primary when it was stronger, 
the coefficient of this variable should be positive and significant.55 
A dummy variable indicating the use of the direct primary in the same year (t) by the 
opposite party in the same county is included to test whether a “copycat” pattern existed. If 
county parties were more likely to adopt the primary when the opposing party was doing the 
                                                  
54 In many counties, election returns for all offices in a specific county, often the unofficial tally with very bad 
prints, would show up in local newspapers, but it was impossible to construct a variable to cover all counties 
from them. 
55 One might think that using a count of defectors might be more attractive for testing my focal candidate 
hypothesis directly. However, creating a variable with the number of defectors was not possible for the 
following reason: In addition to the lack of official records as mentioned above, party defectors could be 
identified among the candidates running in general elections in a very limited number of cases. This was partly 
because partisan affiliation was often not identified when electoral returns were printed in newspapers. Also, 
potential defectors would threaten or negotiate with the party leaders before the convention, and defection 
might be prevented as a result. Therefore, defection, either in terms of a threat or de facto, could not be 




same, the coefficient of this dummy variable should be positive and significant. 
The duration of the CSM that a party used in the previous year (t-1) is also included to 
test whether the inertia of the existent CSM affected the likelihood of CSM reforms. As seen in 
the consecutive reform patterns in the case studies, one reform seemed to have lowered the bar 
for another reform. If a longer record of the existent CSM tended to suppress the likeliness of a 
new reform, this variable should yield a negative coefficient. 
The count of years from 1858 onward is included to capture the time trend that is not 
captured by all other independent variables. The population density variable is included in the 
model to test the impact of urbanization. If the chaos caused by rapid urbanization toward the 
end of the nineteenth century forced party leaders to institutionalize party affairs by way of 
adopting the direct primary, as Ware (2002) argues, the variable should show a positive 
coefficient in the regression. The distance (in kilometers) from Meadville, the county seat of 
Crawford County, where the direct primary was first practiced in 1842, is included to test the 
possibility of some geographical diffusion pattern for the idea. This may absorb most of the 
“West” effect detected earlier in this paper.  
Testing the aggressive candidate hypothesis (Reynolds 2006) quantitatively is not an 
easy task. Listing all county conventions that were affected by stubborn competitors is not 




proceedings printed in party-affiliated newspapers did not show how many hours (or sometimes 
days) the conventions lasted, although in some cases, surely, they went on much longer than 
anyone wanted. In order to test whether the increasing number of hustling candidates (Reynolds 
2006) complicated the management of county conventions by party leaders and enhanced the 
introduction of the direct primary, I generated two variables using the original data collected 
from local newspapers. One variable codes the mean number of rounds of balloting it took to 
arrive at a nomination for an office, and the other represents the mean number of candidates who 
competed for nomination for an office.56 To create these measures, I picked 10 offices whose 
nomination activities appeared in proceedings most constantly, and calculated the mean. 
Although the vast majority of nominations were made by acclamation and this pushed down the 
overall mean of ballot rounds to about two, there were 120 observations with mean ballot rounds 
                                                  
56 The number of offices to be elected each year varied because not just the state but also the county offices 
had varied terms. The total number of offices nominated at county conventions reached about twenty-five, 
including federal (House of Representatives), state (Governor, Assembly, and Senate), and numerous county 
offices (including Associate Judge, Auditor, Clerk of Courts, Commissioner, Coroner, Controller, District 
Attorney, Jury Commissioner, Poor House Director, Prothonotary, Register & Recorder, Sheriff, Surveyor, 
Treasurer, and Trustee of Academy). The number of offices nominated at one convention varied from 1 to 9, 
with an average of slightly above 5. Since nominations for federal- and state-level offices were not likely to be 
determined at a convention of one county, except for Assembly seats, the competition heated up mostly around 
county office nominations. The county parties did not necessarily make nominations for all to-be-elected 
offices at conventions and the nomination records appeared constantly for popular offices while others showed 





greater than 5. Under the delegate systems, all county parties insisted on majority rule, under 
which delegates had to continue voting until some candidate received the majority of the vote. 
Not many county parties had an established rule for the competitor with the least number of 
votes to drop out in the next round, and consequently a few stubborn candidates could drag out 
the convention. In 1879, the delegates at the Cambria County Democratic convention had to vote 
74 times before finally giving up making a nomination. The mean number of competitors ranged 
from about one to twelve, with the average at 2.8. The descriptive statistics of the variables are 
shown in Table 3.4 and pairwise correlations among them are presented in Table 3.5. 
 
< Insert Table 3.4 about here > 
< Insert Table 3.5 about here > 
 
Although Reynolds (2006) suggests that the “hustling candidates” increased toward the 
end of the nineteenth century, these two variables show different patterns. Figure 3.11 shows the 
mean ballot rounds under the delegate system from 1856 to 1900 by party. (No images are shown 
for observations under the direct primary because the one-shot popular vote determined the 
nomination under plurality rule.) The scatter plots represent each county; the red bold lines are 




rounds for each year. Overall, the Democratic Party seems to have suffered lengthy balloting 
slightly more often than the Republicans. No clear time trend can be observed for either party. 
Figure 3.12 shows the same scatterplots, lowess lines (in blue), and statewide means for the 
mean competitor variable. Under the delegate system, the number of Republican competitors 
gradually decreased over time, while the Democratic competitors showed their peak during the 
latter half of the 1870s. Under the direct primary, the mean number of Republican competitors 
increased slightly over time, and the Democratic competitors peaked in the early 1880s. Neither 
of the two variables shows a clear increasing pattern, which is expected under Reynolds’ 
hypothesis.  
 
< Insert Figure 3.11 about here > 
< Insert Figure 3.12 about here > 
 
Two sets of logit regressions were run separately, based on the CSM type which the 
county party used in the previous year: either the delegate system or the direct primary. This is 
because the factors affecting the choice of the direct primary may have been different depending 
on whether the party was switching from the delegate system to the direct primary or whether the 




specifications was run for the pooled data and each party, respectively. This is to see whether 
different factors affected the two parties differently. Data is clustered by county parties in all 
regressions. 
Table 3.6 shows the logit regression results for the county parties that used the delegate 
system in the previous year. The dependent variable is the dichotomous variable for the choice of 
CSM by the county party, which takes the value of 0 if the delegate system was used and 1 if the 
direct primary was used. The lagged vote share was positive and significant for the pooled data 
and for both parties. The positive coefficient suggests that the larger the vote share, the more 
likely the party was to adopt the direct primary. This is consistent with the focal candidate 
hypothesis. The reason why the coefficient for the Republicans is larger than for the Democrats 
is not clear, but it may be a function of the missing data structure. We will come back to this 
point later when we run regressions using moving average data. The opposition primary was 
positive and significant only for the Republican Party. All other variables were insignificant. 
Under this specification, the probability of adopting the direct primary increased from 0.0006 to 
0.0102, and to 0.0397 for the Republican Party and from 0.0053 to 0.0171, and to 0.0304 for the 
Democratic Party, as party vote share increased from 50% to 60%, and to 65%, with the 
opposition party set to not using the primary, time set at 1880, and all other variables held at their 




magnitude of effect was very limited. 
 
< Insert Table 3.6 about here > 
 
 Table 3.7 shows the logit regression results for county parties that had used the direct 
primary in the previous year. The ballot round is dropped from the model because there could be 
only one round under the primary system. The vote share is insignificant for the pooled data and 
both parties. This suggests that, once the direct primary was adopted, whether the party 
continued to use the direct primary or not was not affected by party strength. The duration of the 
previous use of the direct primary was significant for the pooled data and for the Republican 
Party, while the time from 1858 was positive for the Democratic Party. For Republicans, the 
longer the primary system was in place, the more likely that it was kept. Democrats became more 
likely to retain the primary as time went by. 
 
< Insert Table 3.7 about here > 
 
 In order to test the robustness of the findings from the logit regressions, I estimate OLS 




average should ameliorate the potential problem that the missing data might have caused in the 
logit regressions by focusing more on the short-term trend than on the yearly changes. The 
observations are no longer divided into two groups based on which CSM was used in the 
previous year. The dependent variable is the ratio of the years for which the direct primary was 
used by the county party during the 5-year period. The moving average is used for the party vote 
share, population density, and the number of competitors. The opposition primary variable takes 
the form of the ratio of the years for which the opposition party used the primary. The distance 
from Meadville is a constant for each county. The ballot round variable is dropped from the 
model. The descriptive statistics of the variables are shown in Table 3.8 and pairwise correlations 
among them are presented in Table 3.9. Data is clustered by county parties in all regressions. 
 
< Insert Table 3.8 about here > 
< Insert Table 3.9 about here > 
 
The results appear in Table 3.10. Again, the vote share is positive and significant for the 
pooled data and for both parties. Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficients for both parties 
is almost the same. The greater magnitude of impact that the Republican Party showed in the 




increase in the vote share, the ratio of the years for which the party used the direct primary 
during the 5-year period increased by 15% for Republicans and by 17% for Democrats. The 
opposition primary was also positive and significant for the pooled data and for both parties. 
Parties were more likely to adopt the primary when the opposition party in the same county was 
using the primary. The distance from Meadville is, again, negative and significant for the pooled 
data and for the Republican Party, suggesting that party organizations closer to the original birth 
place of the system (especially the Republicans) were more likely to adopt the direct primary.57  
 
< Insert Table 3.10 about here > 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
Overall, the results seen in the statistical analysis support the focal candidate hypothesis, 
while offering no support for the industrialization and hustling candidate hypotheses. The fact 
that the coefficient for vote share was constantly positive and significant strongly suggests that 
                                                  
57 To further check the robustness of the findings, I also estimated two separate sets of OLS regressions by 
dividing the observations into 4-year segments and 8-year segments respectively. All the variables were 
transformed into the 4-year or 8-year means. For these two models, I dropped segments that were missing in 
the CSM data for more than half the years in each segment, and the outcome patterns were exactly the same as 




county parties were more likely to adopt the direct primary as their vote share increased. The 
case studies provide evidence for some causal explanation. In nineteenth century Pennsylvania, 
the better the electoral prospect for the party was, the more candidates competed for the party 
nomination, and the more disgruntled losers were likely to defect and threaten party unity in the 
general election. Party leaders used the direct primary system in order to point out the focal 
candidates to the party supporters, hoping to preserve party unity in the coming election. The 
primary offered credibility to the choice of nominees because of the support that primary winners 
attracted among the party voters. In a sense, the party leaders tested the valence of the candidates 
through the primaries. At the county level, there was little contention over policy positions of the 
candidates. The case of nineteenth century Pennsylvania suggests that the larger parties were 
more likely to suffer internal schisms, regardless of the diversity in the policy preferences of the 
members and candidates. Party leaders used the direct primary as a tool for building consensus 
among party voters during periods when the information level was low. The reforms were mostly 
elite-initiated, and they were not necessarily perceived as vehicles for democratization of party 
affairs. However, with the introduction of the primary for candidate nominations, proposals to 
change the CSM became increasingly more likely to be put to popular vote, as well. Therefore, it 
often became difficult for party elites to switch back to the delegate system.  




when the party’s electoral prospects were at risk. Whether adopting the direct primary brought 
the expected results or not is not tested in this study. This is due to the lack of electoral records at 
the county level. Still, the case studies help reveal the problems and expectations that existed 
behind the CSM changes. Nineteenth century Pennsylvania was a natural laboratory where 
county parties repeated trials and errors in their party management. Both intra-party competition 
and inter-party competition were driving forces behind the invention of innovative CSMs. This 
study provides a new glimpse into local party activities in the nineteenth century U.S., but the 
implications are not confined to the specific historical period or the state. Similar patterns may be 
observed in twenty-first century countries where local party branches are free to choose among 
different CSMs, intraparty competition is not policy-centered, and defection from a party is easy. 
These conditions, for example, overlap a lot with the patterns that Ichino and Nathan (2012) 
found in Ghana. This suggests that intraparty democratization in the form of the direct primary 
might be observed in more emerging democracies where policy-oriented electoral competition 
has not yet taken roots. It also suggests that the introduction of seemingly very democratic CSMs 
may not be fully motivated by democratic values.  
  
Table 3.1. Variation in Sequence of CSM Reforms in the 19th Century Pennsylvania 
 
[d]: Delegate System, type 
unknown 
C: Clarion County System 
U: Uniform Delegate System 
D: Direct Primary 
G: Graded Delegate System  
 
Democratic Party 
Path     County 
U only      Bucks, Fulton, Huntingdon, Lebanon, Mercer, Montour, 
Snyder, Susquehanna, Union, Wayne, Wyoming 
U → G      Blair, Clinton, Delaware, Erie, Franklin, Indiana,  
Lackawanna, Lancaster, Mifflin, Perry, Potter, 
Washington, York 
U → G → U     Luzerne, Lycoming, McKean 
U → G → U → G     Adams 
U → G → D     Columbia 
U → G → D → U → G  Crawford 
U → G → D → G → D → G  Northumberland 
U → C     Schuylkill 
U → C → U → C     Berks 
U → C → D     Clarion 
U → D     Armstrong, Bradford, Butler, Juniata, Tioga 
U → D → U → G    Dauphin, Warren 
U → D → U → D → G → D → [d]    Cumberland 
U → D → G      Bedford, Cambria, Clearfield 
U → D → G → D      Fayette 
U → D → G → D → U → D → U    Somerset 
 
G only       Cameron, Carbon, Chester, Lawrence, Montgomery,  
Northampton, Sullivan, Venango 
G → U → G      Centre, Elk 
G → C      Jefferson 
G → D      Forest, Pike 
G → D → U → D     Lehigh 
G → D → G → D → G → D  Westmoreland 
 
D only      Greene, Monroe
200
Non-Democratic Party 
Path     County 
U only      Berks, Dauphin, Montgomery, Montour 
U → G     Bucks, Chester, Cumberland, Delaware, Elk, Fayette,  
           Greene, Huntingdon, Northampton, Washington 
U → G → U      Susquehanna 
U → G → U → G     Centre 
U → G → U → G → U → G    York 
U → G → U → G → U → G → U→D→G Luzerne 
U → G → U → G → U → G → C→G→D  Mercer 
U → G → U → D → G → D → G→D  Blair 
U → G → C      Warren 
U → G → D     Beaver, Bradford, Lancaster, Lebanon,  
Northumberland, Perry, Pike, Schuylkill 
U → G → D → G    Potter 
U → C → D      Jefferson 
U → D      Crawford, Juniata, McKean, Mifflin, Snyder,  
Somerset, Tioga, Union 
[d] → D      Lawrence, Monroe 
U → D → U      Cambria, Wyoming 
U → D → U → D     Butler 
U → D → G → D     Bedford 
 
G only      Cameron, Carbon, Clearfield, Clinton, Columbia, 
Franklin, Sullivan 
G → U      Adams 
G → D → U → G → U    Lycoming 
G → D → U → D     Westmoreland 
G → D → [d] → D → [d]    Lackawanna 
G → D → G → C    Erie 
 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(1) Direct Primary 2260 0.23 0.42 0 1 
(2) Vote Share 2260 51.3 7.1 35.1 65.0 
(3) Opposition Primary 1503 0.20 0.40 0 1 
(4) Duration of CSM(t-1) 2260 7.0 8.3 0 47 
(5) Year from 1858 2260 25.3 10.8 3 42 
(6) Population Density (1,000) 2260 34.0 26.9 3.0 194.7 
(7) Distance from Meadville 2260 242.1 104.9 0 423.6 
(8) Nomination Seekers 2099 3.0 1.6 1 12 
(9) Ballot Rounds 1671 2.2 2.5 1 74 
(10) Republican Party 2260 0.54 0.50 0 1 
 
 
Table 3.5. Correlations between the Variables 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Direct Primary 
(2) Vote Share 0.13   
(3) Opposition Primary 0.02 -0.27   
(4) Duration of CSM(t-1) -0.16 0.10 -0.11   
(5) Year from 1858 0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.15   
(6) Population Density (1,000) 0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.10   
(7) Distance from Meadville -0.09 0.04 -0.20 0.09 0.07 0.46   
(8) Nomination Seekers 0.11 0.26 -0.15 0.02 -0.11 0.11 0.20   
(9) Ballot Rounds 0.00 0.16 -0.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.31   
(10) Republican Party -0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.13 -0.06 
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Table 3.6. Logit Regressions for Using the Direct Primary among Counties that Used the 
Delegate System in Previous Year 
 
Dependent variable: Dummy variable for using the direct primary (t) 




The table shows the logit regressions for the county-parties which used the delegate system in the previous 
year (t-1). The numbers shown in parentheses under the coefficient estimates are the standard errors. The 
statistics at the bottom are the pseudo R-squared (R2_P), the number of observations (N), and the number of 
clusters (N_Clust). The observations are clustered by the county-parties.  
 
                            Standard errors in parentheses.
                                  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                                  
       N_Clust                                      90          43         47    
       N                                           1,096       557        539    
       R2_P                                        0.16        0.35       0.10   
                                                  (3.795)    (8.911)    (5.293)  
                       Constant                  -12.719**   -17.933*   -10.878* 
                                                  (0.658)                        
                       Republican                 -0.416                         
                                                  (0.042)    (0.888)    (0.018)  
                       Ballot Rounds              -0.013      -0.765     0.017   
                                                  (0.169)    (0.680)    (0.141)  
                       Nomination Competitors      0.169      0.657      0.097   
                                                  (0.004)    (0.010)    (0.004)  
                       Distance from Meadville    -0.007      -0.009     -0.003  
                                                  (0.009)    (0.014)    (0.013)  
                       Population Density         -0.000      -0.018     0.007   
                                                  (0.034)    (0.056)    (0.073)  
                       Years from 1858            -0.015      -0.034     0.030   
                                                  (0.031)    (0.043)    (0.052)  
                       Delegate Duration          -0.024      0.029      -0.083  
                                                  (1.048)    (1.567)    (1.675)  
                       Opposition Primary          1.781      3.301*     2.051   
                                                  (0.056)    (0.140)    (0.055)  
       Direct Primary  Lagged Vote Share (%)      0.187**     0.277*     0.118*  
                                                                                  
                                                  Pooled    Republican  Democrat 
                                                                                  
               Among Counties that Used Delegate System in Previous Year
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Table 3.7. Logit Regressions for Using the Direct Primary among Counties that Used the Direct 
Primary in Previous Year 
 
Dependent variable: Dummy variable for using the direct primary (t) 




The table shows the logit regressions for the county-parties which used primaries in the previous year (t-1). 
The numbers shown in parentheses under the coefficient estimates are the standard errors. The statistics at the 
bottom are the pseudo R-squared (R2_P), the number of observations (N), and the number of clusters 
(N_Clust). The observations are clustered by the county-parties.  
 
                            Standard errors in parentheses.
                                  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                                 
        N_Clust                                     46         28         18    
        N                                           469       275        194    
        R2_P                                       0.07       0.25       0.04   
                                                  (2.014)   (2.929)    (2.713)  
                        Constant                   0.633     0.079      1.301   
                                                  (0.176)   (0.333)    (0.204)  
                        Nomination Competitors    -0.007     -0.326     0.145   
                                                  (0.677)                       
                        Republican                -0.231                        
                                                  (0.004)   (0.004)    (0.008)  
                        Distance from Meadville   -0.003     -0.006     0.003   
                                                  (0.018)   (0.040)    (0.040)  
                        Population Density        -0.003     0.021      -0.013  
                                                  (0.027)   (0.038)    (0.028)  
                        Years from 1858            0.031     0.036      0.061*  
                                                  (0.068)   (0.212)    (0.106)  
                        Primary Duration          0.135*    0.559**     -0.077  
                                                  (0.040)   (0.059)    (0.051)  
        Direct Primary  Lagged Vote Share (%)      0.036     0.033      -0.002  
                                                                                 
                                                  Pooled   Republican  Democrat 
                                                                                 
                Among Counties that Used Primary System in Previous Year
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Table 3.8. Summary Statistics for 5-Year Moving Average 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(1) Direct Primary (Ratio) 2253 0.22 0.40 0 1 
(2) Vote Share (5YMA) 2253 50.1 7.3 35.0 65.0 
(3) Opposition Primary (Ratio) 2253 0.22 0.40 0 1 
(4) Population Density (1,000) (5YMA) 2253 35.7 29.2 3.0 215.0 
(5) Distance from Meadville 2253 240.9 101.5 0 423.6 
(6) Year from 1858 2253 23.3 9.9 3 38 
(7) Nomination Seekers (5YMA) 2253 2.9 1.3 1 9.5 
(8) Republican Party 2253 0.51 0.50 0 1 
 
 
Table 3.9. Correlations between the Variables 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Direct Primary (Ratio)   
(2) Vote Share (5YMA) 0.24   
(3) Opposition Primary (Ratio) 0.33 -0.25   
(4) Population Density (1,000) (5YMA) -0.12 -0.01 -0.12   
(5) Distance from Meadville -0.38 0.00 -0.38 0.40   
(6) Year from 1858 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.02   
(7) Nomination Seekers (5YMA) 0.02 0.30 -0.19 0.18 0.24 -0.04   
(8) Republican Party 0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.17 
 
 
(1) Ratio of years the direct primary was used during the 5-year period 
(2) 5-year moving average of party vote share 
(3) Ratio of years the direct primary was used by the opposite party 
(4) 5-year moving average of population density (1,000 people) 
(5) Distance from Meadville, Crawford County 
(6) Time counter (year from 1858) 
(7) 5-year moving average of mean number of nomination seekers per office 
(8) Dummy of Republican Party 
207
Table 3.10. OLS Regressions for Using the Direct Primary (5-Year Moving Average) 
 




The moving average over five year periods is used for party vote share, population density, and 
the number of competitors. The opposition primary variable takes the form of the ratio of the 
years the opposition party used the primary during the five-year period. Distance from Meadville 
is a constant for each county. 
                            Standard errors in parentheses.
                                  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                         
               N_Clust                     111         56         55    
               N                          2,253      1,138      1,115   
               R2                          0.28       0.38       0.23   
                                         (0.182)    (0.315)    (0.253)  
               Constant                  -0.505**    -0.258    -0.754** 
                                         (0.059)                        
               Republican                 0.004                         
                                         (0.025)    (0.027)    (0.033)  
               Competitors                0.020      0.002      0.024   
                                         (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.003)  
               Years from 1858            0.003      0.000      0.006   
                                         (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)  
               Distance from Meadville   -0.001**   -0.001**    -0.001  
                                         (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)  
               Population Density         0.000      -0.001     0.001   
                                         (0.079)    (0.114)    (0.101)  
               Opposition Primary        0.296**     0.294*    0.342**  
                                         (0.004)    (0.006)    (0.006)  
               Vote Share (%)            0.016**     0.015*    0.017**  
                                                                         
                                          Pooled   Republican  Democrat 
                                                                         
                         Ratio of Years Direct Primary Was Used
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Figure 3.6. Party Vote Share 
 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The scatter plot is cut off at 10 so that the image of the overall trend at the lower part of the graph is not 
squashed. The Republican Party had five cases above 10, and the Democratic Party had eight cases above 10. 
The statewide means and the Lowess line for the Democratic Party were calculated by excluding an outlier, the 
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Figure 3.12. Mean Competitors by Party, 1856-1900 
 
Under Delegate System 
 
 
Under Direct Primary 
 
 
The scatter plots are cut off at 10 so that the image of the overall trend at the lower part of the graphs is not 
squashed. The Republican Party had one case above 10 for each of delegate and primary figures, and the 
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Appendix A: Motor Voter and Agency Based Registration Reform in the U.S. 
 
NOTE: Information in the tables is based on materials in the Human SERVE archives. Rows in Italic suggest 
that the cases have ambiguities due to poor information. Cases of Delaware and Idaho after 1992 are included. 
 
< Date > Introduction: For legislation, the latter known date for the bill to (1) pass the House or Senate or (2) 
be signed by the Governor is listed. For a gubernatorial executive order, the date when the governor signed is 
listed. Effective: Based on descriptions in original documents and Human SERVE notes. Implementation: 
Actual implementation date is listed if known. Otherwise, officially designated implementation date is listed.  
< Location > ABR (= agency-based registration): Voter registration was offered at departments and agencies 
except for those provided MV. MV (= motor voter): Voter registration was offered at departments or agencies 
that issued driver’s license. (Eg. Division of Motor Vehicles in Department of Public Security or Department of 
Transportation.) 
< Path > The types of decision-making that introduced the reform include GEO (= gubernatorial executive 
order), Leg (= legislation by state legislature), and Other (Eg. Initiative, consent decree, or administrative 
implementation). 
< Implementation > Active may include “Ask” (= employees ask all applicant whether they want to register to 
vote), “Amended” (= amended forms with a prompt question), or “Combined” (= combined forms). Passive 
may include “Available” (= voter registration forms are available somewhere in the building or applicants have 
to ask for voter registration services, and involvement of employees is assumed). Weak may include 
“Available” (= voter registration forms are available/displayed but no involvement of employees is assumed or 
allowed), provision of voter registration services is optional, or some agencies are exempted when busy. “[ ]” 
describes how it was actually implemented when different from the formal provisions. “(mail-in)” suggests 
that the mail-in voter registration form was used. The following conditions were noted when information was 
available: Assist (= employees assist applicants fill out voter registration forms); Collect (= agencies collect 
completed voter registration forms and forward them to elections offices; “Box” or “Receptacle” may be 
placed in the office for collection); and Report (numbers of processed voter registration will be reported). For 
these three items, “x” represents there were provisions in the legislation or gubernatorial executive order and “i” 
suggests that implementation took this form. “m” suggests Human SERVE noted that the provision was clearly 
missing. Under Actual Practice: “Yes” suggests some systematic implementation followed. (It does not mean 
perfect implementation by all designated agencies or perfect in quality of implementation.); “Poor” suggests 
that some implementation followed, but it was very poor either in scale or quality; and “No” suggests very 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B: Kobo Interview Codes 
 
Code Party House Prefecture Interview Date Notes
Diet Members
　 D1 DPJ HR Chiba February 28, 2012 Kōbo-selected
D2 DPJ HR Tokyo October 18, 2011 HQ Election Committee
　 D3 DPJ HR Okayama October 20, 2011 Kōbo-selected
October 8, 2012
D4 DPJ HC Okayama October 8, 2012
D5 LDP HR Chiba October 20, 2011 Kōbo-selected
D6 LDP HR Yamaguchi October 20, 2011 HQ Election Committee
D7 other HR Gunma October 17, 2012
Party Staff
　 S1 DPJ HQ October 18, 2011 HQ Election Committee
S2 DPJ HQ October 19, 2011 HQ Election Committee
July 4, 2012
September 19, 2012
S3 DPJ Chiba October 10, 2012 also Prefectural Assembly member
S4 DPJ Chiba October 10, 2012 also City Councilor
S5 DPJ Tokushima October 9, 2012 20-year veteran staff
S6 DPJ Fukuoka October 7, 2012 also Prefectural Assembly member
S7 LDP HQ October 10, 2012 HQ Election Committee
S8 LDP Miyagi October 4, 2012 20-year veteran staff






Appendix C: Pennsylvania Background 
 
One-and-a-Half Party System of Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania politics in the nineteenth century was not an equally balanced competitive 
two party system, nor was it a completely dominant one party system. Figure APX.C 1 and 
Figure APX.C 2 display the vote share held by the two major forces in presidential, gubernatorial, 
and state legislative elections from 1800 to 1906. The ratios for presidential and gubernatorial 
races are to the entire vote, and the ratios in the state House of Representatives are to the seats 
occupied by the two major forces. For the legislative seat share, the Whigs, the Anti-Masons, the 
Native Americans, and the Know Nothings are included in the non-Democratic category. I 
counted independent legislators with partisan leanings as partisan. From 1840 to 1890, although 
the non-Democratic force, or the Republicans after 1860, showed constant advantage, both 
presidential and gubernatorial races remained very competitive. In the state House of 
Representatives, which was elected annually until the 1874 Constitution of Pennsylvania 
changed the term to two years, the leading party clearly switched from the Democrats to the 
Republicans in 1859, but the Democratic Party remained competitive and even won the majority 
several times. 




party system, where a leading party repeatedly held a majority over the opposition party if it 
stayed united, but was not dominant enough to rest assured of electoral victories under every 
circumstance. The majority party always suffered internal factionalism and disunity because of 
its supermajority status and appealing electoral prospects. The minority party could take 
advantage of the majority party’s schism by supporting or building a coalition with dissenters or 
nomination losers from the leading party and occasionally win elections. Therefore, for the 
leading party, the management of internal factionalism was an equally important concern as was 
inter-party competition and this obsession defined the way the leading party would organize 
itself. 
During the first half of the century, the leading party in Pennsylvania consisted of a 
stream of political entities successively called the anti-Federalists, the (Democratic-) 
Republicans, and the Democrats. With the Federalists losing popularity after putting down the 
Whiskey Rebellion in the western part of the state in 1794, the (Democratic-)Republicans 
increased their share of popular vote to nearly equal that of the Federalists by the presidential 
election of 1796, and Pennsylvania entered the nineteenth century as a predominantly 
(Democratic-)Republican state. As early as 1803, the factionalism among the leading 
Jeffersonians split the party into two wings when William Duane’s faction established a primitive 




had to fight by admitting Federalists into the nominating meetings to gain strength 
(Higginbotham 1952; Kelly 1952). The division became permanent when Duane’s Republicans 
called themselves “Democratic Republicans” and nominated Simon Snyder for governor, while 
the Quids adopted the name “Constitutional Republicans” and renominated McKean at the 1805 
election. McKean won by a narrow margin of 43,644 votes to Snyder’s 38,483. However, the 
Federalists took control of the Quids, which presents an interesting but not unusual pattern in 
Pennsylvania: a leading party’s weaker faction merging with the opposition party. 
After the War of 1812, the Federalists collapsed as a national force, and its local 
adherents in Pennsylvania had to seek a way to survive by allying with oppositions within the 
Democratic Party. The mainstream Democrats with Snyder called themselves “New School 
Democrats,” while those close to McKean and those who lost offices to the New School called 
themselves “Old School Democrats” and formed a coalition with the Federalists. The New 
School elected John Andrew Shulze governor in 1823, the Old School collapsed, and Shulze had 
no opposition for reelection in 1826. 
New party lines emerged from the presidential contest in 1824. The “Family Party,” 
inheriting the New School’s line, supported John C. Calhoun, while the “Amalgamation party” 
made a coalition with the Federalists and supported Henry Clay. In the end, they both supported 




factionalism among the Jacksonians in the presidential election of 1828. Again, the 
one-and-a-half party system manifested in the form of the Jackson party being so large that it 
remained split and the Adams party being too weak to win on its own. 
For the gubernatorial election in 1835, the Democratic Party split. The incumbent, 
George Wolf, from the Family faction reran, and the Amalgamation faction nominated Hnery A. 
P. Muhlenberg. Anti-Jackson forces gathered to take advantage of the situation. Joseph Ritner, 
who was nominated by the Anti-Masons, won the election with support from Whigs and some 
Jacksonians. This was a bitter lesson for the Democrats, and they won back the governorship in 
1838 by carefully staying united. However, for the 1840 presidential election, Democrats split 
again into “Improvement men” supporting David R. Porter and “Hard-money men” supporting 
Martin Van Buren, which allowed Whig’s William H. Harrison to win Pennsylvania. In the 1840s, 
the Democrats remained split over patronage, and Democratic Simon Cameron won a seat in the 
U.S. Senate by allying with the Whigs and Native Americans in 1845 (Snyder 1958). 
Cameron approached the Know-Nothings, Free-Soil Democrats, and Whigs in the 1850s, 
and moved to the Republican Party, eventually becoming its statewide boss. With such frequent 
cases of electoral cooperation between the weaker faction of the ruling party and the minority 





In 1848, the Whigs again won both the presidential and gubernatorial elections in 
Pennsylvania because of dissension among the Democrats. The Democratic Party remained the 
strongest political entity in the state to 1857, but the internal dissention over the Kansas 
Lecompton constitution and regular factionalism weakened the party by the end of the 1850s, 
and the Republican Party emerged as a leading party in the state from the Civil War (Coleman 
1975). 
From this to 1893, the second version of Pennsylvania’s one-and-a-half party system 
developed, with the roles played by the two major parties switched. Now, the leading party was 
the Republicans, which would remain the leading party throughout the rest of the nineteenth 
century, but its control was not perfect. The Republican Party became dominant and 
Pennsylvania became a one-party state only after the economic depression in 1893, for which 
President Cleveland and the Democrats were blamed by the voters. With the election of 
Republican McKinley to the presidency in 1896, the Republican dominance in the state was 
cemented. In other words, the Republican rule was in the making before the 1893 panic. 
The Republican Party started this period with fierce internal competition for leadership 
(Bradley 1964). When Lincoln took the office of the President in 1861, the Republican Party was 
already divided into two factions, one led by U.S. Senator Cameron, the other Governor Curtin. 




and became undisputed boss of the ruling party in the state by the election of 1872, which he 
helped Grant win. He designed and started building a statewide machine, which would be 
developed and completed by his successors, Matthew Quay and Boies Penrose, through the 
1930s (McCaffery 1993). 
Still, Cameron’s control was not complete for he had to struggle with internal 
factionalism and bolting. For example, an independent-minded Republican Governor Geary did 
not follow Cameron all the time, but he still won reelection in 1869. The Liberal Republican 
movement in the early 1870s, which was anti-Grant and favored amnesty for the South at the 
national level, was simply an anti-Cameron movement in Pennsylvania. When reformist 
Republican Alexander K. McClure organized opposition to promote municipal reform 
movements in Philadelphia in 1872, the Democrats endorsed him. The Independent Republicans 
forced Cameron and Quay to accept their candidate for the U.S. Senate in 1881. 
The movement for constitutional revision, which culminated in 1873, was a reaction 
against the legislative and municipal corruption for which the Republicans had been held 
responsible by the voters (Klein 1973). The new constitution contained provisions designed to 
undermine the Republican machine such as restrictions on special and local legislation, which 
was a source of Republican patronage; the definition of bribery by state officials and provisions 




registration requirements; and prohibition of Governor from immediately succeeding himself. 
The Republican machine attempted to prevent its ratification, but the new constitution was 
adopted by a vote of 253,774 to 108,594. Although much of the expected reform effect failed to 
materialize, it was certainly a major defeat for the Republican machine. 
The Democratic Party remained a threat for the Republican Party after the Civil War, for 
the former could steal the election when the latter was split. Taking advantage of people’s 
disappointment with the continued corruption after the 1873 constitutional reform, the 
Democratic Party won all the statewide elections except for the seat of State Supreme Court 
Justice in the 1874 election. They controlled the state legislature by 110 to 89 Republicans, 
secured next U.S. Senator seat, which was to be filled by the joint ballot of two houses, and won 
the majority of the Congressional seats by 17 to 10. The Democratic Party retained the majority 
in the House of Representatives in the 1875 election, and won majority of the seats in 1882 again. 
In the same 1882 election, with the Republicans split by Independent Republicans nominating 
John Stewart in opposition to the Republican machine candidate James A. Beaver, the Democrats 
nominated reformist Robert E. Pattison and won the governorship. Pattison won the reelection in 
1886. From 1876 to 1892, the Democratic Party won about one-third of the congressional 
contests. 




Pennsylvania during the nineteenth century in this context of a skewed but not-completely 
dominant party system and persistent intra-party factionalism within the leading party. 
Pennsylvania after the Civil War is often pictured as a typical Republican one-party state, but it 
was not until the mid-1890s. This point becomes especially important when considering the 
implications the development of the well-known Cameron－Quay－Penrose machine had on 
nomination reforms in Pennsylvania counties. 
Boss Rule and Machine Politics 
The Cameron－Quay－Penrose machine is often noted for its outstanding length of life 
spanning from the 1860s to the 1920s. As discussed above, the state machine in terms of 
dominating state politics did not materialize until the mid-1890s. A similar timeline applies to the 
boss rules in terms of systematic discipline down to the lowest level of the party structure, at the 
county or city level, across the state. According to McCaffery (1993), although it is true that 
Cameron started building the statewide machine network in the 1860s, it was not until the turn of 
the twentieth century that a mature political machine with genuine boss rule became a dominant 
institution, for example, in Philadelphia. For the first two decades after the Civil War, the city 
politics was fought between two major forces: the machine and the reformers. Only after the 
mid-1890s, when the machine exercised total hegemony over local affairs, the time of a truly 




Machines in Pennsylvania, typically represented by those in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, 
are different from most other representative large city machines in a few aspects. First, the 
machines were Republican. In many other states, Democratic machines faced challenges from 
Republican reformers. Irish descendants dominated many of those Democratic machines, while 
the Yankees controlled the Pennsylvanian Republican machines. According to Erie (1988), the 
Republicans in Pennsylvania built the machines in cities such as Philadelphia and Pittsburgh as 
offshoots of the state machine in order to prevent an alliance between the urban foreign-born and 
the downstate native-born Democrats who might potentially threaten the Republican state 
hegemony. Reflecting this background, Republican machines were constructed from the top 
down, and they encouraged political passivity and nonparticipation on the part of immigrants, 
typically Irish, working class. 
The Philadelphia Republican machine underwent drastic organizational changes 
between 1896 and 1908, whereby centralization was achieved in several different ways. One was 
to make the party nomination for public office under the strict control of the City Committee and 
various ward committees. With this reform, absolute control became possible and the era of 
machine politics officially began. In other words, four decades after the Civil War, which Erie 
(1988) calls an “embryonic state,” was the time Republican state and local bosses struggled to 




state in this context. The state was competitive in the sense of a “one-and-a-half” party system. 
The Republican Party was the majority party but was not completely dominant yet. State bosses 
such as Cameron and Quay were struggling to quell internal dissentions and institutionalize the 
statewide party machine. In huge cities like Philadelphia and Pittsburgh where it was densely 
populated and machine organizations took elaborate forms, cementing of the machine rule took 
the form of centralization of the delegate convention system. What happened in other counties? 
How did local party leaders respond in designing the nomination methods? 
Nomination Method as a Point of Contention 
In Pennsylvania, the legitimacy of the nomination procedure was a focus of factional 
strife at the state level from an early time (Walton 1897; Tinkcom 1950). For the legislative 
election in 1790, a few Federalist leaders handpicked nominees at an informal meeting and put 
them on the “Conference Ticket,” while the Anti-federalists requested the county Committees of 
Correspondence to send in names of nominees to a central committee, which formed the ticket. 
The Federalist leaders soon developed a prototype of the delegate-convention system, under 
which county representatives attended the nominating conference. The Anti-Federalists, on the 
other hand, used Democratic Societies and Democratic Clubs, which were formed all over the 
state. The practice helped spread the idea of a nomination procedure that is open to all citizens. 




vice-presidential candidate as a fair reward for their support for Monroe, but were disappointed 
when New York Governor Tompkins was instead nominated. Blaming the illegitimacy of the 
Congressional “King Caucus” for monopolizing the nomination process, the Old School 
Democrats in coalition with the Federalists called for a convention of delegates and nominated 
DeWitt Clinton for president. Monroe won in Pennsylvania by polling 25,000 votes, but Clinton 
received 17,000, which demonstrates the anger Pennsylvanians felt. 
When Governor Snyder of the New School picked his successor, William Findley, and 
the legislative caucus endorsed his will in 1817, the Old School attacked the New School for 
using the exclusive King Caucus and demanded the party to open up the nomination process to 
voters. They called a convention to which only delegates chosen by voters at county meetings, 
not those chosen by officeholders, were admitted, and they nominated Joseph Hiester. Findley 
barely won with 66,000 votes to 59,000 for Hiester. 
In March 1835, the Democratic state convention in Harrisburg became stuck in a 
deadlock when trying to nominate a gubernatorial candidate. The mainstream faction attempted 
to give incumbent Wolf a third term, but the opposition Amalgamation faction insisted on 
nominating Muhlenberg. The convention adjourned to meet up in May, but a day or two later the 
Wolf faction nominated Wolf in a snap convention after many of the Muhlenberg delegates had 




called for a formal convention to which only delegates chosen at county conventions were 
invited. 
All these examples suggest that, because of the long history of intense factional strife in 
Pennsylvania, the procedural legitimacy of the candidate nomination repeatedly became the 
focus of attention, which in turn made the nomination method an important tool in keeping a 
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Appendix D: Pennsylvania Data Generation Procedure 
 
There is no single inclusive source for the county-level data on political party activity in 
the nineteenth century. American political parties became semi-public agencies with the advent 
of various regulations introduced by law after the 1880s, but parties were purely private 
associations for most of the nineteenth century and there was no official or public record kept of 
party activities, especially at the local levels. The only place one can find such information on 
local party activity is in the local newspapers, many of them published by local party 
organizations during the nineteenth century (Schudson 1967). Until they became rapidly 
commercialized and less partisan toward the end of the nineteenth century, these local 
newspapers served as party organizations’ bulletin boards. They were widely distributed, even to 
those who did not pay the subscription fee, because it was the vehicle of mobilization by parties. 
They often printed calls for primary meetings and conventions, proceedings of the county 
conventions in detail, and party tickets once the nominations were made. The only way to 
reconstruct a broad picture of the county-level party activity across one state is to delve into the 
numerous but scattered stocks of local newspapers from the nineteenth century. 
I collected the nomination data for this project from thousands of microfilm rolls of 




Library of Pennsylvania in Harrisburg. The State Library has the best collection of Pennsylvania 
historical newspapers. I checked copies of all relevant local newspapers published in each county 
from 1800 to 1906 that have survived to date for this data collection. After locating newspapers 
affiliated with either of the two major local parties in each county, I collected following three 
types of information for each county-party-year: 1) a call for the county convention, 2) county 
convention proceedings, and 3) a county ticket.58 (See Figure APX.D 1-11 for image samples.) It 
is from this information that the candidate nomination method (CSM) used by each county party 
every year was traced. The contemporaries never kept these local party activity records in a 
systematic way, and, therefore, newspapers are the only place we can find them consistently 
across time and place. To my knowledge, no study on local party organizations in the nineteenth 
century that covers all counties in a single state has ever been conducted. This study provides a 
new and unique database that contributes to the further understanding of the reality of 
                                                  
58 The following procedure was applied to each county. First, I searched for all the newspapers in the county 
using the library’s online database. Then, I picked all newspapers published between 1800 and 1906. In this 
electronic catalog, partisan affiliations were noted for some newspapers, but not for all. When partisan 
newspapers were located, I started with those that were best preserved, i.e. with largest records kept. These 
newspapers often provided nomination information for decades. If data is missing for any year, I tried to fill in 
by checking other partisan newspapers. If this was not enough, I checked the rest of newspapers which seemed 
independent or non-political in the online catalog listing. Only newspapers in microfilm format were checked. 
The state library has an extensive collection of historical newspaper original prints which are not available in 
microfilm. However, the rare book section was closed as of February 2010, and these originals were not 
accessible. If checked, they might provide additional nomination data, but the addition should constitute less 




nineteenth-century U.S. party politics at the grass-roots level. 
The county of Philadelphia is excluded from the study. Because of the large population 
from the early days, the county and the city of Philadelphia took a very different administrative 
organizational form from all other counties in the state. Party organizations had to develop 
adjusting themselves to these governmental, and therefore electoral, units, and they ended up 
constituting complicated webs of organization that looked quite different from the simpler ones 
found elsewhere. Because the lower administrative units played roles that were more important 
and the city overlapped and overshadowed the county, the county conventions of Philadelphia 
did not bear the same importance as those in other counties did.59  
Reflecting this situation, in addition to the fact that newspapers were filled with news 
and advertisements from an earlier time in this large city and thus parties were not assured 
reserved space to publish announcements for and records of their formal organizational activities, 
local partisan newspapers printed only scattered information on party nomination activities at the 
precinct or district levels. Virtually no full coverage of the county level nomination activities for 
any year could be located. It was, therefore, impossible to collect the data equivalent to those 
from all other counties, although Philadelphia had plenty of partisan newspapers published 
                                                  
59 The county and the city of Philadelphia were consolidated in 1854 into a single body politic by making the 




throughout the nineteenth century. 
Because of the large size of the delegate body Philadelphia could send to the state 
legislature, state party leaders were obsessed with controlling the nomination in the county, and 
that is why the most well organized machine in the nation developed in the city as discussed in 
Appendix C. There is extensive research on the boss rules and the machine politics in 
Philadelphia. Although they suggest that state and local bosses dominated the nominations, the 
details of the adopted nomination schemes have not been systematically investigated. It seems 
the city Republican organization adopted a direct primary from 1872 to 1873, but there is no 
proof that the direct primary was ever adopted countywide in Philadelphia during the nineteenth 
century. (There were many cases in other counties, also, in which only the city area adopted a 
direct primary for a certain period.) The omission of Philadelphia from the study might have 
caused some bias, especially if the direct primary was ever applied countywide, because of the 
influential position the city occupied in the state. However, it is also true that including this large 
city could have caused even greater bias, especially in the statistical estimates, by being overly 
influential with its outstanding population numbers, different organizational structure, and 
factors unique to large cities. In either case, the direct primary was adopted and tried in counties 
with ordinary traits, which makes it possible to generalize the findings beyond the special 




the state, Pittsburgh (in Allegheny County), and the capitol city, Harrisburg (in Dauphin county) 






Figure APX.D 1 Call for General Meeting 
 
Village Record (Chester, non-Dem) 
Above: Aug 28, 1811. Below: Sept 4, 1811. 
 
 
Figure APX.D 2 County Ticket 
 
Bedford Inquirer (Bedford, non-Dem) 




Figure APX.D 3 Proceedings for General Meeting 
 
Village Record (Chester, non-Dem) 





Figure APX.D 4 Announcements by Candidates 
 
Sky (Cambria, Dem). July 24, 1834. 
 
Figure APX.D 5 Call for County Convention 
(Uniform Delegate System) 
 
 
Mountain Sentinel. (Cambria, Dem). 





Figure APX.D 6 Call for County 
Convention(Graded Delegate System) 
 
 
Warren Mail (Warren, GOP) 
January 27, 1866. 
 
Chester Times (Delaware, GOP) 







Figure APX.D 7 Convention Proceedings (Graded Delegate System) 
 
 
Lancaster Examiner and Herald (Lancaster, GOP) 





Figure APX.D 8 Sample Primary Ballot 
 
Wellsboro Gazette (Tioga, Dem) 




Figure APX.D 9 Call for Primary 
 
Genius of Liberty (Fayette, Dem) 





Figure APX.D 10 Primary Returns with Vote on CSM 
 
 
Johnstown Democrat (Cambria, Dem) 






Figure APX.D 11 Primary Election Rules 
 
Republican and Democrat (Westmoreland, Dem) 





Appendix E: Pennsylvania Case Study: Crawford Democrats 
 
This appendix investigates the oldest known case of the adoption of the direct primary 
by the Crawford Democrats in 1842.60 The nomination-related data for the Crawford County 
Democrats are available only from 1836 to 1878, but the party experienced three transitions of 
the candidate selection method (CSM) during this period. They switched from the uniform 
delegate system to the direct primary in 1842, switched back to the uniform delegate system in 
1850, and adopted the graded delegate system in 1876. The county was typical in that it was 
predominantly Democratic until the early 1850s and then turned majority Republican as many 
other counties in Pennsylvania did over and after the Civil War (Figure APX.E 1). I will first 
summarize the steps leading to the adoption of the direct primary by the Democrats, and then 
discuss the findings and their implications.61  
History of Candidate Nomination Methods 
                                                  
60 Despite the importance of this case, the only previous study that attempted to trace the developments 
leading to the adoption of the direct primary in Crawford County was a senior comprehensive paper written at 
Allegheny College by Robert E. Hunter in 1948. I owe much to Hunter’s work in reconstructing the timeline of 
the reform and locating primary sources. Even the second most detailed article, which is by Giddens, is based 
on his paper, and other short articles added little to what Hunter had found out. (Hunter 1948; Ray 1888; 
Booser 1935; Giddens 1942, 1977a, 1977b; Stewart 1990).  
61 This section is based on the articles from the following newspapers: Crawford Weekly Messenger 





The northwest section of Pennsylvania was the last part of the state to be settled by 
European descendants, and Crawford County, which borders Ohio, was not incorporated until 
1800 (Day 1843; Helmreich 1987). Its population of 31,724 in 1840 ranked above the state 
median, however, at 18th among 54 counties in the state. The mean county population in that year 
was 31,926 (or 26,630 without the two counties containing large cities of Philadelphia and 
Pittsburgh). 
In a remote place like Crawford County, the anti-Federalist sentiment since the time of 
settlement evolved into strong Democratic identification independently of policy debate. Despite 
the late settlement, political parties in the county had a relatively long history of using the 
convention system, dating back to 1805.62 Candidate nomination was the most important 
element of countywide party activities. Tracing the changes in the nomination methods from the 
Democratic-Republican era to the mid-1830s reveals the experience the Democrats of Crawford 
County had prior to the adoption of the direct primary in 1842. 
After the War of 1812, the county Democratic-Republican Party felt less need to control 
the nomination activity as the opposition Federalist Party weakened nationwide. The Democrats 
                                                  
62 1805 is the earliest date for which information on the Democratic-Republican nomination activity in 
Crawford County was available, because the oldest local newspaper in the county, the Crawford Weekly 
Messenger, was established that year. It was the fourth newspaper published west of Pittsburgh and the first in 





replaced its well-disciplined delegate convention system with less formal open-participation 
meetings by the mid-1810s. With the virtual disappearance of the Federalist Party by 1820, the 
Democrats had no need to nominate candidates prior to general elections. Single lists with all 
candidates, regardless of partisan affiliation, voluntary or endorsed, appeared in newspapers. For 
a period in the mid-1820s and early 1830s, no nomination activity took place in Crawford 
County. Newspaper editors did not even put together candidate lists, and only advertisements by 
respective candidates or their supporters were published in newspapers. The backdrop of this 
lack of partisan tension was the dominance of the Democrats in county politics. The party leaders 
felt no legitimacy to carve down the number of candidates. During this period, as many as 10 
candidates competed for a single office in the general election. 
After the National Republican (later Whig) Party took shape in the county in 1832, the 
Democratic Party resumed nominating candidates for all offices every year. With the past 
experiences of nomination by both conventions and mass meetings, controversy over the 
comparative benefits of these two methods erupted and continued until 1836 when the 
Democrats settled on the uniform delegate system. The number of delegates, which had varied 
from one to three in the past, was uniformly set at two for every township. 





“democratic friend” in the newspapers. Yet, this ambiguous boundary allowed the importation of 
illegal voters from other counties by competing factions. The party responded by specifying 
qualifications for participation: being both a resident of the township and an eligible voter, in 
addition to being a Democratic supporter. 
Intraparty Conflict 
The first and most important factor that paved the way for nomination reform was the 
schism within the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party was the majority party in the county, 
winning about 55% of the vote on average during this period. Therefore, securing a Democratic 
nomination seemed the shortest route to winning office, which made the nomination races 
candidate-heavy. However, when the Democrats were split, the Whigs could win. The divided 
election of 1835 proved that this could indeed happen. The memories of the 1835 election were 
still fresh in the early 1840s, and they played an important role in the process of nomination 
reform. 
As it became clear prior to the 1835 election that two candidates from the Democratic 
party, George Wolf and Henry Muhlenberg, would be running for the governorship in 
Pennsylvania, the Democrats in Crawford County shifted their original support for Wolf to 





some key party leaders. George Shellito, a central and active figure at party meetings, was one of 
them. He was highly concerned about the procedural legitimacy of the nomination process, and 
would later propose the direct primary system.63 While the Wolf faction gained power at the 
state level as the election drew near, however, some party activists in the county began to worry 
about being left out of the divvy of patronage after the election, and formed a Wolf faction. With 
the party completely divided, the campaigns degenerated into mudslinging. 
In the general election, the Democratic split allowed the Whigs to win the governorship 
statewide in addition to dominating the county vote. This failure compelled the Democrats to 
reconcile quickly, and the party ran unified campaigns from 1836 to 1838. The Wolf faction 
emerged as a leading force in the county Democratic Party during this period. The leaders of the 
Muhlenberg faction, who were ousted from power, which would later create party schisms over 
other issues, provided motivation for the eventual reform of the nomination system. 
The Whigs and the Volunteer System  
A second factor that paved the road for the introduction of the direct primary was the 
strategy practiced by the opposition Whig Party. This factor became significant through its 
interaction with the first factor, the Democratic intraparty strife. In 1839, dissatisfied Democratic 
                                                  





activists of the minor faction began challenging the party’s mainstream candidates. The leaders 
of mainstream Wolf faction tried to placate the dissidents by accepting their demands, i.e., the 
publication of nomination candidate advertisements in the newspapers, which was a widespread 
practice in many other counties. Four Democratic dissidents declared running against officially 
nominated candidates regardless, criticizing the unjust control of the nomination process by a 
small faction.64 
The Whigs saw this incident as an opportunity to shake up the Democratic dominance in 
county politics. They fueled the Democratic schism by challenging the legitimacy of the party 
practice of winnowing down the number of candidates prior to general election. The Whigs 
ceased nominating any candidates at all, and proposed the “Volunteer System,” encouraging any 
interested individual to run in the general election.65 At the same time, however, the Whigs 
publicly announced support for some Democratic dissidents who had lost their Democratic 
nomination bids and were running against the official Democratic nominees in the general 
election. The Whigs even printed ballots for those Democratic dissidents. This cooperation 
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65 The Whigs in western Pennsylvania promoted this Volunteer System in only those counties where the 
Democratic Party was the ruling force; they used the convention system in all other counties. In Crawford 
County, the Whigs had tried nominating candidates using the regular convention system beginning in 1834, 






between the Whigs and the Democratic dissidents was made possible by some of the Democratic 
dissidents who had originally supported the Federalists (the predecessors of the Whigs), then had 
switched to the Democrats. All the dissidents that year were from the county seat area, and the 
revolt seemed to be based on the grievances of central activists who failed to obtain nomination. 
The splitting of the Democratic force and the formation of an informal alliance between the 
Whigs and the revolting Democrats alerted the Democratic leaders to the potential for a 
repetition of the losses of 1835, and this concern eventually provided an opening for the reform 
of the nomination system. 
In the general election of 1839, the official Democratic candidates won all offices. Still, 
the dissidents performed well not just by garnering Whig votes but also by capturing some 
Democratic votes, alerting the Democratic leadership to the potential effectiveness of their 
opponents’ Volunteer System.66 In passing, I should note that three of the four offices that the 
dissidents ran for were previously appointed and were made elective that year. The Whigs 
promoted the Volunteer System especially for these offices. It suggests that the electoral reform, 
specifically the expansion of the elective offices, provided important momentum for the 
Democratic revolt, changes in Whig’s strategy, and the electoral chaos, which all prepared for the 
                                                  





reform of the Democratic nomination system. 
In 1840 when the turnout for the presidential election jumped up from 54.8 percent in 
1836 to 79.2 percent, the county Democrats won 54.7 percent of the vote on average for all 
offices, while Harrison, the Whig presidential candidate, won the state of Pennsylvania as a 
whole by a narrow margin. The Harrison fever and the bare-knuckles campaign by the Whigs, 
including the provision of alcohol even to the children who attended the meetings, stirred a sense 
of crisis among the Democrats, and silenced the discontent faction for a moment. 
Geographical Representation 
The third factor that made nomination reform an impending issue was the nature of the 
geographic representation embodied in the principle of the convention system. The delegate 
convention system, based on the unit of township, was itself designed to represent sectional 
interests within the county, but on top of this, party leaders attempted to balance the ticket 
geographically so that each section of the county would have a candidate nominated for some 
office. This was done by both informal consensus building among party leaders before primary 
meetings and persuasion of and bargaining with the delegates by them at conventions. 
I categorize Crawford County during this period into five geographic units that provided 





south, and the county seat area around Meadville.67 The county seat area, where the county’s 
population was concentrated, and the north, which included an arterial road to New York, had 
constituted important reservoirs of Democratic support for many years. The east remained 
underdeveloped and its small population limited the influence the region could exert in the 
general elections. In the west, a strong tradition of localism had existed as elsewhere, but the 
construction of the Erie Extension Canal, which started in 1834 and ran through the region, 
contributed to the formation of a stronger regional identity. The construction stimulated 
development and the population increased along the canal line. The Democratic activists in the 
west began to demand their fair share, in ratio to their voting power in the general election, in the 
allocation of nominations for public office in the early 1840s.  
This geographically unequal development (in terms of population and party voters) 
posed a problem for county Democratic candidate nominations. Under the delegate convention 
system, each township was assigned the same number of delegates. This allocation of delegates 
created disconnect between the proportion of delegates each region sent to county conventions 
and the proportion of Democratic votes each region contributed in the general elections. 
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Compared to other regions, in the underdeveloped east there were more townships in proportion 
to population. In the view of Democrats in other regions, this allowed regions that contributed 
relatively little toward Democratic victories in the general elections to be overrepresented at 
conventions, and thus win more nominations than appropriate. 
The sectional antagonism in Crawford County intensified when the number of Assembly 
seats allotted to the county increased from one to two in 1836. In 1841, the nomination of one 
candidate from the east and one candidate from the west led to an eruption of discontent in the 
regions whose favorite sons were not nominated. The discontented criticized the nominations for 
being made by a small inner circle and demanded a reform of nomination system. The party 
leaders responded by holding a meeting just before the election and promised to consider 
nomination reform the following year.68 
Still, a faction in the populous north remained unsatisfied. The faction held a meeting in 
Rockville, a city in the north, and proposed a reform plan that later became a prototype for the 
direct primary system.69 The northern faction particularly attacked the nomination of the 
candidate from the under-populated east and proposed nomination by direct vote of party 
supporters so that the imbalance in voter representation could be rectified and the manipulation 
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of delegate votes at conventions would become impossible. 
The need to focus on the gubernatorial election of 1841, however, deflected the 
smoldering discontent temporarily. The disgruntled who did not win nomination gave priority to 
party unity and refrained from running in the general election. As a result, all Democratic 
nominees won in the general election, but the question of nomination reform remained 
unresolved. 
Failed Convention and Reform 
At a general meeting after the election in 1841, the Democratic Party appointed a 
committee on nomination system reform, which consisted of one delegate from each township.70 
In January 1842, this committee proposed a reform plan that made only small amendments to the 
existing system. It required a majority vote for nominating candidates at conventions, but 
retained the existing practice where each township sent two delegates.71 There was nothing 
drastically new about the majority rule, which was already widely used in other counties. This 
shuffle did not silence the discontent swirling in the party. 
A major revision was made at a general meeting held in February to discuss the reform 
plan. The newly revised graded delegate system adopted this time was intended to solve the 
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problem of distorted representation by allocating delegates in proportion to the electoral 
contribution of each township.72 Under this system, each township was allocated one delegate 
for each 50 Democratic votes they garnered in the last gubernatorial election. This rule change 
increased the maximum number of delegates that one township could send to a convention to 
four, serving the interests of areas growing in Democratic population. Townships with less than 
50 votes were still allocated at least one delegate, and therefore the regions where the 
Democratic supporters were voting in mass remained unsatisfied.73 
The voting instructions given to the delegates by the party voters with respect to the 
Assembly seats were split between the two mainstream and challenger candidates, and the June 
convention became deadlocked.74 Multiple votes were taken and then nullified. The proceedings 
collapsed, and the convention was dismissed in chaos. The sense of crisis produced by facing an 
election without officially nominated candidates was widely felt among the Democrats, and it led 
the party to hold in August another general meeting attended by party supporters from most 
townships.75 At this meeting, nomination reform was the paramount issue. George Shellito, a 
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farmer from the west and one of the central figures of the county Democratic Party in the 1830s, 
proposed a reform plan that would introduce the direct primary system originally devised at the 
Rockville meeting. A committee was set up to discuss Shellito’s proposal. The committee, which 
consisted predominantly of activists from the north and the west, submitted the direct primary 
plan to the convention floor and the plan was adopted unanimously. It was agreed that 
nominations would be made in September under the new system.  
The adoption of the direct primary system eliminated distortion in representation and 
alleviated dissatisfaction of the formerly under-represented regions. Those individuals who were 
involved in creating the institutional design promised to uphold the outcome of the upcoming 
primary elections. The mainstream leaders, who were originally reluctant to introduce any major 
reform, dedicated all their efforts to the realization of the new system in September, hoping that 
the new system would help unite the party. However, those dissidents continued their sabotage 
even after the reform was agreed upon because they could not assure themselves of a nomination 
under the new system. They encouraged the boycott of primary meetings so that they could 
challenge the legitimacy of nomination by claiming that the new system was unpopular and that 
party supporters were not properly represented. These dissenters also cooperated with the Whigs, 





System, i.e. supporting the Democratic dissidents and not nominating their own candidates for 
county offices. They even threatened some Whig members who opposed the tactics and 
attempted to field their own candidates. 
The primary meetings in September were well attended, and the dissident boycott 
initiative had only limited impact in some areas. Party supporters, not only in the west but also in 
the east, participated in greater numbers than they had in June.76 Most of the candidates who had 
competed for nomination in June ran again, and the mainstream candidates won nomination for 
the Assembly and the Prothonotary by large margins. The nomination outcome was the same 
from the previous year for all other offices. Dissident candidates competed for nomination but 
none of them gained more than five percent of the vote that the winners received. In the general 
election, aggravated dissidents ran in six races as bolters. With the Whigs’ support, they won the 
Prothonotary and Sheriff races.77 
The Abolishment of the Direct Primary 
The introduction of the direct primary system did not eliminate candidate revolts but it 
did bring some electoral success to the Democratic Party. Still, the Crawford County Democrats 
abandoned the system in 1850 to switch back to the uniform delegate system. The population in 
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and around the county seat had increased by that time, and the direct vote system had allowed the 
area to capture a disproportionate number of Democratic nominations. The Democrats in the 
west, once the leading proponent of introduction of the direct primary, turned against the system, 
having lost clout due to a decrease in population after the completion of the canal. They showed 
dissatisfaction in the general election of 1849 by supporting candidates of the Whigs. The Whigs 
had become stronger by that time, and therefore the Democratic dissidents could only support 
Whig candidates instead of asking the Whigs to support themselves. This alliance led to a 
disastrous defeat for the Democrats and the party decided to return to the uniform delegate 
system so that they could better balance their tickets in geographic terms and prevent future 
bolting. 
The abolishment of the system was accepted without much debate or resistance. This 
suggests that the system was not deeply rooted in the Democratic voters’ minds as an important 
tool of intra-party democracy. Competing local party leaders who based their claims on the 
principle of fair representation of sectional interests led the process and discourse leading to the 
adoption and abolition of the direct primary. Party voters were regarded as targets of 
mobilization, not as individuals who should be freed from the boss rule (which was the case in 





over time. The top panel plots the total votes in direct primaries with a solid line and the votes 
for Democratic candidates in the general elections with a dashed line.78 The bottom panel plots 
the ratio of primary participants to general election voters. 
One thing to keep in mind is that it is impossible to compare the participation rates 
under the direct primary and that of the delegate system. The number of party voters that 
participated in primary local meetings to select delegates was never reported anywhere. 
Therefore, I cannot trace the impact an introduction of the direct primary had on the degree of 
participation. We can only see how the size of participation changed over time under the direct 
primary. Overall, participation rate did not plunge, but it does not show a clear pattern of 
increase. In 1846, participation to the nomination process superseded that of the general election, 
but it is not clear why. The primary participation rate fell back to below 50% in 1849. In sum, the 
adoption of the direct primary was a practical tool for arbitrating factional strife among party 
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leaders, and thus was not perceived by the party leaders to result in a loss of control over the 
nomination process. The Democrats in Crawford County did not readopt the direct primary until 
compelled by law during the Progressive era. 
Republican Discussion on the Direct Primary 
Before summarizing the findings, we now briefly look at how the Republican party of 
the same county inherited the reform tradition. For them, CSM data are available only after 1865. 
At the time, the party was already using the direct primary, and it was not possible to directly 
track in which year the direct primary was adopted. However, the practice by the Democrats had 
been largely forgotten after the Civil War, and the Republican case was often mentioned as the 
first incident of the adoption of the direct primary by contemporaries in many other counties. 
From those articles and limited accounts written in the twentieth century, we know that the party 
probably adopted the direct primary in 1860. Some limited data suggests that they used the 
uniform delegate system before the reform. Once introduced, the party retained the direct 
primary to the end, but there were at least three popular votes taken among party voters on 
continued use of the system in 1871, 1876, and 1879. The editor of the Republican newspaper, 





county, some one moves that the [CSM] rules be changed forthwith.”79 It suggests that the 
institutional stability on the surface could have been somewhat deceiving. The direct primary 
was maintained not without controversies. 
In 1870, a Republican described the problem they were facing under the direct primary 
system as follows. 
The fight we have each year in our own ranks over nominations is a fiercer battle than 
we wage against the Democracy. The candidates and their friends exhaust their means 
and efforts in the primary canvass, and after a nomination is made it is regarded as 
equivalent to an election, and the general canvass between parties is conducted 
indifferently, and our Republican majorities are not half what they ought to be, in 
ordinary contests.80  
The story very much sounds like the one described by V.O. Key (1956) about the 
situation in the one-party South after the Civil War. The editor also raised the problem of 
minority fraction of the party instead of majority determining the nomination, and suggested lack 
of sectional balance in ticket formation as a source of complaints. The largest problem, however, 
was that the influence of money was felt everywhere, with professional brokers fixing 
candidacies. The article went on, saying, “[A] man must be prepared to spend double the amount 
of his prospective legitimate salary in securing the nomination” to be successful under such a 
state of affairs. However, he did not have any alternative to propose, and the party supporters 
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voted against the abolition of the direct primary almost unanimously in 1871. Five years later, 
another popular vote was taken among three alternatives: some sort of delegate system, the 
Clarion County system, and the direct primary. The numbers of votes cast were 533, 696, and 
1585 respectively, and the direct primary proved its popularity among rank-and-file party voters. 
In 1878, the editor of the Crawford Journal refuted the accusation that the direct 
primary was ruining the Republican Party, denying that any specific section of the county was 
dominating the nomination. He criticized those politicians who “desire to distribute the 
candidates over the county so that each section shall be represented on the ticket.” He continued: 
They desire that a man’s place of abode shall determine whether or not he shall be the 
candidate, while the people desire that the best men be nominated, whether one lives 
east of French Creek, and the other west of that great political divider or whether they 
all live in one township.81 
The convention of balancing the ticket by section was losing to the crude logic of 
choosing winnable candidates. The pro-direct primary faction before the 1879 election raised the 
same point, while the faction against the direct primary brought up again the problem of 
skyrocketing costs that candidates had to bear under the system. 82 As the party advertised the 
$250 reward for reporting evidence of fraud at Republican primaries, we can see that this 
tendency for money-dominated primaries was accompanied by serious corruption. The result of 
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the 1879 popular vote was not found in newspapers, but the direct primary stayed in place. 
The case of the Crawford Democrats in the antebellum era revealed that the nomination 
system was an important issue as early as the 1830s. Intra-party factionalism, bolting, and 
alliance with the opposition party all threatened the party’s electoral prospects. The idea of 
keeping the party united by taming the unsatisfied and nominating winnable candidates 
dominated leaders’ minds and opened the door for reform. Sectional interests and heightened 
interest in the proportionality of representation ruled the direction of the reform. Indeterminate 
chaotic procedures under the delegate system and a failed convention provided direct impetus for 
an urgent reform. At first, the incumbent leaders were reluctant to change the rules drastically, 
but accepted it once it worked. The entire process was a product of power battles among the 
party leaders rather than a result of demand for democratization by the rank-and-file voters. The 
Republican case after the Civil War suggests that the logic of winning elections gradually 
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Appendix F: Pennsylvania Case Study: Tioga Republicans 
 
I chose the Republican Party of Tioga County in the Northeast for a detailed analysis 
from the eight sample cases because of its relative richness in CSM-related information. Tioga 
was a majority Republican county during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The county 
population of 35,097 ranked 34th among the 67 counties in the state in 1870. The state mean 
population of the year was 40,351 excluding the two counties with Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. 
The party started out with the uniform delegate system, switched to the direct primary in 1871, 
and stayed with the system to the end. Although the party went through only one transition of 
CSM, decision-making with respect to the maintenance of the system was observed seven times, 
three times out of which were by popular vote. Party voters overwhelmingly endorsed the usage 
of the direct primary each time. 
The direct primary was adopted at the 1870 county convention as one of the nine 
resolutions made at the end of the gathering. There was no vote taken, and there was no 
discussion on the issue. I therefore had to examine the background information from previous 
years. As early as in 1859, an editorial recognized that the direct primary system was used in 
other counties but it denied the necessity to adopt it as follows: 





elections. . . . In our county the delegate system is considered the better. Both systems 
have defects, but these are more the faults of men than of systems.83  
The simple diffusion of ideas did not seem enough to motivate immediate reform, given that it 
took more than ten years for the party to adopt the system. In the same article, the necessity of a 
strong organization was emphasized: 
Political parties in order to be effective must have a thorough organization, otherwise 
the measures of State or National policy sought to be achieved by it will utterly fail, 
however strong in numbers those who believe in these measures may be. 
The motivation behind such claim was to suppress bolting and promote party unity, as the rest of 
the article clarified. It went on, “Such organization ought to be consistent in all its acts—ought to 
be uniform everywhere and binding on all of its members. And furthermore, it ought to be so 
strong that no disaffected factions or displeased members could defeat or subvert its purposes.” It 
was clear that the paramount task for the Vigilance Committees in each district was to discipline 
the campaigns and prevent dissidents from breaking away. 
Part of the internal conflict may have stemmed from sectional interests. Again, the same 
editorial urged readers “to select the best men to represent them in the County Convention 
without reference to local differences, if such should unhappily exist.” Under the uniform 
delegate system, the nomination tickets printed right under the newspaper banners used to list the 
localities of the nominees every year. This practice ceased once the direct primary was adopted, 
                                                  





which suggests that the party leaders knew that it was a sensitive issue and wanted to avoid 
possible criticism against unbalanced tickets nominated under the direct primary. 
Were aggressive nomination seekers attempting to promote self-interest behind the 
reform? It is unclear, at best. None of the three members of the committee that prepared the 
direct primary proposal won nomination after the reform. Moreover, many of those who won 
nominations under the direct primary were originally against the adoption of the system. They 
became supportive sometime after the introduction. A typical career path of ambitious candidates 
did not seem to have differed much before and after the reform. More than 150 people won Tioga 
County Republican nominations for some office during the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Only 20 of them secured nomination for more than one type of office. There were six nominees 
who proceeded from District Attorney or Associate Judge to the Assembly, and only three of 
them made even further to Congress. Fourteen other candidates were nominated for two different 
offices. These examples are scattered before and after the introduction of the direct primary, and 
no clear impact of the reform can be traced. The rest of candidates won nominations for just one 
office, and repeated nominations for the same office were relatively rare. 
We must consider the issue of competitiveness of the nomination races from two 





nomination seekers per office seat declined during the 15 years preceding the reform. This 
pattern implies that a decreasing trend of competitors might have soothed the fear that the 
adoption of the direct primary, based on plurality rule, would result in birth of extreme minority 
nominees. On the other hand, the problem of lengthy multiple balloting had plagued the 
Republicans for a decade leading up to the reform. The nomination for the office of Sheriff took 
21 and 24 ballots respectively in 1858 and 1861. Battles over the Associate Judgeship in 1866 
and the County Treasurership in 1869 required 15 and 17 ballots respectively to settle. Although 
there was no record of conventions falling apart, the party clearly struggled in arbitrating 
repeatedly between a few stubborn competitors. 
The last case of lengthy balloting for the Treasurership in 1869 led to another, less 
frequent but probably most dire, problem: bolting. The person, who had lost the nomination after 
17 ballots, ran as an independent in the general election. Another person, who had served as 
Prothonotary for five two-year terms since 1854 but did not even compete for party nomination 
that year, also ran as an independent for the office of Prothonotary. Both of them won, which 
could have been the direct imperative behind the 1870 reform. For the latter bolter, the party may 
have attempted to block him from serving another consecutive term, but the name recognition 





voters directly in the general election. The first bolter who won the Prothonotaryship rejoined the 
Republican nomination race in 1872 and won the primaries six times in total. These incidents 
suggest that the party could not penalize those who bolted. Those who could expect popular 
support were going to run and win in the general election, with or without party nomination. 
From the perspective of the party leaders, letting those prospective winners win nomination was 
rational and efficient. The direct primary in this case functioned as a good and easy screening 
process. Another incident of bolting in 1879 proves the point. A candidate who lost Republican 
nomination for Sheriff ran in the general election. He stole some votes from both parties, but did 
not win. It was not easy for bolters to win without support from the opposition party. This case 
shows that the party could not prevent bolting, but the direct primary enabled the party to select a 
winnable candidate. 
So what happened to the system after its original adoption? As early as the next year of 
the reform, according to an editorial, there was an attempt at the county convention to abolish the 
direct primary, which failed. The editorial criticized the anti-direct primary delegates for seeking 
control over nomination even though their districts embraced only small number of Republican 
voters. The editor insisted that party voters preferred the existent system, “by which each vote 





At the 1872 county convention, a switch to the graded delegate system was proposed, 
and it was resolved to put it to a popular vote next year. An editorial in 1873 pointed out the 
distortion of representation the proposed graded system would cause, and emphasized, again, the 
principle of “one man, one vote.” The proposal was defeated by a huge margin. Next year, the 
rules to govern qualifications to vote in the direct primary were fixed as follows:  
[T]he persons permitted to vote at the primary or nominating elections under this system 
shall be Republicans who are legally qualified vote[r]s in said election district, and who 
vote[d] the Republican ticket at the last preceding general election at which they voted 
and were entitled to vote.84 
Setting rules after the implementation of the direct primary implies that no such rules were 
necessary under the delegate system, and that voter participation, legitimate or illegitimate, 
increased since the adoption of the direct primary. It may have been more a product of 
mobilization by candidates than enthusiasm of the voters, however, since concern over 
intensification of campaign activity by candidates was addressed at the 1874 county convention.  
Another attempt to abolish the direct primary was made at the 1876 convention. The 
anti-direct primary delegates criticized delegates from urban districts for imposing the popular 
vote system upon rural areas and proposed replacing the direct primary with the graded delegate 
system, which, according to them, would be a good incentive for local leaders to expand and 
mobilize supporters back home and, in turn, would lead to an increase in apportioned delegates. 
                                                  





They also pointed out that the problem that the direct primary was it allowed minority candidates 
to win nomination. To restore the majority rule and retain some proportionality in representation, 
they argued that the graded system, which combined the apportionment principles of the upper 
and lower houses of Congress, would be the best. Finally, they reminded the floor that “the 
object of a convention is to name the strongest man” but the direct primary “does not enable a 
party to nominate such men.”85 
To this, delegates from urban districts responded that they were in support of the direct 
primary now, but did vote against its adoption when it was first introduced, and thus implied that 
the system was not introduced nor was being promoted by the urban delegates who thought it 
would benefit them. They claimed that they supported the system now because the people 
supported it overwhelmingly. There was a procedural objection to changing the CSM without 
consulting the people, and it was decided to put it to popular vote next year. The party voters 
again upheld the continued use of the direct primary overwhelmingly. 
In 1879, the county convention saw another attempt to overthrow the direct primary and 
revert to a graded version of delegate system. This time the anti-direct primary delegates pressed 
the cause by basing their argument on the principle of majority rule. They claimed that under the 
direct primary the nominee got quite a smaller vote than that of all other candidates combined. 
                                                  





However, the legitimacy question of changing the CSM at convention, not by popular vote, stood 
in the way until too many delegates left to meet the quorum. The issue was not reintroduced at 
the convention next year. There was one more popular vote cast on the maintenance of the direct 
primary in 1887, in which the people once again supported the system overwhelmingly. 
Meanwhile, the Republican Party continued winning election most of the time under the direct 
primary. 
From all these findings, we know that winning elections by maintaining the party unity 
was the main concern behind the adoption of the direct primary. Sectional conflicts, lengthy 
balloting, and occasional bolting all served as catalysts, just as they did in the case of the 
Crawford Democrats. While those opposed to the system emphasized the importance of the 
majority rule in proposing the graded system as an alternative, those who defended the system 
increasingly employed the logic of “one person, one vote.” By 1871, the direct primary had been 
supported by large margin when put to popular votes in other counties. In Tioga County, the 
Republican committee first instructed that the return judges of the direct primary may change the 
mode of the CSM at their meeting if they found it necessary, but CSMs change only by popular 
vote soon became the norm. Figure APX.F 1 shows how the size and ratio of participation 





remained high on average. In sum, it seems that once the popular vote system was introduced, it 


















1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905
year
Presidential Vote Gubernatorial Vote
Max Vote in DP






1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905
year
Max DP Vote Ratio to Pres Max DP Vote Ratio to Gov





Appendix G: Pennsylvania Case Study: Sample Cases From Four Regions 
 
Aside from the Tioga Republican case addressed in Appendix F, all the sample 
county-parties had only scattered anecdotes available, which were not enough to reconstruct the 
entire picture of the path leading to any reform. Still, investigating the rough outlines of reforms 
in each county party and comparing some data across the sample help to understand how the 
county-parties handled the search for the best CSM. 
West 
The Westmoreland Democrats in the West used the graded delegate system as early as 
the 1840s. They were one of the two county-parties in the sample to adopt the direct primary 
before the Civil War, in 1850, but no detailed information on this transition has survived to date. 
The party returned to some sort of delegate system for two years in 1857, returned to the direct 
primary in 1859, reverted once again to the graded system from 1885 to 1886, and finally settled 
with the direct primary in 1887. Popular votes on CSM choice were conducted four times, in 
1854, 1869, 1881, and 1886; in all the direct primary was supported by a large margin.  
An editorial in 1843 is the only source of information on the discourse surrounding the 





for some time and that the Crawford County system would be appreciated if introduced. It said 
the party leaders could “not conceive a plan more likely to counteract the charge of factional 
influence or intrigue, and secure harmony and concert of action; because it will induce a greater 
attendance of the qualified voters in every district. This is what we would call putting the saddle 
on the right horse—the people.”86 Obviously, maintaining party unity was a large concern here, 
and participation by party voters at a higher rate was expected to boost this goal. 
The Republicans of Warren, in the West, switched from the uniform to the graded 
system in 1866, as discussed above, and adopted the Clarion County system in 1886. It took 
almost 20 years before the 1886 reform took place since a nomination method by direct vote was 
first proposed at the 1867 county convention. At that time, the party newspaper remained neutral, 
arguing that it was the voters who were supposed to decide. At the same time, it reminded 
readers of the fact that in Crawford County where the direct primary was used, the Republicans 
were “more distracted by faction and personal feuds than other on this section,” and emphasized 
the paramount importance of preserving “harmony” within the party.87 A “spirited debate” took 
place at the 1868 convention, although no details are available, and the direct primary was voted 
down against the graded system in use at that time. 
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At the 1885 county convention, the adoption of the direct primary was proposed, but the 
details of the institutional design were left to a special committee. An editorial criticized that the 
direct primary would make it easy for large cities to dominate nomination while the Clarion 
County system had a “tendency to break up the party and create dissatisfaction.”88 Avoiding the 
troublesome overrepresentation of the urban area and the maintenance of party unity were clearly 
at the center of concern. In 1886, the party ended up adopting the latter system based on most 
recent Presidential vote. The call for the primaries and the convention of that year asserted, “[i]f 
every Republican would only attend the Primary election, and see that good men are placed upon 
our ticket, no dissatisfaction need arise in the future, and success will attend our efforts.”89 
Although, the problem of twisted outcomes resulting from allocating the popular vote winner all 
the Presidential votes in the township from the previous election (such as the popular vote 
winner losing in the final tally) was pointed out as early as in 1887, the Clarion County system 
stayed to the end. Meanwhile, the system did not seem to have greatly motivated voter 
participation. The same 1887 editorial grumbled that, given this problem of twisted outcome, the 
old delegate system would have been just as apt to represent the majority fairly as the Clarion 
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County system if men were too lazy to go out and vote.90 
Central 
The Cambria Democrats in the Central region started out with the uniform graded 
system, adopted the direct primary in 1881, and switched to the graded system in 1893. The 
factional conflict was already present as early as 1852 when the division of office nominations 
between the two factions was proposed at the convention. The necessity of “a fair distribution of 
the offices,” i.e., balancing the ticket geographically, was again claimed by some delegates at the 
1861 convention.91  The reality was, however, the two major city areas kept dominating 
nominations before, during, and after the direct primary period. Thus, it was a power struggle 
between the two cities rather than one between urban and rural areas, and thus the proportionality 
of representation was not the central interest. 
The most striking feature was the repeated indeterminate lengthy balloting the party 
experienced under the uniform delegate system during the 1870s. The list of outstanding number 
of votes needed until the nomination was determined was as follows: 22 for Treasure in 1875, 53 
for Sheriff in 1876, 25 for Prothonotary in 1877, and 18 for Register and Recorder, and 57 for 
Treasurer in 1878. In 1879, the county convention stumbled on sheriff nomination for two days, 
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and dissolved, after 74 ballots, without nominating the entire ticket. Three contenders stayed in 
race after marginal candidates all dropped out, and delegates would not switch votes for someone 
to gain majority. The editorial insisted that there was an attempt to prevent nomination.92 This 
kind of deadlock may have contributed to the eventual acceptance of the direct primary based on 
the quick and decisive plurality rule. The convention was later reassembled to avoid facing the 
general election without nomination. 
In 1880, the first popular vote on the CSM occurred, and the direct primary was voted 
over the uniform and graded systems. The new system was to be implemented from 1881. It is 
worth noting that there was a consensus on the procedure to change the CSM only by popular 
vote, while delegates still made nominations in 1880. Three additional popular votes were taken 
on the question of continuing the direct primary during the following decade, and people 
remained supportive of the system. There is no background information on the transition to the 
graded system in 1893. Interestingly, however, the convention of the same year decided that the 
delegates would not be instructed. It was right after the Democrats experienced a huge electoral 
plunge statewide in 1892, and this dramatic fall in party support may have made practicing the 
direct primary pointless and too costly.  
                                                  





The Blair Republicans went through five transitions: the uniform system to the direct 
primary in 1869, to the graded system in 1871, to the direct primary in 1877, to the graded 
system in 1880, and to the direct primary in 1896. Right after the 1869 reform, an editorial 
suggested that a change in the nomination system owed to the “flagrant abuse” of the uniform 
delegate system. However, the editor equally blamed the direct primary for its tendency to 
produce fraud and increase the expense of a contest. He was most critical about the plurality rule 
of the system, which gave birth to nominees with minority support. He proposed the graded 
delegate system instead, naming it “Blair County system,” which would “secure justice to every 
section of the county” and instill “a local pride to bring to the polls all legal voters” belonging to 
the party. The system was adopted, and the party returned to a delegate system for a while.93 
No detail information is available for the rest of the reforms. The popular vote on the 
CSM in 1879 is the only case among eight sample county parties in which the direct primary was 
defeated, although by a narrow margin. This time, the vote was split between the two major city 
areas, implying possible existence of some sectional strife. During the period between 1880 and 
1895 under the graded delegate system, the party suffered from lengthy balloting for the office of 
Sheriff occasionally (15, 14, and 10 ballots in 1888, 1891, and 1894 respectively). The party 
adopted new rules in 1888 that made voters cast two separate ballots at local primaries, one for 
                                                  





choosing delegates and the other for nomination instructions. The rules apparently did not help 
prevent indecisive balloting at conventions. The direct primary was adopted at the 1895 
convention without any discussion at all. 
Northeast 
The Northumberland Democrats were another county party that adopted the direct 
primary during the antebellum era. The party, which started out with the uniform delegate system, 
switched to the graded delegate system in 1834, adopted the direct primary in 1853, reverted to 
the graded delegate system in 1872, went back to the direct primary in 1883, and finally settled 
with the graded delegate system in 1886. The direct primary was first introduced by a resolution 
at the delegate convention in 1852. There were two popular votes on the CSM in the 1880s, first 
of which endorsed the direct primary in 1885, but newspaper issues with the results of the second 
vote were missing. Judging from the fact that the party reverted to the graded delegate system the 
following year, the vote may have been another rare example of the popular vote repealing the 
direct primary. 
Very limited information is available for this county party. At the 1836 convention, a 
resolution passed which signified that “any candidate present placed before this convention for 





may be formed this day by this convention.”94 It was right after the divide-and-lose election of 
1835, and the party was obviously concerned about the possible return of bolting and the breakup 
of the party. An editorial in 1845, which read:  
The delegate system is a system of machinery, which the democratic party has adopted, 
to concentrate the power of the party and to carry out the will of the party, by uniting on 
such candidates as may be selected by a majority of the delegates who represent the 
party and the party only.95 
This suggests that party unity was still the central issue of the party in the 1840s. 
The graded system the party adopted in 1886 was irregular in that two delegates sent 
from each district were to cast the last Presidential vote cast for the Democratic candidate. The 
delegates did not have to be instructed, and were to repeat voting until a nomination is made by 
majority vote. In 1896, an attempt to make giving instruction to delegates mandatory was made, 
but the rule never seemed to have been put into practice. 
Southeast 
The Cumberland Democrats in the Southeast went through five transitions, but it was 
another case with very limited background information. The party started out with the uniform 
system, adopted the direct primary in 1869, switched back to the uniform system in 1872, 
adopted the direct primary again in 1875, switched to the graded system in 1884, and finally 
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settled with the direct primary in 1890. The only information at hand is the criticism of the 1875 
reform made by the Republicans of the same county. The editorial slashed Democrats’ direct 
primary by saying “So disastrously has it operated to the interests of the Democratic party, that 
men are now anxiously inquiring how and why such iniquitous business was ever ‘set up’ against 
the unsophisticated.” The article asserted as follows; 
[The reform was effectuated] by the means of the Democratic press in the county, who 
expected to make large gains by extortionate prices placed upon the candidates’ 
announcements in the paper, and by printing circulars, cards and tickets at prices greatly 
above the rates for ordinary job work… So great has been the demand from the card 
board manufacturers for those small cards, industriously circulated by candidates, that 
parties from the city, representing paper houses, have come all the way to Carlisle 
purposely to look after this branch of trade.96  
It pointed out that there had been numerous announcements by candidates in Democratic 
newspapers, for which the charges “have been five or six prices above the ordinary rates of 
advertising.” The editorial emphasized how the system hurt the candidates. Another aspect 
pointed out by the same article was that the Democratic “Ring” supported the adoption of the 
direct primary because 
[t]hey found that the manipulation of the Convention was frequently uncertain. A man 
might be elected drunk and vote in Convention sober. This class was so very uncertain 
that the Ring thought to strike at the root of the evil, and by making the primary voters 
drunk, and keeping them so until after election, to accomplish the election of its 
favorites. 
Even after accounting for the bias partisan newspapers embodied, the article still provided a 
                                                  





unique story among the eight sample cases.  
I wrap up this appendix with case of the Lancaster Republicans. The party followed the 
golden path (theoretically) in moving from the uniform system to the graded system in 1856, and 
then on to the direct primary system in 1867. The adoption of the direct primary was determined 
at a special convention called for the specific purpose of discussing CSM reform. The goal of the 
convention and reform, as stated by a delegate, was to help the party “to stand together.”97 Some 
insisted that any change to the nomination method should be effected by popular vote, but a roll 
call was taken among the delegates that resulted in the overwhelming endorsement of the 
adoption of the direct primary. Some delegates gave short speeches as they voted, declaring that 
they had been in principle against the direct primary but now were supporting it because the 
majority of the party voters were in support of the system. 
One editorial discussing the unexpected effect of the reform is available for this county 
party. The article starts as following: 
The great danger in making a new law is in not knowing what its remote effect may be. 
The bad results which may follow a supposed remedial act are often worse than the 
evils to be corrected. This has been illustrated in the working of our Crawford county 
system.98 
It continues that the direct primary was introduced “upon the theory that a direct vote of the 
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people would break up corruption, political rings and save us from having objectionable men 
chosen to rule over us.” However, “[a]s everyone knows this has not been the result.” It points 
out that rings had increased, more money was being spent than ever in illegitimate ways, and no 
better men had been selected to fill the offices. Under the direct primary, candidates had to 
appeal directly to the people by buying out their votes. The system was responsible for inducing 
candidates into corruption and thus was to be blamed by the editor. To him, it seemed that “what 
was intended to work good, has really brought about evil.” The system betrayed some leaders’ 
expectations, but it probably did not look that bad to the regular voters. The system survived 






Appendix H: Pennsylvania Missing Data 
 
The most important variable in this study is the CSM each county party used each year. 
In this appendix, I address the missing data problem of the CSM data. (Other variables that were 
collected from the same local newspapers suffer the same problem of missing data to a similar 
extent.) One of the following three conditions caused missing data for a certain 
county-party-year: 1) no relevant newspaper was published, 2) one or more relevant newspapers 
were published but no copies survived, or 3) the copies survived but relevant information was 
not published. The Pennsylvania government started to publish the list of newspapers published 
in each county by party affiliation only in 1888, and there is no systematic list of partisan and 
non-partisan newspapers for the earlier period. Therefore, it was often impossible to tell whether 
the first or the second reason caused the missing data. 
The third category applies when the copies of relevant party newspapers existed and 
survived,99 no issue was missing for the period the information was expected to be published, 
but no relevant records were printed at least in a regular recognizable way. This category is 
further divided into two subcategories: 3a) nominations were not made, and 3b) nominations 
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were made but information was not printed. In the former case, for example, a party county 
committee would explicitly announce that the party would not make any nomination for the year. 
It was most likely an uncompetitive situation in which the party was too weak to have any 
prospect to win in the general election. However, these were relatively rare cases. The latter 
pattern happened when the party did not (want to) print the record even though they held a 
convention or committee meeting and made nominations. It is not easy to tell in most cases why 
nothing was printed, but there were, in general, two broad patterns at the opposite extremes: 3b-i) 
there was very low interest in the nomination, or 3b-ii) the nomination was very controversial. 
An example for 3b-i, when there was no competition over nomination or little attention 
was paid, party leaders decided it was not worth holding the convention, and the county 
committee picked candidates behind a curtain. Under circumstances like this, tickets might 
appear in the newspapers all of a sudden right before the general election, or they might never 
appear in the newspapers. In the latter case, only one candidate for each office seat ran in the 
general election so that one could tell there still was some selection process occurring. At the 
other extreme was 3b-ii cases, where the party leaders decided not to print the proceedings and 
other related information because there was extremely intense and divisive competition, the 





animosities by printing the details. We can often learn about these cases from the letters or 
articles printed in the opposition party’s newspapers. Given all these diverse patterns, it is not 
appropriate to classify the third category (the copies survived but relevant information was not 
published) as “no nomination activity” or “no county convention.”  
Overall, the vast majority of missing data for this study was in the form of missing 
newspaper copies. To some extent, it is an unavoidable issue when dealing with historical 
records. Still, the missing data problem should not be left unattended, because, depending on the 
possible selection bias the data generation process embodies, the absence can cause serious bias 
in the estimates I obtained in the statistical analysis with the observed data. This poses a difficult 
problem especially when the data is missing in the dependent variable, which is the case for this 
study. The candidate selection method is the dependent variable, which cannot be substituted by 
any proxy variable. Normally, multiple imputation might be an option when handling the missing 
data problem (King et al. 2001; Allison 2002; Honaker and King 2010), but this is not the case 
with the CSM variable. It is because 1) again, it is the dependent variable, 2) the missing rate is 
too high, and 3) in a strict sense, there is no appropriate way to multiple-impute time-series panel 
data. On top of this, those observations missing in the CSM data are often missing in some 





primary sources. Since there is no easy statistical solution to the problem, we should look into 
the missing data structure carefully, and keep it in mind before moving on to the regression 
analysis. 
Since there were elections for at least a few offices every year, the county conventions 
were held every year and thus the nominations were made every year. Therefore, for the period 
of 1801-1906 with two major parties from each of all 67 counties, the possible maximum number 
of observations is 12,470, in theory. (This number is smaller than 106 x 67 x 2 = 14,202 because 
there were only 35 counties in 1801 and the rest of 32 counties were gradually established one by 
one over the period from 1803 to 1878.) However, two parties from Philadelphia are completely 
excluded from the study and five county-parties (one Democratic and four non-Democratic) are 
entirely missing in observation. With all the missing observations subtracted, the actual number 
of observations in the dataset comes down to 4,889. On average, observations were available for 
37 year units for each panel (county party), which amounts to the missing rate at about .60. Table 
APX.H 1 shows the number of observations by party. The two major parties are evenly 
represented in the entire data set. However, when we look at each nomination rule, the difference 
is easily recognized. While the Democratic Party has more delegate system observations, the 





parties combined, the uniform delegate system is the dominant category providing about 44% of 
the entire observations. The graded delegate system is the second largest with a share of 35%. 
The Clarion County system occupies less than 2%, while the direct primary’s share is slightly 
below 20%. 
The high missing rate is partly due to the paucity of data in the early period. The 
missing data problem is most severe during the earlier times, 1800 to 1830, and the information 
availability improves by the end of the Civil War. The time trends of observation counts (total, 
Democrat, and non-Democrat) are displayed in Figure APX.H 1. Overall, all three lines show a 
simple upward trend, which implies more county-parties printed their nomination activities in 
newspapers over time, and the survival rate of the copies have increased, especially after the 
Civil War, too. The decline in the number of observations after 1890 was not because of missing 
newspaper copies but was due to the rapid commercialization and de-politicization of the 
newspapers. For the antebellum era, the Democratic Party offers observations in more counties 
each year compared to the non-Democratic category. After the Civil War, the Republicans start to 
produce consistently more observations than the Democrats do. When limited to the four decades 
from 1861 to 1900, during which the composition of the two major parties remained the same 





down to 3,005 (Table APX.H 2). With the maximum possible number of observation being 5,280 
for this period, the missing rate comes down to .43. This is an improvement from .60, but the 
missing rate is still very high. 
Figure APX.H 2 visualizes the missing data structure. The year is plotted on the x-axis, 
and counties are listed along y-axis in the alphabetical order from the bottom to the top, letting 
each county occupy one horizontal row. The initials of each CSM are used for plotting: “U” for 
the uniform delegate system, “G” for the graded delegate system, “C” for the Clarion County 
system, and “D” for the direct primary. A quick glance suggests that the Republicans fare better 
in yielding observations during the post-Civil War period compared to the Democrats.  
Finally, in an attempt to model the mechanism causing the missing data for the period of 
1861 to 1900, I ran a logit regression with a missing indicator for the CSM observation as the 
dependent variable. Philadelphia County is not counted as missing. The included independent 
variables are, lagged mean vote share in gubernatorial and presidential elections, years from 
1858, distance from Harrisburg (in kilometers), and population density. Separate regressions 
were run to see if any variable worked in different ways for each party. Results shown in Table 
APX.H 3 suggest that the Republican newspapers were less likely to be missing when the party 





found. Interestingly, the distance to the state capitol, Harrisburg, where the copies were archived 
seemed to have mattered for both parties. The further away the county party was from Harrisburg, 
the less likely were the information was to survive.100 One might think that the population 
density is a good proxy for the degree of urbanization and the size of newspaper circulation, but 
its coefficient was insignificant for both parties.  
  
                                                  
100 Some may argue that many newspaper copies were archived in Philadelphia first before they were moved 
to the archives in Harrisburg or were turned into microfilms. Running the same regressions with the distance to 
Harrisburg replaced with the distance to Philadelphia did not change the outcome for other variables while the 





Table APX.H 1 Number of Observations by Party and CSM, 1801-1906 
 
 
Table APX.H 2 Number of Observations by Party and CSM, 1861-1900 
 
 
Table APX.H 3 Modeling Missingness 
 
  
       Total       2,147      1,703         91        948       4,889 
                                                                     
non-Democrat       1,018        770         36        620       2,444 
    Democrat       1,129        933         55        328       2,445 
                                                                     
       Party     Uniform     Graded    Clarion         DP       Total
                                   csm
       Total         995      1,230         67        713       3,005 
                                                                     
non-Democrat         538        582         26        478       1,624 
    Democrat         457        648         41        235       1,381 
                                                                     
       Party     Uniform     Graded    Clarion         DP       Total
                                   csm
                    Standard errors in parentheses.
                          * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                       
  N_Clust                                132         66         66    
  N                                     5,222      2,611      2,611   
  R2_P                                   0.09       0.12       0.07   
                                       (0.628)    (0.840)    (0.908)  
            Constant                   2.027**    3.232**     0.606   
                                       (0.226)                        
            Republican                  -0.298                        
                                       (0.002)    (0.004)    (0.002)  
            Population Density          0.001      0.004      0.001   
                                       (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.002)  
            Distance from Harrisburg   0.004**     0.004*    0.005**  
                                       (0.007)    (0.009)    (0.010)  
            Years from 1858            -0.048**   -0.056**   -0.043** 
                                       (0.011)    (0.015)    (0.015)  
  csm_miss  Lagged Vote Share (%)      -0.037**   -0.065**    -0.012  
                                                                       
                                        Pooled   Republican  Democrat 
                                                                       


























Figure APX.H 2 Pennsylvania CSM Data Structure 
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